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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Environmental challenges such as climate change continue to threaten human existence globally. 
This has necessitated renewed focus on some existing policies that by design or otherwise may 
counter global efforts at addressing these challenges. Various engineering solutions have been 
championed while economic and social development tools have focused on using various policy 
instruments to reduce the concentration of emissions in the atmosphere. One of such policies is 
the fuel subsidy policy and various arguments for and against this policy exists. While some 
support the policy as it enhances access to energy and promotes welfare, others argue that it 
places budgetary burden on the economy. More so, studies that have focused on policy 
instruments have employed different approaches. However, those that focused on addressing 
environmental questions in terms of promoting green growth are very scarce. This study, thus, 
investigated the environmental consequences of fuel subsidy removal in Nigeria using an 
economy-wide modelling approach. It adapted the energy-environment (E2) dynamic CGE 
model of the Nigerian economy that is based on the Partnership and Economic Policy (PEP) 
recursive dynamic CGE model. Furthermore, the study simulated three scenarios namely the 
partial removal (Simulation1), gradual removal (Simulation 2) and complete removal 
(Simulation 3) of import tariff on imported refined oil. It assessed the impact of the various 
simulation strategies on carbon emissions (as a measure of environmental quality) in Nigeria. 
The dataset employed is the re-aggregated version of the 2006 Nigerian Social Accounting 
Matrix (SAM) that specially accounted for petroleum subsidy. The re-aggregation was to make it 
more compatible with the main objective of the study. This is necessary since the 2006 SAM has 
different components. The outcome of the simulation analysis showed that reduction in carbon 
emission occurred only when subsidy was partially removed, but marginally increased with 
gradual removal and complete removal. This suggests that even though the removal of subsidy 
can reduce emission, it is not sufficient in the long term especially as there is yet to be a viable 
“green” alternative to petrol in Nigeria. Therefore, subsidy removal will only make consumers 
reduce consumption initially and then increases later in order to meet their energy demands since 
there is no better environmentally friendly alternative to petrol. It is recommended that subsidy 
on petrol be targeted towards enhancing the commercialisation of renewable energy sources or 
appropriate technology (such as fuel blending) which are still not affordable for some 
households. This will further enhance the development of green growth practices and then be 
supported with relevant financing options in order to make it sufficient for driving environmental 
quality in Nigeria.   
 
 
Keywords: Fuel subsidy removal, Environmental quality, Dynamic computable equilibrium 
model 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background to the Study 
The need to ensure environmental sustainability as an integral component of sustainable 
development has necessitated renewed focus and attention on the interaction between energy 
consumption and the environment. A key factor attributable to this is the realisation that 
some existing policies may by design, stand in the way of implementing the three pillars of 
sustainable development (economic prosperity, social equity and environmental 
sustainability). This is in addition to the call for a new growth model that will follow a low-
carbon growth path (“green growth” as against “brown growth”) to ensure that the economy 
is not growing at the expense of the well-being and health of the populace. Also, the impact 
of various developmental policies on environmental quality has become an increasingly 
important concern in public policy agenda globally (Al-Amin, Hamid and Chamhuri, 2008). 
The inclusion of environmental sustainability in the newly inaugurated Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs) which represents the modified Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs) equally reflects the importance of supporting growth strategies that enhances a clean 
environment. 
 
Moreover, the energy sector is one of the sectors identified to play a key role in driving the 
environmental sustainability agenda. Other similar sectors include the transport and 
agricultural sector. The importance of energy in growth and development process makes 
energy policy an integral component of an economy‟s plan. Energy services, thus, help to 
foster economic and social development by increasing productivity and facilitating income 
generation and employment (Ajayi, 2009; Sambo, 2010). It plays a central role in 
accelerating growth and development of any nation with its use in communication, 
transportation, industrialisation, health care delivery and services among others (Sambo, 
2010; Akinyemi, Ogundipe and Alege, 2014). In addition, energy is a major source of 
revenue for many countries particularly, oil-producing nations. In Nigeria, the share of oil in 
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total export peaked at 97 percent in 1984 while its share in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
had been between 25 percent and 30 percent (National Bureau of Statistics (NBS), 2012; 
Siddig, Aguiar, Grethe, Minor and Walmsley, 2014). This continued to rise until recent times 
when it began to decline due to the economic recession in 2007 and 2008, conflict in the 
Niger Delta Region and a number of other factors. Also, the sale of crude oil contributes 
between 67 percent and 75 percent to government revenue and about 96 percent of foreign 
exchange earnings in Nigeria while also providing employment (Adenikinju, 2009; CBN 
Statistical Bulletin, 2014).   
 
Furthermore, given that the energy sector is instrumental to economic growth; it has been 
identified as a key contributor to increased concentration of Green House Gas (GHG) 
emission in the atmosphere. This has resulted in environmental concerns such as climate 
change. This relationship between energy consumption and the environment continues to 
receive extensive attention in the literature over the years. The emission of carbon dioxide 
(CO2) is one of the means through which the energy sector influences the environment.  
Efforts have been made by policy-makers and industry experts towards addressing the 
environmental consequences of energy production and consumption. This involves exploring 
different physical options and use of policy instruments to address the challenge of 
environmental degradation, particularly climate change. Some of these options and 
instruments include introduction of energy taxes, carbon taxes, provision of energy subsidies 
(designed to promote technological innovation and research), substitution of carbon-intensive 
energy for better alternatives (e.g. renewables), carbon capture, carbon sinks, carbon storage, 
reform of fossil fuel subsidies, among others (Stavins, 1997; UNEP, 2004; Goulder and 
Parry, 2008; Adenikinju, Omenka and Omisakin, 2012; Akinyemi, Alege, Ajayi, 
Amaghionyediwe and Ogundipe, 2015). However, some policies have been identified to be 
at odds with the achievement of environmental objectives, one of which is the policy of 
energy subsidy. 
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Energy subsidy as a pricing policy represents a policy tool that government employs to 
actualise the objective of enhanced energy access for sustained growth. It is designed to 
make energy cheaper and more accessible for the people by lowering energy prices, 
especially for the low-income earners. This policy is aimed at achieving certain economic 
and welfare objectives such as the strengthening of industrial growth, expanding domestic 
consumption and supporting energy access for low-income households. This is done by 
government placing energy price below equilibrium market price and paying the difference 
so as to protect households from volatile oil price shocks and fluctuations at the international 
market. The justifications for energy subsidies by policy makers is that it contributes to 
economic growth, poverty alleviation and the security of energy supply (International Energy 
Agency (IEA), Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and World Bank Joint Report, 2010). 
They are particularly necessary in periods of high oil prices and other economic shocks as 
they make energy products cheaper. It can also be very helpful in addressing market failures 
and inadequate redistribution of income to achieve social and welfare objectives. Thus, 
energy subsidies if well-designed and targeted could be useful in switching from traditional 
energy sources which are not environmentally friendly, to modern energy sources considered 
to be more environmentally friendly.  
 
However, despite the advantages presented by the adoption of energy subsidies, they also 
have some negative effects on the economy. This includes creation of economic and 
environmental concerns which can alter growth and development processes. These subsidies, 
which are large payments from government budgets, impose fiscal pressure on government 
finances, resulting into many countries attempting to reduce these subsidies. Countries such 
as Egypt and India considered the prospects of reforming energy subsidies as Egypt‟s energy 
subsidy was about 14 percent of GDP (The Economist, 2014a). The Economist (2014b) also 
stated that Indonesia increased fuel price by 44 percent to cut its annual subsidy bill which 
amounted to US$20 billion (2013 figures). Same scenario was experienced in Malaysia and 
Nigeria. Furthermore, these subsidies results in deadweight loss, that is, loss of economic 
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efficiency that can be as a result of the equilibrium of a good or service not been pareto 
optimal (Davies, 2013). Studies such as Jones (2011), Anand, Coady, Mohommad, Thakoor 
and Walsh (2013) and Umar and Umar (2013) showed empirical evidence that suggests that 
subsidising fuel products does not necessarily lead to equitable distribution of income. As 
pointed out by Bao and Sawdon (2011), subsidies on fossil fuel-based energy tend to be 
regressive in nature with the relatively well-off, who tend to consume larger portions of 
energy, benefiting disproportionately from the subsidy. 
 
Furthermore, energy subsidies as part of energy policy also affect environmental quality as 
the continued production, consumption and distribution of fossil fuel leads to increased 
concentration of GHG emission in the atmosphere. These emissions significantly impact the 
environment (Alege and Ogundipe, 2013). The argument is that subsidising fuel consumption 
will lead to higher levels of consumption, since energy prices are cheaper, which increases 
emission levels thereby having implications for efforts at fighting climate change impact 
experienced globally (Bao and Sawdon, 2011). This is the channel of transmission. A number 
of empirical studies analysed the relationship between energy consumption and carbon 
emissions for different countries and regions and found a positive relationship (Ang, 2007; 
Apergis and Payne, 2010; Lotfalipur, Falahi and Ashena, 2010; Shahbaz et al., 2010; Alam et 
al., 2011; Alege, Adediran and Ogundipe, 2015). The argument is that fossil fuels from 
energy consumption enhances carbon emissions while clean energy source mitigate 
atmospheric concentration of CO2.  
 
According to Oosterhuis (2013), providing support for the production and consumption of 
fossil fuel is clearly at odd with the objective of reducing GHG emissions. If tackling climate 
change impact entails reducing emission level, then energy subsidy as a policy is clearly at 
odd with achieving that objective. Koplow and Dernbach (2001) pointed out that fossil fuel 
contributes about 90 percent to the concentration of greenhouse gas through emission.  These 
negative influences of energy subsidies has led to a number of institutions, countries and 
development organisations (OECD, European Union (EU), IEA, OPEC, Asian-Pacific 
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Economic Co-operation (APEC), G-20, African Development Bank (AfDB), World Bank, 
among others) conducting researches on the best option towards reforming these 
Environmentally Harmful Subsidies (EHS). In addition, international agreements such as the 
1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the 1997 
Kyoto protocol which aims to stabilise GHG emissions recognise the key role that fossil fuel 
subsidy reform could play in ensuring energy conservation and efficiency (United Nations 
Environment Programme (UNEP), 2003). The recommendations of the International 
Standard Organisation (ISO) standards (ISO/TC207/SC7) represent another international 
effort toward addressing climate change impacts due to continued concentration of GHGs in 
the atmosphere. These standards (ISO standards 14064, 14065, 14066, 14067 and 14069) 
provide an internationally agreed framework for measuring GHG emissions among other 
activities that countries including Nigeria, should adhere to.  
 
1.2 Statement of the Research Problem 
The threat of environmental challenges such as climate change has made it necessary to 
reform policy-induced distortions such as fuel subsidy policy which have negative 
consequences for both growth and the environment. Different countries continue to adopt 
various policy approaches such as switching to renewable energy and introducing 
carbon/energy tax to tackle the problem of climate change. However, policies such as fuel 
subsidy and the nature they are introduced have been found to not only be unsustainable but 
also contribute to increased carbon emissions. Despite the policy‟s laudable motives, it had 
been regarded as a blunt policy tool that undermines global efforts at tackling climate change 
impacts (Bao and Sawdon, 2011; Ballali, 2013; UNEP, 2015). Thus, the link between energy 
subsidy and the environment rests on how the subsidy encourages increased consumption, 
thereby increasing carbon emissions in the atmosphere. This historic link had pointed to the 
fact that these subsidies were responsible for a 20.7 percent of global carbon emissions 
between 1980 and 2010 (Stefanski, 2014). A number of empirical studies have provided 
evidence that reducing EHSs such as fossil fuel subsidy can be useful in improving the 
environment‟s quality and cutting down global carbon emissions (Larsen and Shah, 1992; 
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Morgan, 2007; Burnianx, et al, 2011; IEA, 2011; Liu and Li, 2011; Ballali, 2013; UNEP, 
2015). Also, it was estimated that global energy-related CO2 will increase by some 50 
percent between 2004 and 2030 unless major policy reforms and technologies are introduced 
to change the manner in which energy is produced and consumed (OECD, 1998; United 
Nations-Energy, 2008). Scientific evidence such as the study of Koplow (2010) has equally 
shown that emission levels could reduce by 10 percent in 2050 if fossil fuel subsidies are 
removed or reformed.  
 
Fuel subsidy as a pricing policy affects environmental quality through the consumption of 
fossil fuel (mainly petrol). When the cost of fuel is placed below the equilibrium market 
price, demand and consumption will increase which results in the emission of CO2 and 
atmospheric concentration of greenhouse gas. This process had been argued by scientists to 
be a leading cause of climate change globally. Thus, debate for the reform of fuel subsidy 
hangs on the fact that the policy acts against global efforts towards tackling climate change. 
The transmission mechanism is explained by the increased fuel price resulting from the 
withdrawal of fuel subsidy coupled with the downward adjustment in use and production of 
non-renewable energy (Abraham, 2013). As the focus of the world is shifted from economic 
development to sustainable development, it becomes necessary to ensure the adoption of 
cleaner sources of energy. A number of empirical analyses had explored different measures 
to achieve energy and economic sustainability, some of which includes uses of taxes (carbon 
and energy) and driving a low carbon growth strategy. 
 
Also, there are indications that the continued existence of the fuel subsidy could pose a threat 
to the actualisation of the growth vision of Nigeria. Nigeria intends to become one of the top 
20 economies in the world by the year 2020 as projected by its economic growth blueprint 
called Nigeria Vision 20:2020. This will require enhancing the growth potentials of the 
economy in a sustainable manner economically, socially and environmentally. The 
environmental dimension had made a green growth strategy imperative in driving the 
economy. One of the identified means towards this green growth policy shift is the adoption 
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of low carbon development initiatives which is recognised as one of the key ingredients of 
green growth. This strategy involves promoting economic growth with minimal carbon 
emissions and lower carbon intensive production technology (Eleri, Ugwu and Onuvae, 
2011). In actualising this, the energy sector will play a strategic role due to both the 
importance of energy to economic growth and its contribution to carbon emission. Thus, the 
valid question is, can fuel subsidy reform be a useful tool in achieving a low-carbon emission 
development strategy? 
 
In year 2011, when fuel subsidy in Nigeria amounted to ₦2.19 trillion, carbon emissions 
from liquid fuel consumption stood at 34.5 million metric tons (IEA, 2013). This emission 
level represents the highest among sub-Saharan African countries after South Africa. Despite 
the fact that Nigeria and many African countries contributes less to climate change; the 
continent is however, most vulnerable to the effects. Nevertheless, the increasing CO2 
emissions and other gases due to crude oil exploration activities and use of fossil fuel can be 
abated. Thus, to achieve a low-carbon green growth strategy within the Nigerian Vision 
20:2020 blueprint, emission levels can be further cut down.  
 
Despite the fact that a sufficient amount of literature exist on macroeconomic, welfare and 
political implications of fuel subsidy removal; its environmental assessment remains scarce 
as limited studies analysing this relationship exist. Two notable studies related to the 
environmental consequences that focused on Nigeria include Adenikinju, Omenka and 
Omisakin (2012) and Abraham (2013). While the former examined the prospect of energy 
(carbon) tax introduction in stabilising CO2 emissions and the economy-wide effects; the 
latter used a narrative analysis to assess how the reform of fuel subsidy can serve as a 
mitigation tool for climate change mitigation in Nigeria. This study fills this existing gap in 
the literature by examining the prospect of the reform of energy subsidy in driving a green 
growth agenda in Nigeria, especially towards achieving vision 20:2020 using a modified 
energy-environment CGE Model. This is done by answering the question, to what extent 
does the removal of fuel subsidy reduce carbon emissions in Nigeria.  
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1.3 Research Questions 
The issues raised above have provoked series of questions which this study provided answers 
to. The methodology of the study focuses on analysing the reaction of one sector of the 
economy to a change in policy in another sector, thus it seeks to ask a “what if” question. 
This justifies the structure of the research questions presented in this session.  
These research questions include; 
1. How has fuel subsidy affected the measure of environmental quality in Nigeria?  
2. How does the partial and gradual removal of fuel subsidy affect environmental 
quality in Nigeria?  
3. To what extent does a one shot, gradual or complete removal of fuel subsidy 
influence environmental quality in Nigeria? 
4. What threshold can fossil-fuel driven economic growth and environmental quality be 
compromised for one another? 
 
1.4 Objectives of the Study 
The broad objective of this study is to investigate the extent to which fuel subsidy reform as a 
policy influences environmental quality in Nigeria. The specific objectives include the 
following, to: 
1. examine the extent to which fuel subsidy has impacted the measure of environmental 
quality in Nigeria;  
2. evaluate the implications of partially and gradually removing fuel subsidy on carbon 
emissions in Nigeria; 
3. investigate the effect of a complete removal of fuel subsidy on carbon emissions in 
Nigeria; and 
4. assess the trade-offs between fossil-fuel driven growth and environmental quality in 
Nigeria. 
 
9 
 
1.5 Scope of the Study 
This study explored the environmental consequences of the economy-wide impact of fuel 
subsidy as an energy pricing policy and its removal on the Nigerian economy, using a 
Dynamic Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model. This was done by modifying the 
energy-environment CGE model of Adenikinju et al. (2012) and incorporating a subsidy 
component. Analytically, the model, consisting of two factors of production (labour and 
capital), two categories of households (rural and urban) and eight (8) sectors of the economy 
form the basis of the analysis which is in line with the objectives of the study. It used carbon 
emissions (CO2) as the measure or indicator for capturing environmental quality. 
Conceptually, the study focused on subsidy provided for petrol and this is because the petrol 
also known as Premium Motor Spirit (PMS) is identified as the major fossil fuel for which 
subsidy was reduced in Nigeria as at the time of this study. Given that fuel as a term covers 
different energy sources such as coal, petrol, diesel, kerosene, biomass, and so on; fuel as 
used in this study refer to PMS also known as petrol in the Nigerian parlance.   
 
1.6 Significance of the Study 
The need to ensure energy security and at the same time, drive environmental sustainability, 
particularly given the global effect of climate change and increased energy prices; had seen 
increased call for the reform of subsidies provided for fossil fuels. In the past few years, 
empirical evidence on the impacts of these categories of subsidies had been increasing, 
especially for oil producing and oil exporting countries. This impact assessment ranges from 
economic to welfare (social), political and environmental impacts. Sufficient attention had 
been given to the analysis of the economic, social and political impacts of the reform of fuel 
subsidies; however, assessment of its environmental implications remains very limited, 
especially for Nigeria. This environmental impact assessment is essential especially as there 
are global efforts to reverse some of the environmental consequences of the activities of the 
energy sector (such as exploration, extraction, transportation and refining). This is also given 
Nigeria‟s voluntary “non-bidding” commitment under the UNFCCC accord, to reduce 
atmospheric concentration of greenhouse gases. 
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Nigeria had been introducing a number of initiatives as part of its commitment through the 
activities of the Ministry of Environment. This study, thus, investigates the extent to which 
the removal of fuel subsidy can be used to reduce emission and thereby mitigate against 
climate change impacts. A key significance of the study is the fact that it used an economy-
wide modelling approach such as the dynamic CGE model by developing a unique version 
that incorporates the environment and energy components. This was done by adapting an 
existing dynamic CGE model. Findings from the study are useful for policy-makers in 
understanding the dynamics of energy policy and environmental management interactions 
while better managing the trade-off. It will also provide insights into the designing of 
appropriate policy mix needed to complement current efforts at addressing climate change. It 
is relevant for policy-makers and other decision-makers to understand the role that fuel 
subsidy removal as a policy can play in addressing environmental concerns and using it as a 
means to achieving a low-carbon development plan. This is in view of the fact that Nigeria‟s 
strategic plan of Vision 20:2020 entails shifting to a low-carbon growth strategy and also 
been part of international negotiations aimed towards better quality of the environment.  
  
1.7 Outline of the Study 
This thesis is organised into six chapters. Following the introductory chapter, chapter two 
focuses on the review of empirical literature. Specifically, it discusses conceptual, 
theoretical, empirical and methodological literature relating to fossil fuel subsidies and 
country experiences. Chapter three presents some stylised facts on the structure of the 
Nigerian economy and trend facts of fuel subsidy in Nigeria with comparisons to similar 
country experiences. While chapter four dwells on the theory, model specification and 
estimation method of the study, the discussion, analysis of results and policy implications are 
presented in chapter five. Finally, chapter six contains the summary of findings, conclusion 
and recommendation. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Preamble 
In assessing the environmental impact of fuel subsidy in Nigeria, there is need to 
understand the state of knowledge in the area of energy subsidies and its reform. A 
general consensus in the literature is that energy subsidies, particularly the 
environmentally harmful ones, are wasteful, inefficient and distorts energy markets, 
invariably leading to calls for their removal or reform. In analysing the impacts of fuel 
subsidy on an economy, different studies have examined its economic, welfare, political 
and environmental implications and how best the reform should be undertaken, most 
especially for developing countries where consumer energy subsidies are prevalent. This 
chapter thus, examines the review of the empirical works on energy subsidies, 
particularly as it relates to its definitional and conceptual issues, theoretical, 
methodological and empirical review. In addition, the chapter presents identified gaps in 
the literature in light of the reviewed literature and summary of selected empirical 
studies.  
 
2.2 Review of Definitional and Conceptual Issues 
This section focuses on discussion relating to the concept of subsidies, energy subsidies 
and environmental quality. It covers the various forms and definitions that exist in the 
literature on the main concepts of the study (energy subsidy and environmental quality). 
 
2.2.1 The Concept of Energy Subsidy  
The IEA, OPEC, OECD and World Bank (2010) joint report described subsidies as one 
of the many policy instruments employed by governments to achieve economic, social 
and environmental objectives. Despite the wide usage of the term “subsidy” in 
economics, it is rarely defined (World Trade Organisation-WTO, 2006). There is no 
universally adopted definition for subsidy; instead, studies use any of the several 
definitions that exist depending on the perspective of the study (Steenblik, 2002; 
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Valsecchi et al, 2009). The international community (IEA, OECD, IMF, UN, GSI, G-20, 
World Trade Organisation, and so on) have attempted to provide different definitions to 
the term, legally or otherwise. Generally, subsidies are widely used by government as 
policy tools to achieve certain desired objectives. These various definitions suggest that 
despite the varying definitions of subsidy in the literature, the common denominator in 
many of the definitions is that subsidy is any form of government assistance provided to 
reduce cost of a product to consumer and cost of production to producers. The Global 
Subsidy Initiative (GSI, 2010) defined subsidy as a form of government action that 
results in an advantage for consumers and producers in order to supplement their income 
or reduce their cost. According to Fattouh and El-Katiri (2012), the concept of subsidy is 
often “too elusive” to define and this is evident in different definitions across empirical 
research on subsidy. The United State Congress Joint Economic Committee as cited in 
Fattouh and El-Katiri (2012) viewed subsidy as any type of assistance rendered by 
government to private sector producers or consumers in which case government receives 
no equivalent compensation in return, but expects certain level of performance by the 
recipient.  
 
                    A more narrow definition is the one provided by Fattouh and El-Katiri (2012), which 
stated subsidy as any step taken towards keeping prices for consumers below the market 
price or above for producers or that reduces costs for consumers and producers through 
direct or indirect support. This definition supports Guiyang (2007)‟s argument that the 
character of subsidy is such that the government support consumers or producers 
directly or indirectly so as to reduce cost and increase income for various policy targets 
to be realised. Other definitions include the definition by Whitley (2013), where subsidy 
was defined as “any financial contribution by a government or agent of a government 
that confers a benefit on its recipients”. Also, the UNEP (2003) presented a simple 
description of subsidy, as a direct cash payment by a government to a producer or 
consumer; but this is believed to be just one-way. Subsidies can be in form of cash, 
credit, tax procurement or what is called in-kind subsidies (Fattouh and El-Katiri, 2012).  
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             Government can equally provide subsidies in different forms. It could be in form of 
direct cash transfers from government to the recipients, through tax concessions (in 
terms of preferential tax treatment), assumption of contingent liabilities, through 
procurement policies at administered prices or by equity injections into businesses 
(WTO, 2006). Other forms of government intervention that may be classified as subsidy 
in the energy sector include trade restrictions, energy related services provided by 
government at less than full price or through the regulation of the energy sector (UNEP, 
2008; Ballali, 2013).   
 
                   Subsidies exist in different sectors of an economy, including agriculture, energy, mining, 
manufacturing, road transport, and so on. When subsidies are targeted towards the 
energy industry to achieve certain objectives, such subsidy is called energy subsidy. The 
IEA (2011) study defined energy subsidy as any act by government centered on the 
energy sector which reduces the cost of producing energy, increases the price collected 
by energy producers or reduces price paid by energy consumers. These energy subsidies 
are employed to alleviate energy poverty, thereby promoting economic development by 
enabling access to affordable modern energy services (IEA, OPEC, OECD and World 
Bank, 2010). Thus, energy subsidies are intended to make energy products such as 
petroleum, kerosene, diesel, amongst others, cheaper and affordable. Policy makers 
provide justification for energy subsidies with the argument that they enhance economic 
growth, alleviate poverty and ensure energy security (IEA, OPEC, OECD and World 
Bank, 2010). However, as stated in International Institute for Sustainable Development-
IISD (2012), energy subsidy is often not an efficient tool in achieving these objectives. 
They are often viewed as an inefficient tool that promotes waste and environmental 
pollution. In reality, the motivation for energy subsidies is mainly political (IISD, 2012). 
Energy subsidies are useful in enhancing access to energy for the poorest households, 
but the consensus in most empirical analysis reflects the fact that the negative impact of 
fossil fuel subsidies is evident both at country level and at the global level (Ellis, 2010). 
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There are two categories of energy subsidies identified in literature which are consumer 
and producer subsidies. The former are designed to reduce cost of consuming energy 
products while the latter are aimed at supporting the domestic production of energy 
products thereby reducing the cost of production for producers. Also, the Africa 
Development Report (ADR, 2012) differentiated between two types of subsidies. This 
classification depends on the position of the country as either a net importer or net 
exporter of oil in the foreign market. As an importer, a subsidy represents the difference 
between foreign price (covering associated costs) and local price. On the other hand, for 
the exporter, the government derives a difference which is regarded as indirect subsidy 
by placing the local price below the foreign price (ADR, 2012).   
                  
Distinction is also made between subsidies that are considered environmentally harmful 
and those that are environmentally friendly. According to Valsecchi et al (2009), 
environmentally harmful subsidies represent government action that confers an 
advantage on consumers and producers aimed at supplementing income or lowering 
costs, but in doing so discriminate against sound environmental practices. An example is 
fossil fuel subsidy. On the other hand, environmentally friendly subsidies do not damage 
the environment as they are designed to enhance its quality. This could be in terms of 
subsidies to enhance commercialisation and development of clean forms of energy (such 
as renewables), improvement in research and development or providing incentives to 
shift from environmentally harmful products to the friendly ones. 
 
                   Another form of distinction of subsidies relate to the explicit and implicit subsidies. The 
former refers to the difference between production cost and the selling price while the 
latter on the other hand is the difference between the opportunity cost of a wasting asset 
such as crude oil and the present selling price (Nwafor, Ogujiuba and Asogwa, 2006). 
The implicit subsidy is usually important due to their implications for efficiency as 
prices must equal their Marginal Opportunity Cost (MOC) for the prices to be efficient. 
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It also reflects in the difference between the border prices and the domestic prices of the 
energy products.   
 
2.2.2 The Concept of Environmental Quality 
 The concept of environmental quality consists of different definitions and interpretations, 
especially in the sciences and the public policy sphere. According to Kerekes (2011), the 
concept had been a historically difficult concept to measure and evaluate. However, it 
essentially entails the set of features and properties that defines the condition of the 
atmosphere. It represents the measures of the environment in relation to basic human or 
specie requirements. It could also relate to the potential effects that these features tend to 
have on general well-being (mental or physical health). In terms of characteristics, it 
refers to the natural and built environment which includes air, water, land, noise and 
pollution (Kerekes, 2011).  
 
The built environment is the environment created by humans for themselves while the 
natural environment is the natural inhabitant occupied by plants, animals and humans. It 
also includes the surrounding natural resources. The state of health of this environment is 
what is considered as environmental quality. Similarly, Khattab (1993) defined 
environmental quality based on two meanings; the physical and the perceived 
environment. The physical or natural environment entails the material components of the 
surrounding environment such as the air quality, water quality, pollution, negative effect 
of overpopulation and noise (Khattab, 1993). On the other hand, the perceived or built 
environment which is considered the more sophisticated definition by Khattab (1993), 
consists of man-made environment that provide support or otherwise, the social and 
cultural structures and institutions related to specific group of people. As stated earlier, 
common indicators of environmental quality includes the quality or otherwise of air, 
water, soil, degree of deforestation, amongst others.  
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Air quality/pollution which is one of the common indicators of environmental quality, is 
often measured by carbon dioxide (CO2), carbon monoxide (CO), nitrogen oxides (NOx), 
sulfur dioxide (SO2), methane (CH4), Suspended Particulate Matter (SPM), 
chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) and lead (Kerekes, 2011). Carbon dioxide is regarded as the 
primary greenhouse gas that contributes to environmental degradation. It is emitted 
through both natural causes and human (anthropogenic) activities. This is either by 
adding to the carbon emission in the atmosphere or by altering the ability of natural sinks 
such as forests to remove CO2 from the atmosphere (United States Environmental 
Protection Agency-EPA, 2015). A major form of human activity through which this CO2 
is emitted is through the combustion of fossil fuels which includes oil, coal and natural 
gas. These fossil fuels essentially emit CO2 through their use for energy, transportation 
and other processes such as industrial process and some land use changes. The US-EPA 
(2015) identified the reduction of the consumption of fossil fuel as a most effective 
method in cutting down CO2 emissions. Other techniques commonly discussed to be 
adopted include energy efficiency, energy conservation, fuel switching, carbon capture 
and sequestration.    
 
Empirical literature had also assessed the relationship between economic growth and 
environmental quality, especially as it relates to the Environmental Kuznet Curve (EKC). 
Some of them include Shafik (1994); Johansson (2001); Liu, Heilig, Chen and Heino 
(2007); Alege and Ogundipe (2013); Awan (2013); Strong (2013); Osabuohein, Efobi 
and Gitau (2013); Osabuohein et al. (2014); Osabuohein et al. (2015); among others. 
Strong (2013), however, opined that this relationship between income and environmental 
quality is poorly understood as emphasis is often on pollution. Thus, using a simple 
conceptual model, the study constructed two different aggregates of indicators of 
environmental quality. These two aggregates are the ecosystem approach and the 
biodiversity approach. The main idea behind the EKC hypothesis is that at earlier stages 
of development, the society will be developing at the expense of the environment, thus 
environmental deterioration is commonly experienced at earlier stages of industralisation. 
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However, over time, quality of the environment begins to improve with higher levels of 
income as the income generated are been used to clean-up.  
 
Strong (2013) attempted to expand the frontier of the literature on EKC by not only 
evaluating the role of emissions but also consider the role of absorptive capacity of the 
environment. Awan (2013) considered how the sustainable development concept can 
support environmental quality so as to control the spread of environmental degradation. It 
supports the link between sustainable development and environmental quality as the latter 
is one of the pillars of the former (that is, environmental sustainability). The achievement 
of environmental quality is dependent on efficient and sustainable use of resources as 
argued by many environmentalists. Another underlining argument in the growth-
environment nexus is that there is always a trade-off effect between economic growth and 
the achievement of environmental quality (in terms of low pollution, minimal depletion 
of resources, cleaner air, better soil quality, water resources, among others). This is due to 
the desire to experience high levels of growth through excessive use of resources, which 
then result to varying environmental challenges (Awan, 2013).  
 
Also, some studies developed environmental models to examine the impact of certain 
externalities on the environment. The development of these models which are often 
funded by international organisations such as the World Bank, IMF, OECD, UN, EU, and 
the African Development Bank, helps in explaining policy strategy directions towards 
addressing these environmental problems. Other ways the environment had been linked 
with other concepts includes property rights and regional conflict. The work of Kerekes 
(2011) exemplified the role of property rights in environmental quality by stating that if 
these rights are not properly defined, especially property right over air; this can erode the 
quality of the environment. In the same vein, Kennedy (1998) opined that excessive use 
of resources in a depleting and unsustainable manner is capable of inciting violent and 
non-violent regional conflict. These are the various approaches in describing how the 
quality of the environment can enhance sustainable growth and development.     
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2.3. Review of Theoretical Literature 
A number of economic theories have been used in explaining the theoretical foundation 
of the impact of fuel subsidy on the economy in general. Economic theory tries to explain 
theoretical underpinning of the existence of subsidies and how they result in wasteful and 
unproductive consumption. According to Holton (2012), subsidies change the price of a 
product and therefore the consumption of that product. This section thus reviews the 
economic theory relating to subsidies and other theories that explain the justification for 
subsidies and need for its reform. 
 
      2.3.1 Economic Theory of Subsidies 
Economic theory suggests that unwarranted subsidies result in inefficiency and a 
suboptimal allocation of resources which could ultimately have a negative effect on GDP 
per capita (Holton, 2012). These subsidies make products to be sold at less the economic 
opportunity cost that “leaves energy firms with inadequate financial resources for 
investing in productivity, capacity or environmental improvements”. This according to 
Pearse and FinckVon (1999) has the capacity to generate a vicious cycle of poor supply 
and low investment or none at all. From this standpoint, the argument against subsidies is 
that they create uncompetitive domestic industries. Subsidies are also often discouraged 
for the fact that it diverts or redirects government spending from social and investment 
spending. Unless a subsidy is designed to address a market failure, it is likely to be 
harmful for economic efficiency (Saunders and Schneider, 2000). 
 
Furthermore, as stated in Adagunodo (2013), subsidies are not efficient because in the 
absence of market imperfections coupled with a convex indifference curve, the value the 
subsidy will have, to the consumer will be less than its cost to the government. The report 
then asserts that consumers do not use resources optimally. Hence, they will be on higher 
indifference curve if prices were increased to reflect commercial costs with subsidy been 
returned to consumers in form of cash. This is in addition to economic theory that states 
that social welfare is maximised at the point where the price of each good and service is 
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determined by the interaction of the willingness of producers to supply and extent to 
which consumers are willing to pay. As this price shifts from this point of static 
equilibrium, allocation of resource will be inefficient as benefit to consumers from the 
last unit of energy consumed are lower than the costs involved in supplying the energy 
services (Adagunodo, 2013).  
 
Another economic reasoning is that subsidies create deadweight loss by “enabling 
transactions for which the buyer‟s willingness-to-pay is below the opportunity cost” 
(Davis, 2013). In calculating the deadweight loss of global fuel subsidies, Davis (2013) 
asserts that it is the short run elasticity of demand and supply for crude oil that is 
inelastic. However, the economic cost of subsidies depends on the long run elasticity. 
Gupta et al. (2002) stated that most oil exporting countries do not tax domestic fuel 
consumption and this results in significant economic losses. This deviation from efficient 
pricing then results in a deadweight welfare loss. Onyemaechi (2012) added that fiscal 
policies theoretically impact the development of an economy directly or indirectly. The 
direct effect is usually through its impact on aggregate demand functions while the 
indirect channel is through effects on endogenous variables of consumption and 
production functions. Ekong and Akpan (2014) also illustrated deadweight loss as the 
cost to society as created by market efficiency in social welfare associated with fossil fuel 
subsidy.  
 
The argument is that given an infinitely elastic supply of fuel (which can be the case for 
Nigeria, as a price taker since it cannot influence the price of imported fuel as it is 
determined in the international market), the introduction of subsidy will lower market 
price and increase quantity demanded. Ekong and Akpan (2014), however, noted that the 
extent of the overconsumption of the subsidised fuel would depend on the elasticity of 
demand. Adagunodo (2013) further stressed that income transfers are superior to 
subsidies and reduce inefficiencies as the income transfers do not result to deadweight 
loss. While analysing how fuel subsidy removal will have effect on crime in Nigeria, 
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Oladipo (2012) reviewed the classical utilitarianism, traditional and neoclassical welfare 
theories and considered suitable, the neoclassical welfare theory. This is given that it 
emphasised more on government responsibility to make the need of the people available 
without undue stress. In other words, the ideal of the neoclassical welfare theory is that 
the performance of economic institutions should be judged in relation to whether they 
provide economic goods in quantities that is in line with consumer‟s relative desires and 
at the barest minimum cost (Oladipo, 2012). 
 
Amegashie (2006), however, argued that departures from the competitive equilibrium 
quantity and price reduce social welfare and do not make economic sense. The question 
then is if subsidies are distortional and reduces welfare in perfectly competitive markets, 
are they necessarily so in markets which are not competitive? The answer according to 
Amegashie (2006) is no. Using the theory of second best, the explanation is that there is 
no guarantee that the removal of any form of imperfections like subsidy, will improve 
social welfare. 
 
      2.3.2 Public Choice Theory 
This is another theory that had been adopted in empirical literature in explaining the 
behaivour of subsidy. It is majorly employed by authors analysing political dimension for 
the persistence of subsidies, particularly energy subsidy. As described by Butler (2012) 
the theory is essentially an approach that uses the methods and tools of economics to 
explore how politics and government work. It describes the application of the rational 
choice model to non-market decision making (Hill, 1999). The argument of the public 
choice theory is that, just as self-interest motivates people‟s private commercial choices; 
it can also influence their communal decisions (Butler, 2012). One of the key studies in 
this category is Israel (2010) who explained the staying power and rigidity of these 
subsidies or the endurance of the policy with the public choice theory. In terms of how 
this theory relates to  fossil fuel subsidies, it holds that energy subsidies persists due to 
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the commonality of interest that exists among the relatively few who receive these energy 
subsidies (Israel, 2010). 
 
     2.3.3 Neo-liberalism Theory 
The “neo-liberal” component entails a modern economic policy with state intervention. 
The word “neo-liberalism” was originally coined by the German scholar, Alexander 
Rustow in 1938 at the Colloque Walter Lippmann and the concept entails “the priority of 
the price mechanism, the free enterprise, the system of competition and a strong and 
impartial state” (Anyadike, 2013). Other aspects of the Neo-liberalism concept entail 
economic liberalisation, open markets, free trade, privatisation, deregulation and 
enhancing the role of the private sector in the economy for efficiency. Other underscoring 
tenets of neo-liberalism as identified by Anyadike (2013) are sound macroeconomic 
policy, trade liberalisation, labour market flexibility and export-oriented sectoral policies. 
Neo-liberalism‟s aim is to transfer the control of the economy to the private sector with 
the assumption that it will bring about efficiency and better working of the economy. 
Onyishi, Eme and Emeh (2012) equally adopted the neo-liberalism theory in explaining 
the domestic and international implications of fuel subsidy removal crisis in Nigeria and 
concluded that the reactions was due to the fact that Nigerians were simply tired of 
policies that does not increase their purchasing power in the country.  
 
As laudable as this theory may be, opponents have argued that fuel subsidy is not the 
monster in the oil industry but corruption (Victor, 2009). So the tenability of deregulation 
of the sector to save the country from truncation is questionable.  Anyadike (2013) stated 
that even as the theory fundamentally recognises the importance of deregulating the 
petroleum industry, it does not address what happens when liberalism becomes 
corruption as may be the case for Nigeria. In other words, the theory does not consider 
who feels the impact of the deregulation.  
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Many of the policies of neo-liberalism are rooted in the John Williamson “Washington 
Consensus” which is a list of policy proposals approved between the IMF and World 
Bank. The three main ideals of the consensus are macroeconomic discipline, 
development and promotion of a market economy and a general degree of openness to the 
world (Symoniak, 2011). These are broken down into ten policy points as stated by 
Williamson (1999) and Symoniak (2011) which are the following: 
i. Fiscal Discipline: Government should avoid running large fiscal deficits as 
they contribute to inflation and capital flight; 
ii. Public Expenditure Priorities: Government spending should be directed at 
key sectors that will enhance growth (sectors such as health, education, and 
infrastructure). Also, subsidies should be reduced or eliminated, particularly 
the ones described by neo-liberals as indiscriminate subsidies; 
iii. Tax Reform: The tax base “should be broad” and marginal tax rates “should 
be moderate” so as to encourage innovation and efficiency; 
iv. Interest Rates: This should be “market-determined” by the domestic financial 
markets as positive (real) interest rates will discourage capital flight and 
increase savings; 
v. Exchange Rate: The exchange rate to be adopted by developing countries 
should be floating exchange rate and one that is “competitive” to boost 
exports by making the goods produced cheaper abroad; 
vi. Trade Liberalisation: There should be liberalisation of imports with 
minimised tariffs. There should be no tariff on intermediate goods that are 
used to produce exports; 
vii. Foreign Direct Investment: Foreign investment should be encouraged as it 
brings in the required capital and skills for development. There should be 
opportunity to invest funds overseas and for foreign funds to be invested in 
home country; 
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viii. Privatisation: State-owned enterprises should be privatised to promote the 
provision of goods and services which the government may not be able to 
provide in an efficient manner (for example, telecommunication); 
ix. Deregulation: This is the removal of restrictions or regulation that impedes 
market entry or competition as excessive regulation can promote corruption. 
The only exception should be for industries that are justified on safety, 
environmental and consumer protection grounds. For financial institutions, 
there should be prudent oversight; and 
x. Property Rights: This must be enforced with legal security for property 
rights. Weak and poor legal institutions reduce the incentive to save and 
accumulate wealth. 
 
There have, however, been attempts to revisit and restate these policy instruments 
by some economic analysts including Symoniak (2011) and John Williamson 
himself in light of the various debates, oppositions and dispute experienced in the 
process of its application. Still, the points highlighted above shows that inadequate 
understanding and implementation of the policies of neo-liberalism, could account 
for its opposition in Nigeria during the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) 
era. The aim of the policy is to bring about efficiency in the economy and the 
controversy in its application to the deregulation of the petroleum downstream 
sector points out difficulties that could arise due to the unique features of a country 
such as Nigeria.  
 
           2.3.4. Competitive General Equilibrium Theory 
The Competitive General Equilibrium theory is commonly adopted as the theoretical 
framework for studies centering on CGE model analysis. The Competitive General 
Equilibrium theory is a theory that seeks to explain the behavior of demand, supply 
and prices in an economy having different interacting markets and economic agents. 
These several markets and agents have several linkages within an economy. General 
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Equilibrium analysis theoretically looks at the economy as a whole and then takes 
account of linkages between all markets, including markets for all goods that use 
energy as input and labour markets (Ellis, 2010).  Its initial structure was developed 
in the second half of the 19
th
 century by neoclassical economists or marginalist school 
of thought (Decaluwe et al, 2000). Sometimes called the Walrasian Competitive 
General Equilibrium model, it is based on analysis of economic agents‟ individual 
choices in response to given prices and other exogenous variables (technology, 
preferences, and resource endowments). Under this condition, all the markets within a 
system must balance for equilibrium to exist; in other words the demand for different 
products in the different markets must equal their supply at prevailing prices. 
 
The theory develops a model that describes interactions and nature of optimising 
behaviour among the households, the firms, government and other economic agents 
given the price of goods and services, land, labour and capital. It is suitable for 
explaining the nature of disturbances caused within an economic system and 
transmitting to different sectors as a result of an external shock such as policy change. 
This is due to the nature with which all sectors of the economy are linked to one 
another. Its main points explains the behaivour of agents (households, producers, 
government), and other macroeconomic aggregates (capital stock, investment, 
international trade) with the manner in which adjustments take place when change 
occur. A recurring idea in general equilibrium analysis, has been that the competitive 
price mechanism result in outcomes that are efficient in a way that outcomes under 
other systems such as planned economies are not (Levin, 2006). 
  
 
 
 
 
 
25 
 
2.4. Review of Methodological Issues 
In helping policymakers to better understand the trade-off between economic, 
environmental and social impacts of fossil fuel subsidy, a number of organisations and 
researchers have attempted to analyse fossil fuel subsidies and their effects using some 
complex economic models (Ellis, 2010). According to Koplow and Dernbach (2001), 
these models compare certain factors such as economic activity and projected emissions 
if subsidies were removed to “business as usual” emissions and economic activity. Two 
of the common methods used are the partial equilibrium approach and the general 
equilibrium approach.  
 
2.4.1 Single and Simultaneous Equation Models 
         These categories of models analyses the direct impact that fuel subsidy has on the 
economy through regression analysis implemented using either cross sectional, time 
series, or panel data. Others make use of primary data collected through interviews, 
focus group discussions or distribution of questionnaires. In simultaneous equation 
models, set of variables are determined by other set of variables simultaneously 
(Safdari et al., 2012). In other words, this class of model cannot estimate parameters 
with just one equation unlike the case of the single equation model. Safdari et al (2012) 
used the simultaneous equation system to investigate the effects of energy subsidy on 
macroeconomic variables in the industrial sector in Iran. Examples of single equation 
models commonly used are the Johansen co-integration method and VAR Impulse-
Response function used to describe existence of long run equilibrium relationship 
between fuel subsidy and any macroeconomic variable such as poverty, crime, trade, 
consumption, investment, business development, welfare, among others. This method is 
popular due to its simplicity, ease of use and minimal data requirement compared to 
other complex models. Studies such as Olomola (2006), Anwal and Mamman (2012), 
Holton (2012), Oladipo (2012), Onyemaechi (2012), Charap et al (2013), Efobi, 
Osabuohien and Beecroft (2013), Oriahki and Iyoha (2013), amongst others, employed 
the use of different single equation models for different countries and form of data, and 
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many of the results reflected evidence that fuel  subsidy negatively affects the 
economy. Thus, policy change should take a systematic approach.    
 
2.4.2 Partial Equilibrium Models 
This approach is often used in analysing the impact of energy policy on the economy, 
especially when policy question focuses on just one sector directly. This category of 
models consider just the product market where subsidy reform is taking place (for 
instance, the energy market), and then measure the changes observed in demand, 
production and price in fossil fuel due to subsidy removal (UNEP, 2003). This is usually 
done with the aid of some economic assumptions. They are also helpful in providing 
insights useful in understanding the effect the subsidy reform has on the particular 
market. Allaire and Brown (2012) adopted the partial equilibrium approach in 
determining the effects of about 60 categories of energy subsidies on United States of 
America‟s energy markets and carbon emissions. Evidence from the study suggests that 
the expenditure of the US government centered on energy subsidies that increased carbon 
emissions and those that equally decreased level of emissions. These were mainly 
focused on tax provisions and other spending programmes.  
In Nigeria, Umar and Umar (2013) evaluated the direct welfare effect of fuel subsidy 
reform in Nigeria with the assumption that consumers do not shift their demand from 
fuel, despite price change. Cooke et al (2014) also assessed the distributional effects of 
fuel subsidy on the households in Ghana by applying partial equilibrium approach, which 
according to them is the most suitable approach given the data requirements and the fact 
that it is less intensive and can be completed within a short time. In partial equilibrium 
analysis, price of a good is determined by simply focusing on the price of the good while 
assuming that the prices of other goods are constant. In economic theory, it is adequate if 
the first-order effects of a shift in the demand curve do not affect the shift of the supply 
curve.  
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The study of Ballali (2013) used the same approach to analyse the level of petroleum 
product subsidy while highlighting its impacts on carbon emissions and the aggregate 
welfare gains for Nigeria and Venezuela. The study found that a substantial amount of 
fuel subsidy exists in the two countries and reforming these subsidies can reduce carbon 
emissions. Despite the strengths of the partial equilibrium models, they also have their 
short-comings. They are not adequate in answering questions on sectors that employ 
energy as a significant input (Ellis, 2010).  Increase in energy prices leads to higher cost 
of production in other sectors and thus higher prices of many goods including energy. 
Another disadvantage of partial-equilibrium models according to Ellis (2010) is that they 
do not address macroeconomic questions relating to the effects of international 
competitiveness. To then answer these kinds of questions, general equilibrium models are 
required. 
2.4.3 Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) Model 
CGE model is one of the economy-wide analyses that enhance the understanding of how 
the different sectors in an economy interact. The initial structure of the theoretical 
underpinning of the model was developed in the second half of the 19
th
 century 
(Decaluwe et al, 2000). CGE models incorporate the fundamental general equilibrium 
links among production and employment structure, incomes of various groups and the 
pattern of demand (Falokun and Adenikinju, 2009). They are also known as Applied 
General Equilibrium (AGE) models and are built on the economic foundations of Adam 
Smith‟s invisible hand, Walras law, Edgeworth‟s contract curve, Arrow-Debreu proof of 
existence and Leontief‟s input-output analysis (Chitiga and Adenikinju, 2009). 
 
This category of models is part of a family of multi-sector macro models. As pointed out 
by Chitiga and Adenikinju (2009), CGE models differ from macro-econometric models. 
While the latter emphasies time series data analysis, the former focuses on inter-industry 
analysis. This allows for the analysis of the impacts of policy measure on resource 
allocation. Having a neo-classical foundation, CGE models usually consist of non-linear 
simultaneous equations that permits feedback relations from production levels and prices 
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to final demand (Mitra-Kahn, 2008). It has been applied to a number of economic issues 
ranging from trade, public finance, labour, to energy policy. The method continues to 
receive considerable attention in the analysis of energy policies and reform. Also, the 
penetrating role of energy in the economy and different ways energy subsidies can 
influence allocation of resources, necessitates the use of CGE model (Manzoor, 
Shahmoradi and Haqiqi, 2012). Even though it is widely used globally, its application to 
energy and environment research in Nigeria remains limited. Studies such as Nwaobi 
(2004), Adenikinju (2009), Ajakaiye (2009), Adenikinju and Omenka (2012), Adenikinju 
et al. (2012), Siddig et al. (2014), among others, are examples of researchers that have 
applied CGE modelling in Nigeria. 
 
      According to Petersen (1997), the CGE model differ from the traditional General 
Equilibrium models in that, the former are solved numerically and not analytically where 
their use is policy driven. One of the advantages of the CGE model is its ability to solve 
very large models without the need of finding an analytic solution, but the price paid for 
this is the loss of generality, since the results obtained will be specific to the model and 
the calibrating parameters (Petersen, 1997). The CGE model is a valuable approach for a 
number of reasons. Firstly, it provides the framework for the analysis of the total effect 
(direct and indirect) of policy change in one sector on the rest of the economy 
(Adenikinju and Falobi, 2009). Secondly, the CGE model is best suited for assessing the 
multiplier effects of a policy shock (such as subsidy removal) in an economy. 
 
      Notwithstanding the numerous advantages of CGE, it also has some limitations. Some of 
the limitations as stated by Chitiga and Adenikinju (2009) include; firstly, being 
abstractions from reality, their structures are determined by modeller‟s judgments and 
predispositions, thus it is subjective in nature. Secondly, CGE models are still relatively 
aggregated given their emphasis on macroeconomic, sectoral and social effects. Thirdly, 
they use large number of parameters and elasticities which are often borrowed or 
guessed. This can make it difficult to assess validity and reliability of forms of 
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specification adopted by a modeller. Also, they are not suitable for forecasting. And 
finally, it demands considerable technical skills to formulate, solve and interpret the 
results produced by any CGE model. Despite these limitations, they are still useful in 
analysing economy-wide impacts of policy changes.  
 
Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) models are equally widely used in the analysis 
of energy policy impact and are particularly useful in examining the economy-wide 
impact of a change in policy. They are applied to a wide range of issues such as poverty, 
inequality, trade, environment, among others. Its development was said to have begun in 
the early 1970s when the World Bank Group showed interest in its application to 
economic analysis. The CGE model also overcomes one of the criticisms of the partial 
equilibrium analysis, which according to Baron et al (2010), lacks consideration for a 
general equilibrium important for deadweight loss measures when a change in the price 
of a subsidised product affects the supply or demand in other markets which are subject 
to distortions.  
 
The CGE model as a type of macroeconomic model has the capacity to provide 
quantitative information on the likely effects of some introduced policies on a wide 
range of macroeconomic and sectoral aggregates (Falokun and Adenikinju, 2009). Also, 
the CGE model has the capacity to reveal more comprehensive economic relationships 
than partial equilibrium or econometric models (Lin and Jiang, 2011). Perhaps a more 
vivid explanation of what the CGE model does is the one given by Adenikinju (2009), 
where CGE model is stated as providing the framework for analysing the total effect 
(direct and indirect) of policy change in one sector on the rest of the economy. As put by 
Kuster, Ingo and Ulrich (2007), CGE modelling provides an established instrument for 
the quantification of the impacts of energy and environmental policy measure on the 
economy. They are also useful for the evaluation of feedback effects of policy reforms 
undertaken in an economy by the government. 
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The CGE model which is based on the empirical application of the abstract Arrow-
Debreu General Equilibrium model, defines the production and consumption functions 
that reflects the interdependent relationship among multi-sectors and multi-markets (Lin 
and Jiang, 2011). According to Bacon et al (2010), a typical CGE model consists of a 
number of simultaneous equations that explain the characteristics of the economic actors 
and sectors considered to be relevant for the analysis, which explains all of the payments 
across sectors recorded in an economy by means of a Social Accounting Matrix (SAM). 
They are very helpful in considering policy impact where there are significant market 
interactions. Basically, the CGE model explains all payments recorded in a SAM and 
thus, follows the SAM disaggregation of activities, factors, commodities and institutions 
(Lofgren, Harris and Robinson, 2002). The model is presented as a system of 
simultaneous equations that are often times nonlinear with no objective function. It 
composes of three main components, the theoretical, data and shock component. The 
equations are based on microeconomic assumptions using database of the entire 
economy and introducing shocks as changes to the economic system under study. 
CGE models have both static and dynamic components (Adenikinju and Falobi, 2009). 
According to Chitiga and Adenikinju (2009), most early applications of CGE models 
were mainly based on comparative static analyses where time path adjustment to 
proposed policy changes were usually not considered. In essence, the static CGE models 
examine the economy at a point in time, due to policy change. The results are often 
reported as percentage difference in each variable between the base case and the reform 
case for target year for example year 2015 or 2020 (Ellis, 2010). The process that gives 
rise to this percentage difference is however, not reported. 
 
                     The dynamic CGE models on the other hand, trace what happens to each variable from 
the base year through to the forecast year, usually at annual intervals (Ellis, 2010). They 
are extremely useful for stimulating the overall economic development path of an 
economy or an entire region (Chitiga and Adenikinju, 2009). In incorporating dynamics 
into CGE modeling, there are two approaches as stated by Chitiga and Adenikinju 
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(2009). There is the recursive and the inter-temporal approach. In the former, economic 
agents deal with only one period at a time, neglecting the impact of subsequent changes 
in prices, tastes, and technology or resource endowments. However, in the latter case, 
each commodity is dated with all economic agents making consistent projections of 
future prices.  
 
A number of researchers have applied this methodology to the analysis of the impact of 
various energy policies both for Nigeria and other countries using different variants of 
the models. This variation covers multi-region models (Larsen and Shah, 1992; Larsen 
and Shah, 1994; Petersen, 1997; Kuster et al., 2007; Sue, 2011) and single-country 
models (Nwafor et al., 2006; Al-amin et al., 2008; Bao and Sawdon, 2011; Allaire and 
Brown, 2012; Adenikinju et al., 2012; Adenikinju and Omenka, 2013; Siddig et al., 
2014). These studies have used the CGE model to analyse economic, social and 
environmental impact of fuel subsidy under varying objectives. For example, Ba and 
Sawdon (2011) developed a CGE model for the Vietnamese economy in addition to a 
bottom-up energy accounting approach using the Long-range Energy Alternative 
Planning system (LEAP) software. The study assessed the overall (economic, social and 
environmental) impact of change in fossil fuel price due to reduction in subsidy and an 
imposition of environmental tax. Also, Bahta (2014) used the CGE approach to explore 
the impact of international oil price increase on the economy of Free State Province in 
South Africa.  
Kuster et al (2007) employed the CGE to analyse if upcoming future energy systems 
will have implication on employment rate in the midst of persistently high 
unemployment rates in Europe. Lin and Jiang (2011) investigated the economic impacts 
of energy subsidy reforms using CGE model for China. Liu and Li (2011) established 
CGE model that contains pollutant and CO2 emissions account so as to stimulate fossil 
energy subsidy reform under different scenarios. Abouleinein, El-Laithy and Kheir-El-
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Din (2009) evaluated the short and medium-term impact of phasing out subsidies of 
petroleum products in Egypt using an input-output analysis and the CGE model. 
In the case of Indonesia, Dartanto (2012) and Widodo, Sahadewo, Setiastuti and 
Chaerriyah (2012) used the CGE micro-simulation and CGE model, respectively, to 
assess fuel subsidy impact. While the former examined the implication of reducing fuel 
subsidies on poverty, the latter considered how it will affect government spending and 
fiscal balance. Twimukye and Matovu (2009) applied the CGE model in investigating 
the macroeconomic and welfare consequences of high energy prices in Uganda. 
Coffman, Surles and Konan (2007) analysed the impact of petroleum prices on the 
economy of Hawaii using the CGE model under two scenarios. They applied the static 
model for price shocks under the first scenarios while a dynamic model was utilised 
under Energy Information Administration (EIA) scenarios. Also, Petersen (1997) 
applied the CGE model technique to the analysis of the Europe Agreements between the 
EU and Hungary, Poland and the former Czechslovakia.   
There were also some studies conducted for Nigeria, where Siddig et al (2014) evaluated 
the impacts of removing refined oil import subsidies on poverty using a global general 
equilibrium model called MyGTAP to link the Nigerian economy to the rest of the 
world. This newly developed MyGTAP according to Siddig et al (2014) is an extension 
of the standard GTAP as it augments it by including multiple households, improved 
government specification and inter-regional transfers such as remittances and foreign 
capital incomes. Adenikinju (2009) also adopted the CGE model in the analysis of the 
policy implications of efficient energy prices in Nigeria while equally exploring the 
impact of a compensatory scheme to cushion the effects of higher energy prices. 
Employing the CGE model approach and survey method, Adenikinju and Falobi (2006) 
investigated the macroeconomic and distributional consequences of energy supply 
shocks in Nigeria 
A number of CGE models currently exist, each having a set of complex non-linear 
equations to be solved, on the basis of assumptions on economic behavior. This includes 
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price elasticity of demand and supply. They are also applied in analysis of energy policy. 
According to Ellis (2010), the model when applied in fossil fuel subsidy impact are 
initially run with values that assumes subsidy payment, then it is run with the 
assumption that the subsidy is removed. This helps to estimate the overall net benefits 
and costs related with subsidy removal. Data requirements for general equilibrium 
modelling are usually very large and so the accuracy of the results will be dependent on 
the accuracy of the assumptions made and data employed. The strategic role of energy as 
an important input to the production of most goods in the market makes changes in 
energy prices to affect almost all goods across sectors. Ellis (2010) thus, recommended 
that energy-intensive industries should be included in the model in a disaggregated 
manner.  
 
2.5. Review of Empirical Issues 
The analysis of fuel subsidies and their impacts have been extensively studied in the 
literature. In empirical literature, evidence suggests that there is a general agreement that 
fuel subsidies are increasingly growing and are not sustainable, and their adequate and 
sequential reform can provide net benefits for the economy. Ellis (2010) reviewed six 
major studies on fossil-fuel reform undertaken since the early 1990s to determine if there 
are any common conclusions that can be drawn while identifying areas in need of further 
research. The study concluded that there exist significant economic and environmental 
benefits that would result from the reform of fossil fuel subsidy. Thus, the reform of 
fossil fuel subsidy should be considered as a “key element of a larger overall package for 
global climate change mitigation” (Ellis, 2010; pp. 8). This corroborates the assertion of 
Abraham (2012). Studies on the economic, social (welfare), environmental and political 
dimension of fuel subsidy as a policy are discussed in this section as well as measures for 
a successful reform of the policy. 
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2.5.1 Fiscal and Macroeconomic Impact of Fuel Subsidy 
Fuel subsidies are increasing by the year and if not eliminated, can pose a threat to 
sustainable development objectives. The rising energy consumption, energy prices and 
import dependency coupled with oil price volatility, had made fossil fuel subsidies to 
represent an increasingly significant drain on public financial resources (Bao and 
Sawdon, 2011). Also, in many countries, the percentage share of fuel subsidies in GDP is 
greater than the share of priority sectors such as healthcare, education and infrastructure. 
Furthermore, the economic consequence of fuel subsidy creates distortive and 
deadweight loss implications for the economy at large (Cust and Neuloff, 2010). This has 
generated some concerns among policy-makers and economic analysts over the years on 
the sustainability of these categories of subsidies. There is a general consensus on the 
need to analyse the fiscal implications and response of key macroeconomic aggregates of 
a change in fuel pump price. Empirical studies on economic impact of subsidy reform 
indicate that these subsidies hamper budgetary balance of government finance and affect 
key macroeconomic aggregates such as investment, trade, and so on. Their removal or 
reform will however, have significant benefits on the economy in the long run. The 
reform process may initially create shock to some economic indicators, but things will 
begin to normalise in no time. 
 
The IEA (2011) stated that fossil fuel subsidies result in an economically inefficient 
allocation of resources and market distortions which often fail to meet the intended 
objectives. The report pointed out that these subsidies can speed up the depletion of 
resources for oil-producers which can reduce export earnings over the long term. Also, 
for importers, these subsidies can impose a heavy burden on state budgets. Cust and 
Neuloff (2010) supported that domestic consumption subsidies do impose high costs and 
fiscal burden on the economies that provide them. Using Iran as an example, they 
asserted that consumption fuel subsidies is as high as 10 percent of GDP, thus invariably 
reducing overall GDP through higher taxes needed to be raised on other economic 
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activities. Also, these subsidies imply large forgone export revenues for fuel-exporting 
countries (Cust and Neuloff, 2010). 
 
Davis (2013) examined the economic cost of global fuel subsidies and found that using 
recent data from the World Bank, fuel and diesel subsidies amounted to US$110 billion 
in 2012. This underpricing of fuel products which results in overconsumption was found 
to create annual deadweight loss of about US$44 billion worldwide under baseline 
assumptions about demand and supply elasticity. This study posited that the incorporation 
of external costs substantially increases the economic costs of these form of subsidies. 
Lawrey and Pillarisetti (2011) supported the inefficiency argument of energy subsidies by 
stating that the pricing of energy products below marginal cost results in deadweight loss. 
This is because consumers are not confronted with the true opportunities cost of energy 
production and thus have little incentive to conserve.  
 
Plante (2013) investigated the long run macroeconomic impacts of fuel subsidies on the 
steady state level of macroeconomic aggregates such as consumption, labour supply, and 
aggregate welfare. The study found that subsidies creates distortionary effects such as the 
crowding out of non-oil consumption, inefficient inter-sectoral allocations of labour, 
reduced aggregate welfare and other forms of distortions. Macroeconomic variables such 
as prices, investment, growth rates of GDP, budget deficit, sectoral value-added, resource 
gap and welfare were significantly impacted in Egypt using a CGE approach in the study 
of Abouleinein et al. (2009). Their results indicated that subsidy removal will induce a 
significant increase in Consumer Price Index (CPI) and prices of energy-intensive 
industries. Also, the price of transport, communications and electricity will rise by about 
40-60 percent, budget deficit will turn to a surplus, resource gap will widen, total private 
consumption falls while GDP achieves about 4.14 percent growth rate under different 
simulation scenarios. These findings are similar to that of Jiang and Tan (2013) where 
using an input-output model for China, the removal significantly impacts energy-
intensive industries while driving up general price level. 
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Holton (2012) provided evidence from a panel study that GDP per capita as a measure of 
growth would be negatively affected with the introduction of energy subsidies. Widodo et 
al., (2012) studied how fuel subsidy removal will impact government spending in 
Indonesia using the CGE model and found the removal to affect income distribution of 
households, firms and government. For Solaymani and Kari (2014), they found that the 
removal of fuel subsidies in Malaysia resulted in increase in the level of real GDP and 
real investment but decreases total exports and imports, aggregate energy demand and 
carbon emissions. On the other hand, Safdari, Nabisheyhakitash, Jafari and Bargharden 
(2012) employed a simultaneous equation technique for Iran and found that the reduction 
of energy subsidies will cut down energy demand, increase industrial/sectoral 
productivity and likewise employment rate. 
 
According to Lin and Jiang (2011), the removal of energy subsidies will result in a 
significant reduction in energy demand and emissions, but with negative effects on 
macroeconomic variables. They concluded that offsetting policies could be employed to 
support other sustainable development measures, which ultimately can reduce energy 
intensity and favour the environment. Jiang and Tan (2013) corroborated the effect on 
energy-intensive industries and consequently stated that it will drive up general price 
level in China. In terms of impact of subsidy on investment, Lawal (2014) analysed the 
different regimes of fuel increases, subsidy payments and its effectiveness or otherwise in 
stimulating investment in the petroleum industry in Nigeria, providing recommendations 
on how best to attract private investment. As asserted by Balouga (2012), without 
reforms, creating a sound investment climate and promoting economic growth becomes a 
dream. 
 
The study of Onyemaechi (2012) revealed three major economic implications of 
petroleum policies in Nigeria suggesting that in the first place, there was a rapid 
expansion of economic actors in the Nigerian petroleum industry. Secondly, there was 
increased development of the transport system and finally, there were observed 
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improvements in the country‟s GDP, FDI and employment levels.  However, some other 
negative consequences their study identified include some economic problems generated 
ranging from fuel scarcity to loss of man-hours and confusion relating to the actual 
beneficiaries of the subsidy in Nigeria.  
 
Also, Efobi, Osabuohein and Beecroft (2012) using the VAR technique of estimation, 
found that the fuel subsidy removal in January 2012 had negative consequences on 
certain macroeconomic variables with a breakpoint in the trend of the indicators. Their 
econometric analysis established that there was a sharp reaction of variables such as 
exchange rate, inflation and money supply to fuel subsidy reduction considering the 
structural break and the impulse response function. Applying a linear function, Abang, 
Elufisan and Okwubunne (2012) ascertained how the subsidy removal affects the value of 
the Nigerian currency (naira) and local production. The study found that the policy will 
lead to increase in every commercial aspect, thus having negative impact on standard of 
living of the people. For local production, the removal will drive up transport cost for 
local manufacturing industries leading to increase in prices of both raw materials and 
finished products. This will make the local industries suffer at the expense of their 
foreign counterparts which eventually results in the promotion of large dependence on 
importation. 
 
The work of Adenikinju and Omenka (2013) analysed the potential benefit-loss and  
trade-offs associated with a domestic response to a 60 percent increase in international 
pump price of fuel. Their findings indicated that subsidising local fuel consumption 
brings about reductions in GDP, government revenue, investment, trade balance and 
household income by 4.3 percent, 2 percent, 27.2 percent, 2.7 percent, 9.6 percent and 5 
percent respectively. They however, pointed out that any negative consequences observed 
on the macro-economy can be reduced with a gradual reduction of fuel subsidy.  
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Another key macroeconomic indicator is investment and Morgan (2007) showed how the 
magnitude of energy subsidies is capable of influencing energy investment, pointing out 
that direct subsidies such as grants or tax exemptions is a drain on government finances. 
The study explained that these subsidies can undermine economic efficiency and 
investment in more efficient and cleaner energy technologies through different ways. 
This is in addition to incurring some macroeconomic costs as well. Pershing and 
Mackenzie (2004) equally indicated that the removal or reform of fuel subsidies can help 
in leveling the playing ground for the development of renewable energy technologies. 
This is because the subsidy makes fossil fuel cheaper, thereby hampering the 
commercialisation of alternatives such as renewables. In past years, there had been some 
improvements in switching to cleaner energy source such as solar and wind power. If the 
large amounts paid on subsidies are used to further develop the renewables, the demand 
for fossil fuel can be drastically reduced. Pershing and Mackenzie (2004), however, 
warned that the political hurdle to enacting this approach is remains very high in many 
regions. 
 
Energy subsidies can also compete for limited resources which could have otherwise 
been used to deliver other essential services. This is in addition to widening the scope for 
rent seeking and commercial malpractices, promotion of non-economic energy 
consumption, discouragement of both demand and supply side efficiency and make new 
forms of renewable uncompetitive (Baron et al., 2010). In studying three oil-exporting 
countries (Iran, Algeria and Nigeria), Birol, Aleagha and Ferroukhi (1995) found that 
with fuel subsidy reform, these countries will save substantial amounts of oil from 
domestic consumption which will in turn translate to additional revenue. 
 
Relating to impact of subsidies on trade, Burniaux, Chateau and Sauvage (2011) 
examined the trade effect of eliminating subsidies provided for fossil fuel by many 
developing and emerging economies using the OECD‟s ENV-linkages general 
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equilibrium model and the IEA estimate of consumer subsidies. Their findings indicated 
that a unified multilateral elimination of these subsidies over the 2013-2022 periods 
would raise world trade volumes by a very minimal amount (0.1 percent) by 2020. In the 
same vein, Agbedo and Akaan (2012) presented a critical discourse perspective on how 
the fuel subsidy debate represents a mind control game between the more powerful group 
represented by the government and the less powerful group represented by the organised 
labour union with the Nigerian populace.  
 
The study of Amegashie (2006) provided a unique insight as it argued that the removal of 
subsidies may not necessarily enhance the economic performance of developing countries 
as being put forth by the IMF and other empirical studies. The argument of opponents of 
the subsidy is that any form of departure from the competitive equilibrium price and 
quantity will result to a fall in social welfare which is not ideal. Thus, if the market is in a 
perfectly competitive equilibrium, a reduction in the price of the good which serves as a 
way of subsidy will lead to rises in its consumption beyond the competitive equilibrium 
quantity. This makes subsidy undesirable. Using the theory of the second-best as showed 
by Lipsey and Lancaster (1956), Amegashie (2006) concluded that conclusions can not 
necessarily be made that subsidies reduce social welfare unless the relative magnitude of 
the costs and benefits are known. The “second-best” theory implies that if there are 
irremovable disruptions in some sectors of the economy, then behaivour of economic and 
social indicators may be higher given that lasses-faire pricing doctrines are intentionally 
violated in other sectors of the economy (Amegashie, 2006). 
 
2.5.2. Welfare Impact of Fuel Subsidy 
The welfare impact of fuel subsidy is an important analysis as it is the aspect that creates 
controversy the most. This is because the policy is considered to protect poor households 
from oil price shocks and enhance energy access which will ultimately promote growth. 
Any form of call for its reform is however, met with stiff opposition.  This welfare effect 
on household income will have both direct and indirect effect (Coady et al., 2006; 
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Granado, Coady and Gillingham, 2012). The direct effect will emanate from higher 
prices for petroleum products consumed by households while the indirect effect will be in 
terms of higher prices of other goods and services consumed by households. This is due 
to the strategic role of fuel/energy in production, thus any increase in energy prices will 
increase production cost (raw materials, transportation, distribution, etc.) which will 
increase price of goods and services. The magnitude and distribution of these impacts 
will depend strongly on the share or value of cooking, lighting, heating and private 
transportation costs in total household consumption (Granado et al., 2012). This is in 
addition to the fuel intensity of other goods and services.   
 
In exploring the fiscal and welfare impacts of reforming fuel subsidies in India, Anand et 
al (2013) found that despite the fact that the reform generates substantial fiscal savings; 
the associated fuel price increase lowers household real incomes for all income groups. 
Umar and Umar (2013) measured the direct welfare impact of fuel subsidy reform 
through higher fuel prices, on different socio-economic groups in Nigeria using the 
Household Expenditure Survey of 2010 and found reduction in welfare to be larger for 
the middle 40 percent group compared to the top and bottom 20 percent.   
 
Nwafor et al. (2006) and Siddig et al. (2014) studied how fuel subsidy removal will 
impact poverty levels in Nigeria. Nwafor et al. (2006) stated that national poverty level 
would increase without the spending of the associated savings as a result of the 
consequent rise in input costs. Siddig et al. (2014) equally asserted that even though GDP 
would increase, it can have a detrimental impact on household income particularly poor 
households. However, these negative impacts can be alleviated if the subsidy cut is 
accompanied with income transfers targeted at poor households. Likewise, Cooke, 
Hague, Cockburn, El-Lahga and Tiberti (2014) assessed the impact that Ghana‟s fuel 
subsidy reform will have on poverty and the relevant mitigating response. They found 
that almost 78 percent of fuel subsidies benefitted the wealthiest group while less than 3 
percent of the associated benefits reached the poor.  
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IEA (2011) further confirmed that fossil fuel subsidies continue to remain an inefficient 
means of helping poor households as statistics revealed that at the global level, only 8 
percent of the US$409 billion spent on fuel subsidies in 2010 went to the poorest 20 
percent of the population. Gangopadhyay, Ramaswami and Wadhwa (2005) showed that 
for India, reduction in fuel subsidies will negatively affect the income of poor 
households. Thus, the removal should be supported with other policies that would limit 
the adverse impacts. Employing a household budget survey for 5000 households, 
Adagunodo (2013) found that the marginal social cost for all petroleum products are 
extremely low which is indicative of the reduction of petroleum subsidies in Nigeria.  
 
2.5.3. Political Economy of Fuel Subsidies 
Energy subsidies continue to persist despite their negative effects mainly due to some 
political issues which affect any attempt at the reform. Governments often find it difficult 
to institute reform measures as a result of the political economy of fuel subsidies (ADR, 
2012). Globally, reform measures in this regard are always confronted with stiff 
opposition from the public, mainly attributable to the politics that revolves around the 
policy. This is due to the lack of confidence in the government and since government do 
not want situations of political and social unrest, most countries often reverse any reform 
attempt. A number of countries have experienced nationwide protests that threatened 
economic activities when government attempted to introduce fuel subsidy reform. They 
include Nigeria, Egypt, Morocco, Iran, among others. This makes the analysis of the 
political constraints to reforming energy subsidies important. A number of empirical 
studies exist in understanding the political aspect of the prevalence of subsidies.  
 
Victor (2009) asserted that often times, attempts to reform fuel subsidy could result from 
the inability of relevant institutions to understand the dynamics of the political dimension 
of a subsidy policy. As co-ordinated groups tend to gain more from introduction of 
subsidy, naturally there would be moves against any policy to take it away. Commander 
(2012) was in support of the notion that fuel subsidy is better understood from a political 
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economy ideology given that political institutions are able to influence the choice of 
policy instruments. The study also provided a guide to the political economy of reforming 
energy subsidies by assessing why these subsidies persists and possible channels of 
overcoming barriers to their reform. Victor (2009) analysed the politics of fossil fuel 
subsidies by examining the interactions among key fundamental puzzles such as the 
prevalence of fossil fuel subsidies, the goals of government and the political structure of 
the fossil fuel industry. 
 
Furthermore, Strand (2013) discusses and models the various political economy aspects 
of fuel subsidies with particular focus on democratic and autocratic governments. The 
study designed a political path where promises of low fuel prices are introduced under a 
democratic system of government to make people vote while also being used as a tool to 
gather support among essential groups under an autocratic system of government. In 
Nigeria, Akinwale, Olaopa, Ogundari and Siyanbola (2013) analysed the influences of 
politics on the operations of subsidy provided for energy. Studies such as Henshaw and 
Onyeacholem (2012) were able to argue that the problem of corruption also is 
accountable for the crisis that usually surrounds subsidy and not just a fiscal burden 
challenge. The study analysed the role of government in allowing illegal and unlawful 
practices in the payment of subsidy to oil importers.  
 
Thus, in the absence of efforts at addressing the corruption challenge, reform measures 
may not generate meaningful result but rather continue to lead to agitation. According to 
Commander (2012) designing an adequate process through which reforms are presented, 
managed and executed will be a more viable measure to ensure success. This is in 
addition to due consideration for political and other associated constraints. The study 
noted that while countries experience the infeasibility of rapid reform, a gradual or 
systematic approach had been shown to be problematic, often leading to policy reversal.  
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2.5.4. Environmental Consequences of Fuel Subsidy 
The assessment of the environmental implication of fuel subsidy is the key focus of this 
study. The importance of this analysis lies in the need to reassess some existing policies 
that could by design or otherwise, hamper global efforts at tackling environmental 
challenges such as climate change. The study of the link between fossil fuel subsidies and 
environmental quality is rooted in the three impacts that these categories of subsidies 
have on climate change as stated by Merrill (2015). In the first place, their presence 
prevents energy efficiency and cleaner energy alternatives such as renewable energy. 
Secondly, there reform is capable of reducing demand for fossil fuel based energy and 
encourage a switch to cleaner sources of energy, thereby causing a fall in carbon 
emissions. Thirdly, removal and taxation of fossil fuel subsidy can generate and raise 
domestic revenue that can be invested in the transition to a low-carbon economy (Merrill, 
2015). This is further explained by the statistics of Stefanski (2014) that the relationship 
between fossil fuel subsidies and climate change points to the fact that these subsidies 
contributed to about 20.7 percent of total global carbon emissions between 1980 and 
2010. These and more empirical evidence had thus, resulted to calls to reform these 
subsidies for a cleaner and more sustainable environment.  
 
This growing international pressure to reduce GHG emissions has necessitated renewed 
attention on policies that focus on subsidising the consumption or production of fossil 
fuel, an environmentally harmful source of energy (Koplow and Dernbach, 2001). 
Though energy is an essential input for economic growth, its production, transformation, 
transmission, distribution and utilisation exerts negative effects on the environment 
(Sambo, 2010). This point was supported by Bao and Sawdon (2011; pp. 2) which stated 
that “environmental impacts occur all along the value chain of fossil subsidies; from the 
activities of the extractive industries through to the intermediate process (transport, 
refining and power generation) and then to the final consumption of energy”. This 
realisation had led to some attempts at analysing the implications that fuel subsidy as a 
policy can have for the environment and also examining the existence of a relationship 
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between subsidies and environmental quality. Studies such as Larsen and Shah (1992); 
OECD (1998); Koplow and Dernbach (2001); Bao and Sawdon (2011); Allaine and 
Brown (2012); APEC (2012); UNDP (2012); Ballali (2013); Mukherjee and Chakraborty 
(2013); Whitley (2013); Douthwaite and Healy (2014), Stefanski (2014); Merrill (2015); 
UNEP (2015); among others, have analysed how different EHS, majorly fossil fuel, can 
influence the environment and how their reform can help tackle climate change. This was 
carried out for different countries and regions. 
 
The study of Mukherjee and Chakraborty (2013) found a positive relationship between 
subsidies and environmental degradation using a cross-country framework. This 
relationship could be due to the fact that policies designed to subsidise consumption or 
production of fossil fuel will inevitably promote increased concentration of GHG and 
CO2 emissions in the atmosphere. The argument is that if adequate measures are not put 
in place, the policy can significantly hamper global efforts at tackling climate change as 
an environmental concern. Many of these studies that focus on the environmental 
consequences of fuel subsidy asserts that reductions in GHG emissions can be achieved 
with the adequate reform fossil fuel subsidy, which will further help in fighting climate 
change (Burnianx et al., 2009; IEA, 2011; Ellis, 2010; Liu and Li, 2007; Ballali, 2013; 
UNEP, 2015). This is supported by the assertion of the IEA that the phasing out of energy 
subsidies is one of the four policies to keep the world on course for the 2-degree global 
warming target at no net economic cost (Whitley, 2013). This is further re-emphasied by 
the findings of Bao and Sawdon (2011). Developing a CGE model for the Vietnamese 
economy, they assessed the environmental impact of reducing fossil fuel subsidy and 
imposing environmental tax. The study found the reduction of subsidies and tax 
imposition to result in significant reductions in emissions. This is evident in reductions of 
about 3 percent of BAU emissions by 2015, rising to over 9 percent by 2020 and 
remaining at that level by 2030. The subsidies covered subsidy on coal, petrol and 
electricity. 
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The work of Larsen and Shah (1992) considered one of the pioneering works on the 
relationship between fossil fuel subsidies and global carbon emissions, asserts that 
removing these large subsidies could substantially cut down carbon emissions in some 
countries. Thus, assuming no change in world fossil fuel prices, global carbon emissions 
could be reduced by 9 percent and by 5 percent when accounting for estimated changes in 
world prices. Larsen (1994) applying a simple model with inter-fuel substitution using a 
detailed sectoral data of a sample of countries found support for this result. In the same 
vein, Burniaux et al., (2009) provided evidence that overall world CO2 emissions can fall 
by 10 percent by 2050 if consumer fossil fuel subsidies in 20 OECD countries were 
removed. In IEA (2011)‟s estimation, growth of these emissions will fall by 6 percent by 
year 2020. Evidence for Nigeria and Venezuela showed that carbon emissions will 
average 1.89 and 11.77 million metric tonnes respectively as provided by the work of 
Ballali (2013). As stated in Whitley (2013), IEA estimates suggest that even a partial 
phase-out by year 2020 would reduce GHG emissions by 360 million tons, equivalent of 
12 percent of the reduction required to achieve the objective of holding temperature rise 
by 2 degrees. UNDP (2012) estimated benefits of reforming fossil fuel fiscal policies for 
Vietnam in the context of responding to climate change when GHG emissions are cut.   
 
Also, the reform of fuel subsidy had been argued to be a useful instrument in driving a 
green growth agenda/strategy. This is in view of the growing consensus that phasing out 
fossil fuel subsidies is an essential component of the green economy agenda (UNEP, 
2015). Furthermore, Merrill (2014) asserted that a growing research, modelling and 
evidence suggests that reforming fossil fuel subsidies is an important piece of the jigsaw 
needed if we are to solve the climate change challenge in terms of absolute reductions in 
GHG emissions. This will help solve not only energy security concerns, but also advance 
climate change agendas of many countries. Following this line of argument, Whitley 
(2013) opined that large and increasing fuel subsidies represents obstacles to green 
investment while seriously undermining attempts to put a price on carbon. That is, in 
addition to being a drain on national budget, they undermine global efforts at averting 
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climate change. Jones (2011) showed how an economy can drive towards a green 
economy through fiscal policy reform and public finance (tax), stating that fiscal policies 
are essential part of a co-ordinated strategy towards improving resource efficiency, 
reducing environmental risks and scarcities. 
 
However, studies such as Morgan (2007), Liu and Li (2007), Ellis (2010) and Laan, 
Beaton and Presta (2010) emphasised the issue of switch overs from less polluting fuel to 
a more polluting fuel as a result of fuel subsidy removal due to increase in energy prices. 
For instance, an increase in the price of petrol due to the removal of subsidy can drive 
poor households to using dirty energy such as coal for cooking and other needs. The 
alternative would be to ensure the switch is to renewable energy sources that are 
considered to have minimal or no emission. The argument is that government can 
internalise such externalities, thereby achieving a positive environmental impact through 
the introduction of the subsidy. The end result will be a stricter form of regulation to 
guide decision of the switch overs by rational energy consumers. Thus, for fuel subsidy 
reform to be successful and not create negative consequences, it must be properly 
planned and executed with adequate consideration.   
 
2.5.5. Energy Subsidy and Environmental Quality 
The relationship between energy subsidy and environmental quality stem from how the 
subsidy results to lower energy prices which increases energy consumption. This, in turn 
increases the burning of fossil fuel and by extension, increase emission of greenhouse 
gases into the atmosphere. Through this channel of transmission, the environment 
deteriorates. Fossil fuel been a non-renewable energy source, has proven to be adequate, 
however, its byproducts are harmful to both humans and the environment (Ajayi, 2013). 
The assertion that energy subsidy continues to deteriorate the environment forms an 
integral aspect of many international and regional debates that tends to be more 
favourable towards the adoption of alternative sources of energy. In other words, 
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production and generation of energy should be from renewable energy sources such as 
hydropower, wind, solar, geothermal and biomass (Ajayi and Ajayi, 2013). 
 
The emphasis of government subsidy in the energy sector should be towards supporting 
technological developments and commercialisation of renewable energy. For instance, 
government can decide to subsidise technologies for efficient environmentally friendly 
energy sources to enhance access to electricity in remote areas, diversify energy mix or 
promote a decentralised generation (UNEP, 2003). Subsidies to enhance these 
technologies could be in form of research and development (R & D) funding, favourable 
tax structure, grants, soft loans and favourable regulations.  
 
These global efforts at reforming fossil fuel subsidies stemmed from the need for a 
renewed focus on existing policies that may encourage consumption or production of 
fossil fuel. Koplow and Dernbach (2001) showed that fossil fuel contributes about 90 
percent to greenhouse gas emission. The impact fossil fuel has on the environment flows 
from this channel of emission, which subsidies enhance since it leads to 
overconsumption. These emissions significantly impacts the environment (Alege and 
Ogundipe, 2013; Akinyemi, Ogundipe and Alege, 2014), and the energy sector is a key 
contributor. This makes it essential to consider the structure of some policies in the 
energy sector that may influence the environment negatively. In addition to this, the 
global drive towards green growth/economy and low-carbon development initiatives has 
seen many countries and regions seek for necessary avenues to discourage economic 
activities and production technology that increases carbon intensity. This is essentially 
through the provision of incentives to support shift towards modern energy sources which 
are environmentally friendly and sustainable. This will trigger higher growth rates and at 
the same time with minimal emission levels. Africa is equally making attempt at being 
part of this global effort and this is reflected in the Africa Development 2012 Report 
where issues relating to moving towards green growth in the continent are discussed. 
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The identification of the negative consequences of these forms of subsidies coupled with 
the corrupt practices surrounding payment of subsidies to fuel importers, led the Federal 
Government of Nigeria (FGN) to announce the removal of fuel subsidy on January 1
st
, 
2012 (Odoh, 2012). Some of the factors cited for the removal ranges from the huge 
unsustainable burden of the payments to how it stifles competition and discourage private 
investment in refinery development. This was, however, met with a stiff opposition from 
organised labour and civil society which resulted in a mass protest across the country for 
two weeks. This reaction was partly due to the economic hardship the removal creates 
and the multiplier effect of an increase in fuel price in the entire economy. Since then, 
there had been series of debates in support or otherwise for the removal of fuel subsidy in 
Nigeria.  
 
On one hand are those raising concerns on the fiscal pressure that fuel subsidy payments 
places on government finances which had been argued to be unsustainable. On the other 
hand, the civil societies believe the removal of the subsidy will drive up fuel prices and 
make prices of commodities and services more expensive with attendant multiplier effect. 
Following the socio-economic crisis the policy shift created in the nation, the then 
President, Dr. Goodluck Jonathan decided to reverse the decision to a partial removal. 
This brought the fuel pump price from ₦165 to ₦97 instead of going back to the initial 
₦67. Government also inaugurated the Subsidy Reinvestment and Empowerment-
Programme (SURE- P) to act as a form of welfare safety net that will absorb the negative 
impact of the removal on poor households. This programme was to utilise the fuel 
subsidy savings in infrastructural development projects and designed along the 
transformation agenda with a life span running from 2012 to 2015. Some of the social 
safety net programmes by the SURE-P includes vocational training, mass transit system, 
maternal and child healthcare, community service, women and youth empowerment, 
HIV/AIDS intervention, polio eradication programme and heart/stroke center (SURE-P, 
2013). Other infrastructural development projects include construction of roads and 
bridges, railways, including Abuja light rail, Niger delta projects and mass housing 
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scheme. The SURE-P team was mandated by the presidency to ensure transparency, 
accountability and restore the confidence of the people in the government. 
 
2.5.6. Achieving Successful Reform of Fuel Subsidy 
Energy subsidies are costly, rising and inequitable making it necessary to reform the 
policy framework for setting petroleum product prices (Coady et al., 2010). This is to 
reduce the fiscal burden of these subsidies and tackle environmental challenges such as 
climate change effectively. Other motivations behind these reforms centers on the desire 
to reduce fiscal expenditure, improve energy efficiency or minimise pollution and 
emission levels. However, according to Laan, Beaton and Presta (2010), if poorly 
planned and executed, the reform can result to adverse economic, social or environmental 
consequences due to higher energy prices.  Friedrichs and Inderwildi (2013) presented an 
argument for fuel rich countries support for fossil fuel subsidies. They asserted that these 
categories of countries are most likely doomed with what they termed as “carbon curse”. 
This carbon curse is related to resource curse, in which case the more the fuel endowment 
of a country, the more their emissions. They identified uneconomic fuel consumption 
subsidies as one of the causal mechanisms for most fuel rich countries to experience 
carbon curse. This is because governments in these countries are often under pressure to 
grant these subsidies which further augments carbon intensity of economic output. 
Friedrichs and Inderwildi (2013) attributed three reasons why government grants these 
uneconomical subsidies.  
 
In the first place, political leaders are obliged to accommodate the feeling of entitlement 
by citizens to the national resource wealth. Secondly, fuel subsidies in most fuel rich 
countries are opportunity costs rather than fiscal expenditure, since the marginal cost of 
fuel production is only a fraction of world market prices (Friedrichs and Inderwildi, 
2013).  Lastly, fuel subsidies are sometimes affordable even in countries where marginal 
production costs are higher than subsidised fuel prices. The paper concluded that fuel rich 
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countries such as Iraq and Nigeria should focus on addressing energy poverty and 
infrastructure rather than investing in uneconomic fuel subsidies.  
 
Pearse and Finck Von (1999) emphasised means of advancing subsidy reforms which 
should be about moving towards a viable policy package. They advocated a gradual 
approach coupled with adequate public awareness, transparency and accountability as the 
best method for reform subsidies with success. UNEP (2003) presented the lessons learnt 
in assessing the impact of energy subsidies and the design of their reforms; while the 
IEA, OPEC, OECD and World Bank (2010) joint report analysed the scope of energy 
subsidies and suggestions for the G-20 initiative. Koplow (2012) appraised the 
commitment of the G20 towards fossil fuel subsidy phase out and highlighted some 
structural reforms that would increase the likelihood of the phase out being successful. 
Some of these reforms include separating reporting from reform, establishing an 
oversight and review board, setting up necessary technical committee, among others. 
However, despite the need for the reform or removal of these categories of subsidies due 
to their being inefficient, inequitable and fiscally costly; many developing countries‟ 
government still find it politically difficult to reform them (Granado et al, 2012).   
 
2.6. Some Regional Experiences and Lessons Learnt 
The nature and characteristics of energy subsidies is almost the same in different part of 
the world, the unique features and peculiarities of some regions only present some 
differences. Different countries have attempted to reform their fossil fuel subsidies with 
varying degrees of success (Laan et al., 2010). Studies from a number of the regions 
supported the view that energy subsidies are costly and require urgent reform. The 
sequence, timing, pace and politics that play out then determines how profitable the 
reform process will be. The sub-section below presents energy subsidies for the different 
regions of the world and lessons learnt from their success or otherwise stories. 
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2.6.1. Energy Subsidies in the European Union 
 Different studies (European Environment Agency, 2004; Kovacevic, 2011: GSI, 2012; 
Alberici et al., 2014, among others) have analysed the nature, magnitude and impact of 
fuel subsidy in the European Union. Kovacevic (2011) assesses fossil fuel subsidies for 
the Western Balkans, a country close to the South east of Serbia. A GSI (2012) report 
presented a synthesis of existing knowledge on fossil fuel subsidies through the profiles 
of some European Union and G20 countries. The goal was to highlight how much could 
be saved by governments from the reform without applying any subjective judgment to 
available data. Evidence from the report suggested that countries such as USA, 
Germany, Australia, Mexico and UK could save between 4 billion and 12 billion Euros 
a year by the phasing out of government support for fossil fuels. The reform is expected 
to lead to a significant cut in greenhouse gas emissions and the money saved can be 
invested in clean alternative energy, green jobs and other public goods. The GSI (2012) 
report also presented four steps for governments to reform fossil fuels subsidies from 
the case studies analysed. The steps are as follow; 
i. Define plans to phase out fossil fuels by 2015. Countries should agree to eliminate 
fossil fuel subsidies by 2015; 
ii. Increase transparency and Consistency in the reporting of subsidies. A fair and 
transparent disclosure of the existence and value of subsidies will help to enhance 
informed and robust plans for reform; 
iii. Incorporate assistance and safeguards to developing countries, as well as poor and 
vulnerable groups. The reform of consumer subsidies for fuel will only be 
successful if adequate safeguards are incorporated for the poor and the vulnerable. 
Developing countries should be assisted with financial and technical resources 
with capacity building; and  
iv. Create an international body to enhance the support for subsidy reform. This body 
will help support the global effort towards the phasing out of fossil fuel subsidies.   
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2.6.2. Energy Subsidies in OECD Countries 
         The OECD has been working on reforming and the elimination of support for 
inefficient consumption and production of fossil fuel subsidies as contained in their 
numerous reports. This is to help enhance the achievement of economic and fiscal 
objectives and further tackling of environmental crisis such as climate change. 
According to the IEA, OPEC, OECD and the World Bank (2010) report, many OECD 
countries have been raising taxes on energy which represents negative subsidies, 
majorly fossil fuels transport which are up to US$400 billion (this excludes goods and 
services tax and VAT) in between the period 2003 and 2008. The report cited 
examples of Poland‟s reduced VAT for energy products, Indonesia and Malaysia‟s 
reform of direct subsidies for petroleum products including the United States.  
 
Also, the work of Allaire and Brown (2012) assessed the effects of energy subsidies on 
energy markets and carbon emissions in the United States of America. The study 
covered about 60 different subsidies targeted towards the increase of energy 
production, subsidising of energy consumption and increasing energy efficiency. 
These categories of subsidies cover both tax provisions and spending programmes 
between the period 2005 and 2009. The major finding of the study using a partial 
equilibrium approach is that within the period under review; government expenditure 
shifted from subsidies that increased carbon emissions to those that emphasised its 
reduction. 
 
According to Allaire and Brown (2012), the US government expenditure on subsidies 
that increased CO2 emission in 2005 amounted to US$9.1 billion while expenditures 
that reduced CO2 emission stood at US$3.4 billion. In 2009, these figures shifted as 
expenditures on subsidies that increased and decreased CO2 emission was given as 
US$15.4 billion and US$18.5 billion respectively. Examples of subsidies that 
increased CO2 emission as indicated in the report includes tax provisions for fossil 
fuel-based companies, assistance for low-income housing cooling and heating; and 
53 
 
alcohol fuel excise tax. On the other hand, subsidies that reduced carbon emission 
ranges from home weatherisation programmes, tax credits for energy efficient home 
improvements, renewable energy production and loan guarantees for energy efficient 
improvements (Allaire and Brown, 2012).  
 
2.6.3. Energy Subsidies in Asia 
       The Chief Economist of IEA, Dr. Faith Birol asserted in October 2013 that Southeast 
Asia must remove US$51 billion (2012 estimates) of fossil fuel subsidies which distorts 
energy markets in the region. The total fossil-fuel subsidies for five Asian countries for 
2011 estimates as presented by the IEA showed that Indonesia‟s subsidies amounted to 
about US$21.3 billion (2.5 percent of GDP); US$7.2 billion for Malaysia representing 
2.6 percent of GDP; US$1.5 billion for Philippines with 0.7 percent of GDP; US$10.3 
billion for Thailand with 3.0 percent of GDP and US$4.1 billion for Vietnam 
representing 3.4 percent of GDP. The argument is that many of the Asian countries such 
as Malaysia, Indonesia and Thailand who are rich in renewable energy resources (solar, 
geothermal, biomass, hydro), might remain underdeveloped if the Asian governments 
continue to spend billions of dollars on subsidising fuel consumption.  
 
        Breisinger, Engelke and Ecker (2011) supported the reform of petroleum subsidies for 
development in Yemen. Attempts towards the removal of these subsidies are often met 
with angry protests from local communities who are already used to cheap fuel. These 
unsuccessful attempts are, however, due to their being sensitive and political in many 
parts of the region. In recent years, there have been some encouraging signs that 
countries are beginning a gradual phase out of these subsidies. Though Lin and Li 
(2012) pointed out that for China, subsidy removal would affect competitiveness 
through the trade channel which would generate negative externalities in china but 
positive externalities to other regions without subsidy removal. Also, it would generate a 
rebound effect that would produce positive externalities to areas without subsidy reform 
which may however hinder global emission reductions (Hong, Liang and Di, 2013). 
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       The fuel price of Indonesia was found to be the lowest in comparison with some selected 
countries such as Singapore, Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam and Malaysia (Askolani, 
2010). Mourougane (2010) asserted that the oil price hike of 2007 and 2008 underlined 
the vulnerability of Indonesia‟s energy subsidy policy to oil price volatility. Askolani 
(2010) suggested that for Indonesia, subsidised fuel should be limited to the households, 
micro businesses, fishery business, public transportation and public services. Other 
policy measures include reduction of fossil fuel consumption by introducing new types 
of bio-fuel, enhancing the development of alternative energy and the monitoring of 
subsidised fuel distribution and law enforcement for misuse. How practicable these 
suggestions will be, is another question entirely. GSI (2012) at a workshop with South 
Asian policy makers on fossil fuel subsidy rise in 2012 stated that three main pillars of 
implementing reform plans should entail getting energy prices right, managing the 
impacts of the reform and building support for reform. 
 
2.6.4. Energy Subsidies in Arab Countries 
Fattouh and El-Katiri (2012) evaluated the nature, characteristics, financing and reform 
of energy subsidies in the Arab world and found that despite the negative effects of 
energy subsidies; they represent a vital social safety net for the poor in many parts of the 
Arab region. Studying seventeen Arab countries, they asserted that energy subsidies are 
costly to the Arab world in economic, social and environmental terms. Also, the year 
2011 presented the Arab region with difficulties in terms of energy pricing structure as 
that year witnessed a number of protests and uprisings that resulted to the removal of 
long serving presidents particularly in Egypt, Libya and Tunisia.  
 
        This made government in the region in the coming years who were willing to engage in 
energy pricing reforms to be faced with tremendous pressure to achieve a delicate 
balance between necessary but painful economic reform, and the political and economic 
expectations of their younger generations (Fattouh and El-Katiri, 2012). However, the 
enormous fiscal burden created by increasing energy subsidies in the Arab countries has 
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thus made its reform essential rather than a matter of choice. Fattouh and El-Katiri 
(2012) then recommended that despite the serious negative effects the reform will have 
on the people, the reform programme must be accompanied with focused mitigation 
measures that will help reduce the impact.   
 
Energy subsidies are prevalent in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region as it 
accounts for about half of the global energy subsidies (IMF, 2013c). The region is made 
up of the Algeria, Bahrain, Djibouti, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, 
Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, UAE and 
Yemen. Half of the subsidy on energy is on petroleum products, while the other half is 
on electricity and gas. In this region, the countries, both energy importers and exporters 
have had to rely on energy subsidies as a tool to provide social protection and the 
sharing of hydrocarbon wealth (IMF, 2013c). It is observed that even though these 
subsidies provide support for the consumers, its benefits basically flow to the upper 
income group in the society. IMF (2013c) cited the example of Sudan where the poorest 
20 percent of the population receives only about 3 percent of fuel subsidies, while the 
richest 20 percent gets more than 50 percent and this situation is said to be similar in 
many other countries of the region. 
 
The IMF (2013c) prepared a report on the benefits of energy subsidies in the region, the 
barriers to reform and the roadmap for an effective policy take-off. Some of the 
measures for effective reform according to the report include a comprehensive energy 
sector reform plan and communications strategy; appropriately phased and sequenced 
price increases; improved efficiency of state-owned enterprises to reduce producer 
subsidies; and targeted mitigating measures and depoliticised price setting. An important 
point recognised in reform process is that there should be careful planning in terms of 
the timing and pace of the reform.   
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2.6.5. Energy Subsidies in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) 
The reform of energy subsidies is an important but challenging issue for SSA countries 
(IMF, 2013a). Analysis on prevalence and persistence of fossil fuel subsidies also exists 
for the SSA countries. El-said and Leigh (2006) presented the fiscal and distributional 
cost of fuel price subsidies for Gabon. Despite reform efforts in the region, energy 
subsidies still represent a large share of the scarce public resource. IMF estimates 
showed that fiscal cost of fuel subsidies, both direct subsidies and forgone taxes, 
amounted to 1.4 percent of the region‟s GDP in 2012; where these subsidies mostly 
benefit the better off. Then again, their removal will equally hurt the poor. In SSA, 
energy subsidies mostly benefit the higher income earners as they consume energy 
products the most. IMF (2013c) suggested the following lessons to be learnt from case 
studies of SSA countries that have attempted to reduce energy subsidies; 
a. Transparency and public communication on the size of energy subsidies and their 
beneficiaries is essential to kick start the reform process. Like the case of Nigeria, 
Niger and Ghana where the government used fact sheets to call for the need for 
reform; 
b. There should be careful preparation with public education and wide consultation 
with key stakeholders. This is critical for success, like in the case of Kenya and the 
electricity reform and Namibia; 
c. A gradual phasing in and sequencing of subsidy reforms seem to work best, which is 
especially true when subsidies are large or have been in place for a long time;  
d. Also, strong institutions are needed to sustain energy subsidy reforms; and 
e. The case studies showed that durably reducing electricity subsidies involves much 
more than tariff increases. There must be an environment that is conducive to 
seizing the considerable scope for energy gains.   
In addition, Laan et al. (2010) documented lessons that can be learned from the 
experiences of Ghana, Senegal and France in reforming their fossil fuel subsidies. They 
provided in a similar manner, six important strategies towards improving the chances of 
a sustainable reform. These includes research, establishing reform objectives and 
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parameters, building a coherent reform policy, implementation, monitoring, evaluation 
and adjustment, and then preventing a backsliding (going forward). These can provide 
valuable insights for introducing reform measures while considering features specific to 
the African region. 
 2.6.6. Energy Subsidies in Nigeria 
The nature and the impact of energy subsidies have also been analysed for Nigeria just 
like other regions. Majority of these studies for Nigeria mostly investigated economic 
and welfare impacts of energy subsidies on the economy. This is in terms of assessing it 
both at micro and the macro level, and also how the policy can affect macroeconomic 
variables. With the exception of Abraham (2012), many ignored the environmental 
dimension. Abraham (2012) argued that even though the removal of subsidy on fuel 
may create some welfare implications in the short run; the policy will result to greener 
growth and the enhancement of sustainable development in the long run. The study 
Adenikinju (2009) examined the response of energy prices and the private sector to 
energy sector reform and found that despite the growth in energy prices; significant 
private sector investment is yet to be stimulated.  
 
Onyeizugbe and Onwuka (2012) attempted to find out if fuel subsidy removal can be an 
imperative for enhancing business development and wealth creation for the citizenry by 
adopting the descriptive survey design method. Based on classical economic theory of 
regulated monopolies with which subsidies are perceived as distorting prices, they 
found the non-existence of a significant relationship between fuel subsidy removal and 
job creation in Nigeria. Similarly, Bazilian and Onyeji (2012) observed that as 
beneficial the removal of fuel subsidy might be, especially in reducing demand; it has 
the ability to shrink firms‟ cost competitiveness in severely power-constrained 
economies. In other words, the removal of fuel subsidy in the face of inadequate public 
power supply can exert negative influence of performance of businesses.  
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They emphasised the importance of considering structural features that are peculiar to 
developing countries when analysing issues of fuel subsidy removal. There should be 
adequate mechanisms in place while also measuring the tempo of change in order to 
ensure that increasing access to high-quality energy services is not impeded by non-
affordability (Bazilian and Onyeji, 2012). Overall, there should be means by which 
subsidy removal will promote growth rather than exerting negative influence on the 
business community. Anyandike (2013) assessed the implication of the full scale 
deregulation of the downstream oil sector of the Nigerian Economy looking at the neo-
liberalism approach. Designing questionnaire for 1,177 respondents in Delta, Rivers 
and Bayelsa, the study found that the deregulation policy is a good policy but wrongly 
implemented hence, leaving the existing refineries in a state of comatose.   
 
    Chiwetalu (2012) and Ering and Akpan (2012) assessed the socio-economic 
implications of fuel subsidy in Nigeria, the politics surrounding it and why the populace 
often put up a resistance towards attempts at its reform. They found out that the subsidy 
benefited the rulers and multinational companies and not the citizen; thus 
recommending that government must engage the citizenry at all levels in policies that 
affect the masses. Balogun (2012) attributed this stiff opposition from the masses to the 
lack of trust in government which is as a result of failed promises made in the past. In 
order to ascertain the fallacy or fact claims on the existence of fuel subsidy in Nigeria, 
Nwachukwu and Chike (2011) found that fuel subsidy is a fact and not a fallacy. 
 
In estimating the effect of the fuel subsidy removal on the real estate industry, Odudu 
(2013) assessed the effects of fuel subsidy removal on property values in Nigeria and 
found that the partial removal led to high cost of production and transportation in the 
real estate sector. The high cost of building materials thus, led some developers resort 
to using substandard or lesser quantities of materials so as to still be able to maximise 
profits. In relation to the issue of sustainable development, Lin and Jiang (2010) opined 
that energy subsidies can have important implications through their impact on 
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efficiency, choice of fuel use and energy use. For Nigeria, Ekong and Akpan (2014) 
indicated that even though it is knotty issue for government, reforming fossil fuel 
subsidy in Nigeria offers greater opportunities in placing the country on the path of 
sustainable development.   
 
Odoh (2012) identified the remote and immediate causes of the oil subsidy removal in 
Nigeria and asserted that the reform will help curb oil smuggling activities in the 
country and corruption. In light of all these assertions by the various empirical studies, 
Isihak and Akpan (2012) designed a “win-win” roadmap for the restructuring of 
petroleum subsidies in Nigeria, while addressing some of the deficiencies of previous 
attempts at reforms. Some vital elements identified from the reform process of 
successful countries as recognised by their study are effective consultation, strong 
political will coupled with effective communication with relevant stakeholders, in 
addition to well-targeted compensatory schemes that cushions the reform effects on the 
most vulnerable group of the population.  
 
2.7. Knowledge Gaps in the Literature 
Based on the literature reviewed, it is evident that there have been concerted efforts 
globally in addressing the challenges posed by large subsidy payments, Nigeria 
inclusive. The general consensus in the literature is that subsidies create fiscal harm to 
government budget and inefficient conditions which can hamper sustainable 
development efforts. In other words, these subsidies, particularly the environmentally 
harmful ones, should be eradicated or reformed as they often do not achieve the primary 
objective of enhancing energy access for the poor households. This is evidenced from 
majority of welfare impact studies that found that the top richest income group in the 
society often benefits from subsidy payment than the bottom poor 5 percent. Also, these 
categories of subsidies hamper global efforts at tackling climate change impacts while 
also eroding investment in the energy sector and development of green energy. A 
number of these studies have examined how these subsidies impact macroeconomic 
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variables, poverty, environment and welfare. However, studies on Nigeria mostly focus 
on either macroeconomic implications of fuel subsidy, welfare cost or both, or the 
impact of its removal. Studies that examine impact of fuel subsidy on environmental 
quality (carbon emissions) in Nigeria were found to be scarce.  
 
The analysis of the impact of fuel subsidies on environmental quality is important as it 
has key implications for policy measures put in place to tackle environmental problems 
such as climate change, pollution and others. An analysis of fuel subsidy impact on the 
economy can then help to assess how effectively the policy can be useful for climate 
change mitigation incentive. The rationale is that fuel subsidies increases the production 
and consumption of fossil fuel, by making fuel prices cheaper, which increases carbon 
emissions in the atmosphere, thereby hampering environmental quality in general. Thus, 
if subsidies on fossil fuel are removed, they can be re-invested towards the development 
of alternative energy sources that are environmentally friendly. This is supported by 
Ajayi (2013) that stated that the harnessing of renewable energy potentials of ECOWAS 
countries can spur sustainable development and environmental protection. So by making 
these alternative sources of energy cheaper and accessible, government can still achieve 
their objective of enhancing energy access for the poor households.   
 
       In terms of methodology, many apply survey design analysis, critical discourse or 
econometric methods (VAR, multivariate co-integration), only few apply the CGE 
approach to energy policy analysis, especially relating to the environment. This is 
supported by Adenikinju and Falobi (2009) that only relatively few applications of 
multi-sector CGE models to policy making in Nigeria exists compared to other multi-
sector macro models. The CGE model as an approach is useful for analysing the 
economy-wide effects of a policy change as it provides a platform to evaluate policies 
that have multi-sectoral implications (Adenikinju and Falobi, 2009) just as the fuel 
subsidy as a policy affects the different sectors of the economy. This is due to the 
strategic role energy plays as an essential input for all productive sectors. Thus, any 
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price change transmits a multiplier effect throughout the economy as transportation costs 
and cost of production changes. The framework of the CGE model provides a logically 
consistent way to look at problems involving more than one economic agent (Adenikinju 
and Falobi, 2009). This and other earlier discussed advantages, makes CGE model a 
useful and appropriate methodology for this study. 
2.8. Summary of some Empirical Studies 
Table 2.1 below present a tabular summary of some selected empirical studies in the area of 
energy Subsidy impacts showing their objectives, study area, methodology and key findings.  
 
Table 2.1a: Summary of Selected Empirical Studies 
S/N Author/Year Study Area Objectives Methodology Findings/Critique 
1. Abraham 
(2013) 
Nigeria Using fuel subsidy 
removal as a possible 
policy option for 
mitigating climate 
change. 
Narrative 
Method 
The policy shift may have welfare 
implications in the short run, in the long 
run; it can drive green growth and 
enhance sustainable development. 
It was descriptive in analysis. 
2. Whitley (2013) Global study Examined the 
relationship between 
fossil fuel subsidies and 
the climate. 
Descriptive Cutting down subsidies will help reduce 
carbon emissions. 
Nigeria was not included in study and 
was descriptive in nature. 
3. Holton (2012) Panel study Assessed the effects of 
fossil-fuel subsidies on 
growth, the environment 
and inequality. 
Panel Analysis Subsidies have negative effect on GDP 
per capita and income equality while also 
increasing emissions. 
Adopted single equation method of 
analysis 
4. Adenikinju and 
Omenka (2013) 
Nigeria Analysed potential trade-
offs associated with 
domestic response to 60 
percent increase in 
international fuel price. 
Recursive 
Dynamic CGE 
Negative impacts of removal on macro-
economy are less with gradual reduction 
with rural poor households been the worst 
hit. Focused on economic and welfare 
impacts. 
5. Adenikinju  et 
al. (2012) 
Nigeria Explored the economy-
wide impacts of pursuing 
a green growth strategy 
using carbon tax policy. 
Energy-
Environment 
CGE 
Achieving a green growth strategy will 
yield economic and social costs, 
depending on how energy tax revenue is 
disbursed. 
Focused on tax and not subsidy. 
6. GSI (2012) Asian-Pacific 
Economies 
Provides an analytical 
framework on how the 
reform of fossil fuel 
subsidies can reduce 
waste and CO2 emissions. 
Analytical A framework that will adequately reform 
these subsidies and at the same time 
reduce emissions from waste. 
Nigeria was not included in the study 
and was essentially analytical. 
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S/N Author/Year Study Area Objectives Methodology Findings/Critique 
7. UNDP (2012) Vietnam Assessed role of reform 
of fossil fuels in Vietnam. 
Analytical Analysis will enable transition to a more 
competitive and greener growth economy. 
Focus was on Vietnam 
8. Mukherjee and 
Chakraborty 
(2014) 
131 countries Assessed relationship 
between fiscal subsidies 
and CO2 emissions. 
Panel data 
regression 
Higher proportional devolution of 
budgetary subsidies leads to higher CO2 
emissions. 
Used single equation modeling. 
 
9. Gerlagh and 
Zwaan (2006) 
Global Study Explored options and 
instruments for 
significantly reducing 
CO2 emission.  
Dynamic top-
down 
economy-
energy-
environment 
model. 
Recycling of carbon taxes to support 
renewables was found to be the most cost-
efficient way to address the challenge of 
global climate change. 
Nigeria was aggregated with other 
African countries in the modeling. 
  
10. Morgan (2007) Global Study Investigates how energy 
subsidies affect energy 
investment and GHG 
emissions. 
Descriptive Reform of these subsidies can play a key 
role in government efforts at mitigating 
GHG emissions, with strong political will 
and compensating measures. 
Analysis was Descriptive. 
11. Ellis (2010) Reviewed six 
major 
studies. 
Considers analytical 
approaches often used to 
estimate economic, 
environmental and social 
impacts of fossil fuel 
subsidy removal. 
Review/ 
Explanatory 
Supports the view that reform of subsidies 
can achieve significant economic and 
environmental benefits. 
Approach was basically analytical 
12. Allaire and 
Brown (2012) 
United States Identified energy 
subsidies that increases or 
reduces carbon emissions. 
Simulation 
Procedure 
Subsidy on the energy sector influences 
the level of carbon emissions mainly 
through the energy markets.  
Used partial modeling  
13. Shafie-Pour and 
Farsiabi (2007) 
Iran Analysed economic and 
environmental 
implications of reducing 
energy subsidies. 
Environmental 
Cost-benefit 
Analysis 
(ECBA) model. 
Evidence shows that reducing energy 
subsidies for each energy form is 
considerably beneficial. 
Focus was on Iran 
14. Koplow and 
Dernbach 
(2010) 
United States Examined previous 
studies of fuel subsidies 
within the US and how 
they influence level of 
emissions. 
 
Descriptive 
Analysis 
Reforming these subsidies can reduce 
impact of climate change. 
Adopted descriptive analysis and was 
not based on Nigeria. 
15. Guiyang (2007) China Analysed prospect of 
energy subsidy reform in 
providing economic 
incentives for climate 
change mitigation. 
Descriptive Suggests that China should emphasise 
positive impact of subsidy policies which 
will promote climate change mitigation. 
Analysis was descriptive and focused 
on China. 
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S/N Author/Year Study Area Objectives Methodology Findings/Critique 
16. Larsen and 
Shah (1992) 
World Study Provided evidence on fuel 
subsidies and effect on 
emissions. 
Uses a simple 
model 
Removing these subsidies could cut down 
CO2 emissions by 9 % in some countries. 
Focus was on the developed economies 
17. Larsen (1994) World Study Extends Larsen & Shah 
(1992) by incorporating 
inter-fuel substitution in 
the model. 
Includes inter-
fuel 
substitution in 
the empirical 
model. 
 
Removal of the subsidies can reduce 
global CO2 emissions by 7 percent. 
Focus was on the developed countries 
18. Umar and Umar 
(2013) 
Nigeria Measured direct welfare 
impact of high fuel prices 
on different socio-
economic groups. 
Partial 
equilibrium 
approach. 
Reduction in welfare is larger for the 
middle 40 percent compared with the top 
and bottom 20 percent. 
Focused on welfare effect. 
19. Siddig et al 
(2014) 
Nigeria Evaluated impact of 
removing oil import 
subsidies on poverty. 
CGE 
(MyGTAP). 
Accompanying a subsidy reduction with a 
transfer of income to poor households 
alleviate some of the negative impacts.  
Focus was on poverty. 
20. Bao and 
Sawdon (2011) 
Vietnam Assessed environmental 
implications of changes 
in fossil fuel pricing 
policy and imposition of 
tax. 
CGE  Reducing fossil fuel subsidies 
significantly reduces carbon emissions.  
Analysis based on Vietnam. 
21. Widodo et al 
(2012) 
Indonesia Analysed the impact of 
fuel subsidy removal on 
the economy.    
CGE Subsidy reform affects the income spread 
of firms, government and households. 
Study did not cover the environment. 
22. Jiang and Tan 
(2013) 
China Analysed how the 
removal of energy 
subsidy affects general 
price level. 
Input-output 
model 
Removal has significant impact on 
energy-intensive industries, consequently 
pushing up general price level. 
Study did not cover the environment. 
23. Bahta (2014) Free State 
Province 
(South 
Africa) 
Investigated the impact of 
international oil price 
increase on the economy. 
CGE Percentage of labour demand of selected 
industries decreases. GDP equally 
decreases by 0.01 percent.  
Study was not based in Nigeria did not 
cover the environment. 
24. Anwal and 
Mamman 
(2012) 
Nigeria Investigated the impact of 
petroleum products 
supply and domestic 
prices on domestic 
distribution. 
VAR model 
and OLS 
estimation 
Domestically refined petroleum and 
petroleum prices were insensitive to 
quantity distributed in the long run.  
Study did not cover the environment. 
25. Efobi et al 
(2012) 
Nigeria Effect of change in fuel 
price on macroeconomic 
variables such as 
exchange rate, inflation 
and money supply. 
 
Chow test and 
VAR approach 
Observed a sharp reaction of the 
macroeconomic variables to fuel subsidy 
reduction. 
Study did not cover the environment. 
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S/N Author/Year Study Area Objectives Methodology Findings/Critique 
26. Adagunodo 
(2013) 
Nigeria Evaluates equity and 
efficiency implications of 
Welfare effects of energy 
(petroleum products 
pricing) reform.  
 
Marginal social 
cost Approach  
Reduction in price led to reduction in 
consumption of petrol by households. 
Study did not cover the environment. 
27. Oladipo (2012) Nigeria Impact of fuel subsidy 
removal on crime. 
Survey 
research design 
(Questionnaire)  
Both rate of inflation and crime within 
Nigeria is still alarming. 
Study did not cover the environment. 
28. Hong et al 
(2013) 
China Analysed how to achieve 
economic and 
environmental gains from 
energy subsidy reform. 
Hybrid energy 
input-output 
model. 
Removal reduces demand in various 
sectors such as electricity, coal, gas and 
oil.  
Focus was on China. 
29. Charap et al 
(2013) 
60 countries Explored the degree of 
responsiveness of energy 
consumption to changes 
in energy prices. 
Panel analysis 
of cross-
country data 
Countries can reap short and long term 
gains, but the former will be shorter.  
Study did not cover the environment. 
30. Lin and Jiang 
(2010) 
China Estimated energy 
subsidies and the impact 
of its reform. 
Price-gap 
Approach and 
CGE model 
Significant fall in energy 
demand/emissions. 
Study did not cover the environment. 
Source: Compiled by Author 
 
2.9. Summary of Main Issues 
The review done was able to show that the analysis of the impact of energy subsidy on the 
environment is dependent on the definition of the concept of subsidy and the measure of 
environmental quality. This is in addition to the methodology adopted and the region covered. It 
was observed that the issue of driving environmental quality (green growth) and tackling climate 
change is globally recognised and the reduction of carbon emission from fossil fuel is a viable 
means. The country-specific analysis seemed to be more detailed and in-depth compared to the 
multi-country analysis. Furthermore, results were based on the region covered, category of 
subsidy, size and measurement of energy subsidy and the underlying assumptions of the models. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
ENERGY SUBSIDY AND THE NIGERIAN ECONOMY: SOME STYLISED FACTS 
 
3.1 Preamble 
This section presents an overview of the structure of the Nigerian economy and the 
energy sector within the context of the objective of this study. This is important in order 
to understand the extent to which a change in policy in terms of the removal of fuel 
subsidy brings about changes in different sectors of the economy. Thus, understanding 
the features and structure of the Nigerian system is essential. It will also present 
background information or what can be termed stylised facts on the Nigerian economy 
especially as it relates to the context of this study. Some of the variables of interest will 
include fuel price and some measures of environmental quality (carbon emissions). In 
addition, this chapter examines Nigeria‟s experience with energy reform, particularly 
energy pricing while assessing the transmission mechanism through which fuel subsidy 
impacts the economy (through household effects and the environment).  
 
3.2 The Structure of the Nigerian Economy 
The Nigerian economy regarded as the biggest economy in West Africa, was declared the 
largest in Africa following South Africa after the rebasing of the economy in 2014. In 
August 2016, South Africa overtook Nigeria as the largest economy in Africa due to 
falling oil prices and dwindling government revenue in Nigeria. However, the IMF World 
Economic Outlook for October 2016 calculated Nigeria‟s GDP to be $415.08 billion 
from $493.83 billion in 2015 while South Africa‟s GDP was put at $280.36 from $314.73 
billion in 2015 (Vanguard, 2016). The rebasing of the economy involves the re-
benchmarking or change of the base year from 1990 to 2010 to give an up-to-date 
measure of the economy. Also, the rebasing brought about an increase in the number of 
industries used in the calculation of GDP. Prices and structure of the economy grow over 
time, thus there is a need to reflect these changes in data and statistics used in economic 
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planning. The rationale is to enhance the reliability and robustness of planning and 
investment decisions.  
 
According to Masetti (2014), this rebasing process raised the economy by about 75 
percent with a nominal GDP of US$451 billion as against South Africa‟s US$382.3 
billion. The rebasing exercise covered the revision of the classifications of economic 
activity in the National Accounts. It recognised the significant contribution of the 
telecommunications and entertainment industry. This has shown that the economy is 
more diversified than what is being reported and the structure of the economy has 
changed significantly. 
 
In terms of structure before the rebasing, the Nigerian economy was dominated by two 
main sectors, agriculture and crude oil. Broadly, it was structured into five sectors namely 
Agriculture, Industry, Building and Construction, Wholesale and Retail trade and 
Services. Ezirim, Okeke and Ebiringa (2010) also segregated the economy into three 
main areas namely primary sector (agriculture and mining); secondary sector 
(manufacturing and construction) and the tertiary sector (made up of mainly service 
activities ranging from transportation, distribution, wholesale, hospitality, finance, 
insurance, real estate). With respect to the sectoral classifications, agriculture was the 
mainstay of the economy in the 1960s and early 1970s and it contributed significantly to 
the economy in terms of employment and revenue generation.  
 
According to World Bank (1996), in the 90s, the sector provided employment for about 
75 percent of the population, contributed about 97 percent of food supply, 68 percent of 
GDP and 78 percent of foreign export earnings.  However, the discovery of oil in Nigeria 
in 1956 at Oloibiri (Niger Delta) resulted in a decline in the contribution of agriculture 
and the sector lost its prominent position to the oil industry. This then ushered in the oil 
boom of the 1970s when oil was discovered in commercial quantity and exported, 
increasing government revenue. Nigeria been blessed with a vast amount of petroleum 
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resources which is said to be one of the best quality in the world, rapidly prospered from 
oil earnings. This made the sector play a vital role in the economic and political destiny 
of the nation (Oyeyemi, 2013). Tables 3.1 and 3.2 show the structure of the contribution 
of each of the key sectors to real GDP for the period 1981 to 2014. 
 
Table 3.1: Contribution of Sectors to GDP (in percentage) for 1981-2013 (Average*) 
Year Agriculture Industry Building & 
Construction 
Wholesale & 
Retail trade 
Services Total 
1981-1989 38.23 32.86 1.63 14.66 12.62 100.00 
1990-1999 40.45 31.74 1.35 13.61 12.85 100.00 
2000-2005 41.65 29.18 1.42 13.02 14.72 100.00 
2006-2013 40.59 20.61 2.00 18.38 18.42 100.00 
1981-2013 40.40 26.85 1.67 15.62 15.46 100.00 
            Source: CBN Statistical Bulletin (2014)  
            Note: *Based on old classification of 33 activity sectors before the rebasing exercise 
 
 
Table 3.2: Contribution of Sectors to GDP (in percentage) for 2010-2014 (Rebased*) 
Year Agriculture Industry Construction Trade Services Total 
2010 23.89 22.03 2.88 16.47 34.73 100.00 
2011 23.35 22.39 3.16 16.76 34.34 100.00 
2012 23.91 21.74 3.32 16.44 34.59 100.00 
2013 23.33 20.59 3.59 16.62 35.87 100.00 
2014 22.90 20.54 3.82 16.57 36.17 100.00 
2010-
2014 
23.46 
 
21.41 
 
3.38 
 
16.57 
 
35.18 
 
100.00 
 
            Source: Computer by the Author from the CBN Statistical Bulletin (2014)  
            Note: *Based on new classification of 46 activity sectors after the rebasing exercise. 
 
Table 3.3: Nigeria‟s Total External Trade (in percentage) 
Sector 1981 1990 2000 2003 2005 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Oil 45.26 72.43 73.08 65.63 79.00 65.13 64.72 66.20 69.56 67.05 60.52 
Non-oil 54.74 27.57 26.92 34.37 21.00 34.87 35.28 33.80 30.44 32.95 39.48 
Source: Computed from CBN Statistical Bulletin (2014) 
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Table 3.4: Trends in Selected Macroeconomic Indicators in Nigeria (1981-2014) 
Year GDP Per capita 
growth (annual 
%) 
% of oil* in 
total GDP 
% of oil in total 
revenue 
% of non-oil 
in total 
revenue 
1981 -13.13 29.09 64.41 35.56 
1991 -0.62 27.78 81.86 18.14 
2000 5.32 25.91 83.50 16.50 
2003 10.35 26.53 80.55 19.45 
2009 6.93 16.29 65.89 34.11 
2010 7.84 15.39* 73.88 26.12 
2011 4.89 14.95* 79.87 20.13 
2012 4.28 13.64* 75.32 24.67 
2013 5.39 11.24* 69.77 30.23 
2014 6.31 10.44* 67.47 32.53 
Source: WDI (2015), CBN Statistical Bulletin (2014). 
Note: Data for GDP per capita growth was from WDI (2015), while other data are from CBN Statistical 
Bulletin (2014), 2010-2014 figures are rebased 
Oil* is crude petroleum and natural gas  
 
 
As oil was discovered in commercial quantity, it began to dominate the Nigerian economy. 
Oil accounted for more than 90 percent of exports in Nigeria, contributes 40 percent of GDP, 
95 percent of foreign exchange earnings and about 70 percent of government revenues 
(Ezirim et al, 2010). This is evident from the figures in Tables 3.3 and 3.4 which show that 
the economy is mainly dependent on revenue from crude oil. Percentage of oil revenue in 
total revenue averaging 70 to 75 percent as against the non-oil sector contribution of about 28 
percent average, further reflects the fiscal dependency of the economy. The share of 
agriculture in total export began to decline continuously from about 89.7 percent in 1960 to 
about 2.2 percent in 1985 and increased marginally to about 4.1 percent in 2005. The 
contribution of the oil and gas sector fell in the period 2006 to 2010 from about 25 percent in 
2005 to 16 percent in 2010 mainly due to the crisis in the Niger Delta region. It however 
picked up later in 2011 when normalcy returned to the region. The performance of the 
manufacturing sector which peaked at 9.89 percent in 1981 reflected government‟s effort at 
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enhancing productivity through the import substitution policy. However, as stated by Ezirim 
et al. (2010), this policy was unable to sustain growth over time due to the dependence on 
import of machineries, equipments and raw materials. It rather made the manufacturing 
sector volatile to external shocks from the international economy.   
 
Nigeria‟s economic growth has averaged about 7.4 percent annually beginning from the year 
2012 driven mainly by the non-oil sector, particularly telecommunications sector, 
entertainment, construction, wholesale, retail trade, hotel and restaurant services, 
manufacturing and agriculture (African Economic Outlook, 2012). However, despite this 
impressive performance (at least in terms of growth), it had been without jobs and with 
increased poverty, making many term it “jobless growth”. According to Ezirim et al. (2010), 
even though the economy had undergone some fundamental structural changes in the last 
four decades, these changes are yet to bring about appreciable improvements in terms of 
growth and development. The dualistic nature of the economy where there is the co-existence 
of the formal and informal sector is also important. The informal sector has been argued to 
perform a significant role in the economy as it is a huge sector but difficult to measure. 
Evidence according to Ezirim et al. (2010) suggests that the informal sector represents an 
estimated 40 percent to 50 percent of economic activities in Nigeria.  
 
In an attempt to enhance the strategic competition of the economy especially as it relates to 
attract FDI, the President Musa Yar‟ Adua administration introduced the vision 20:2020 in 
2009 which serves as the economic transformation blueprint aimed at making Nigeria one of 
the top 20 economies in the world by year 2020. It involves growing the economy 
consistently at the rate of 13 percent and the GDP moving from current position of about 
$170 billion to $900 billion (Ezirim et al., 2010). This was continued by the President 
Goodluck Jonathan administration as contained in the transformation agenda and continued 
by the present President Buhari‟s administration.   
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3.3 The Nigerian Oil Sector 
      The oil sector in Nigeria provides a strong fiscal linkage with the rest of the world. 
According to Cantore et al. (2012), oil contributed about 70 percent to government 
budget in 2011 showing it as a means for implementing public policy. It contributes 
significantly to the economy in terms of its contribution to GDP, foreign exchange 
earnings, government revenue, composition in export and employment generation. For 
example, in 2013, the sector accounted for around 67 percent of government revenue and 
about 95 percent of foreign earnings (CBN Statistical Bulletin, 2014). Oil being the 
mainstay of the economy, had played a key role in shaping the economic and political 
destiny of the country (Odularu, 2008). This sector has contributed to the economy both 
positively and negatively. On one hand, it provides a stabilising effect on government 
revenue; while on the other hand, it has created environmental problems and conflicts. 
This had resulted in deprivation of means of livelihood coupled with other economic and 
societal factors (Odularu, 2008). 
 
      The Nigerian oil sector, which is a major part of the mining and quarrying sector, had 
three sub-sectors. They are the upstream (exploration), downstream (distribution) and 
natural gas sub-sectors. The downstream sector had been the most challenging and 
problematic (Odularu, 2008) as the operations of the sub-sector is always marked with 
disruption of supply and scarcity of petroleum products. This led the Federal Government 
to take steps towards its deregulation in 2003. This has, however, been affected by 
various controversies.  
 
      In terms of production, Nigeria currently has four refineries with a combined capacity of 
445,000 barrels per day (bpd). Two of the refineries are located in Port-Harcourt, one in 
Warri and one in Kaduna. The two refineries in Port-Harcourt established in 1965 and 
1989 have a combined capacity of 210,000 bpd. The other two refineries in Warri and 
Kaduna were established in 1978 and 1980 respectively. The former presently has a 
capacity of 125,000 bpd while the latter‟s production capacity is 110,000 bpd. However, 
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as stated by Odularu (2008), the country still depends on imported refined fuel as the 
combined capacity of these refineries exceeds domestic consumption. The IMF had 
estimated that demand for refined oil products in Nigeria is growing in the midst of a 
booming economy and will likely increase to 7.1 percent from 2013 figure of 6.4 percent. 
The low performance of these refineries is often attributed to poor funding, lack of 
maintenance and low level of investment. 
 
      3.4 Nigerian Government Policy on Emission Reduction 
The Nigerian government had over the years shown commitment towards reducing 
greenhouse gas emission as a viable means in tackling climate change impacts. The 
beginning of 1992 marked a strategic step with the establishment of the Federal 
Environmental Protection Agency (FEPA). There had also been various policies targeted 
towards the reduction of carbon emission levels especially from the flaring of gas through 
the exploration of crude oil. This is given the fact that gas flaring is the highest 
contributor to greenhouse gas emission in Nigeria (IEA, 2014). Furthermore, towards the 
drive for the achievement of Vision 20:2020, the Nigerian government had articulated a 
number of policy targets so as to cut down emissions from fossil fuel. This intention was 
documented in the World Bank report where three key sectors (agriculture, energy and 
transport) were identified as necessary targets in reducing these emissions. The effort of 
the government is usually convened by the Department of Climate Change, Federal 
Ministry of Environment in Abuja.  
 
The department is responsible for the “co-ordination of activities towards the national 
implementation of the Climate Change convention and the Kyoto Protocol” (Awojuola, 
2015). It also serves as a unit of the Federal Ministry of Environment which supports the 
ministry in carrying out its various activities by working closely with other relevant 
supporting agencies namely non-governmental organisations, private sector, the academia 
and other government organisations. This arrangement takes place under the committee 
known as the Inter-ministerial Committee on Climate Change. According to Awojuola 
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(2015), the Nigerian government addresses the challenge of carbon emission under three 
major strategies. These includes strengthening of various institutions, capacity building 
and the execution of different projects such as CDM projects, GHG inventory system, 
largest gas gathering programme in Africa and mandatory reduction of emissions by 20 
percent by Joint Ventures.  
 
Furthermore, the unit engages in public awareness programmes, training of stakeholders 
as well as beneficiaries both domestic and internationally. Even though efforts at 
implementing the expectations of the Kyoto Protocol are at a slow pace, a lot still needs 
to be done compared to other African countries. According to Ibikunle (2006), 
government‟s commitment to reducing carbon emissions in Nigeria is not only related to 
gas flaring reduction but also through the promotion of the use of cleaner and more 
environmentally friendly fuel. However, in driving this low-carbon growth strategy, there 
are usually constraints. One major area of challenge is the issue of finance in achieving 
the various plans, operations and strategies as set by the stakeholders. This is a similar 
experience globally in the fight against climate change impacts, especially as it relates to 
climate financing.  
 
Another aspect of limitation had been technology adoption. This is in terms of localising 
foreign technology as developed by the industralised countries, especially in the African 
context. A good example is the “mandatory fuel blending” technology as observed in the 
Southern African region. This technology entails a blend of renewable energy (for 
example, ethanol) with fossil fuel. It will reduce the amount of emissions from the 
burning of fossil fuel especially from motor vehicles. Thus, fuel blend of E15 will contain 
15 percent ethanol and 85 percent fossil fuel. In Nigeria, there were also plans to recreate 
a variant of the fuel blending. For example, Ibikunle (2006) stated that there is 
government initiative on the development of renewable energy through the introduction 
of biomass ethanol programme. This is carried out through the production of fuel grade 
ethanol which is then blended with gasoline or petrol. The product of this process, which 
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is called "green petrol” is expected to reduce the volume of CO2 released to the 
atmosphere. This green fuel or petrol which is also known as biofuel is a type of fuel 
refined or processed from plants and animal materials and assumed to be more 
environmentally friendly than the fossil-fuel based energy sources. However, as laudable 
as this plan is, it had been very challenging for many of the countries to implement and 
domesticate the technology due mainly to institutional and legal constraints. It is believed 
that with appropriate policies in place, efforts at reducing emission levels will yield good 
result.               
 
3.5 Stylised facts on the Energy Sector in Nigeria 
      From historical facts, it is known that oil was discovered in Nigeria at Oloibiri in Niger 
Delta in the year 1956 by Shell-British Petroleum. With this, the first exploration took 
place in 1958 making Nigeria to join the ranks of oil producers producing 5,100 barrels 
per day (Onyemaechi, 2012). In 1971, Nigeria became a member of OPEC and in 1977; it 
established the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC). The country was 
identified as the 12
th
 largest producer of crude oil in the world, producing 2.5 million 
barrels of sweet light crude oil per day as at 2011 (IEA, 2011). Nigeria is also currently 
the 4
th
 largest oil exporting country in the world and Africa‟s biggest oil producer with 
about 2.2 million bpd (IEA 2013 figures). As at 2009, about 98 percent of its crude oil 
was exported. In spite of the abundance of oil in the country, Nigeria still largely imports 
about 80 percent of its refined oil due to lack of adequate capacity to refine (Cantore et 
al., 2012). Thus, the country still imports a large portion of its petroleum products due 
mainly to underinvestment in the energy sector and insufficient energy infrastructure. In 
Nigeria, government had attempted series of reform in the oil and gas industry. Fuel 
subsidy is a pricing policy issue and government has been involved in regulating fuel 
prices by allowing households to pay below international oil price.  
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3.5.1. Stylised fact 1: Gasoline constitutes the highest form of energy consumption  
      The consumption of petroleum products continued to be on the increase in the past years 
due to economic growth (Adagunodo, 2013). Four main forms of energy consumed in 
Nigeria include PMS also known as petrol or gasoline, diesel (AGO), kerosene (DPK) 
and gas (LPG). Petrol consumption as represented with the sales in the domestic market 
by PPMC is the highest compared to other forms of energy consumption in Nigeria and 
this is presented in figure 3.1. Lower prices due to subsidy and lack of alternative for 
petrol are likely factors for this increase. The 10-year analysis period from figure 3.1 
evidently shows that the consumption of petrol was high throughout compared to diesel 
and kerosene as petroleum products. The refineries are only able to meet about 20 percent 
of fuel demand, while the balance of 80 percent is imported to avoid scarcity.  
 
According to ADR (2012), Nigeria has been subsidising fuel since the 1970s. 
Government had been controlling petroleum prices in the domestic market since 1973 
when the government took over from the private oil companies (Adagunodo, 2013). The 
nature of the demand and supply of fuel in Nigeria is such that it is inelastic and subject 
to a subsidy and price fixing effect (Adagunodo, 2013). This implies that alternatives to 
the use of gasoline, kerosene and diesel by consumers, is difficult. The Nigerian 
government instituted some consumption and production related policies and of the 
consumption-related policies, the fuel subsidy policy stands out. The goal of this policy is 
to support local consumption of petrol which necessitates the government to make 
provision for a certain percentage of the marginal cost of supplying the petrol 
(Onyemaechi, 2012). This was intended to help avoid disruption to the distribution of 
petrol while also ensuring that the transportation network is as effective as possible.  
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Figure 3.1: 10-Year PPMC Domestic Petroleum Product Sales in Nigeria („000,000 litres) 
Source: NNPC Bulletin (2014) 
 
3.5.2. Stylised fact 2: Petrol subsidy had been increasing and is unsustainable 
            Ordinarily, petroleum product prices in Nigeria ought to be theoretically derived from 
international crude oil prices. In other words, the import price should be reflected 
(Onyemaechi, 2012). However, this has not always been the case for different reasons 
such as socio-political reasons. What always happens is that government decides to 
subsidise price of petrol so as to make it cheaper and pay the difference between 
international price and domestic price. This subsidy payment by government has, 
however, on the average been on the increase over the years as shown in Figure 3.2. 
Thus, the assertion is that, these payments continue to rise yearly and with dwindling 
government revenue, they are unsustainable. Cantore et al. (2012) attributed these 
increases to be partly due to increasing oil prices in the international market and 
depreciating exchange rates.   
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Figure 3.2: Petrol Subsidy in Nigeria (₦billion) 2006-2014 
Source: NNPC Bulletin (2014), WDI (2014), Author‟s Estimate 
 
The payment reached a peak of ₦1.9 trillion in 2011 which was revised from ₦1.3 
trillion according to the NNPC Statistical Bulletin (2014). This figure reduced to about 
₦1.04 trillion in 2012 and further to ₦951 billion and ₦853 in 2013 and 2014 
respectively. It is important to note that these figures are estimates based on the subsidy 
paid on each litre of petrol and total petrol consumption. This is evident from indications 
that the amount is likely larger than the reported as there were supplementary payments 
made to marketers during the year. This has been a critical issue in Nigeria, especially as 
it relates to the actual amount paid on subsidy. Also, it was observed that different 
institutions of government provide varying figures.  
 
Furthermore, payment of subsidy had been argued to divert resources from priority 
sectors such as health, education, infrastructure and communication. An analysis of the 
2013 budget showed that provision made for fuel subsidy constituted about 20 percent of 
the entire budget. The allocation for fuel subsidy was also about 10 times more than the 
appropriation for agriculture and rural development (₦81.41 billion), thrice the amount 
for health (₦279.23 billion) and twice the allocation for education (₦426.53 billion). 
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These are sectors which are expected to propel economic growth. However, government 
had been making efforts at eliminating these subsidies through strategic reforms of 
various agencies. The reform agency had helped the PPPRA to eliminate previous 
manipulation of the bill of laden and generate savings for the government. The reality 
that the subsidy payment is not sustainable eventually led the government to stop subsidy 
on petrol in May 2016 which then placed petrol price at ₦145 per litre. This is reflected 
in the PPPRA revised template as shown in Table 3.5 where provision for fuel subsidy 
had been removed. This is expected to resolve the problem of scarcity experienced across 
the country, reduce smuggling to neighbouring countries and attract more investment to 
the energy sector.    
 
Table 3.5: PPPRA Pricing Template-May 2016 
S/N Cost Element Naira/litre 
1. C+F 111.30 
2. Lightering Expenses 4.56 
3. NPA 0.84 
4. NIMASA Charge 0.22 
5. Financing 2.51 
6. Jetty Thru‟Put Charge 0.60 
7. Storage Charge 2.00 
 Total Landing Cost 122.03 
 Distribution Margins  
8. Retailers 6.00 
9. Transportation Allowance (NTA) 3.36 
10. Dealers 2.36 
11. Bridging Fund 6.20 
12. Marine Transport Average (MTA) 0.15 
13. Administrative Charge 0.30 
 Total Margins 18.37 
 Total Cost 140.40 
 Source: PPPRA Website 
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3.5.3. Stylised fact 3: Prevalence of Petrol subsidies encourages Smuggling activities 
            In addition to the large fiscal burden of these subsidies, they also encourage smuggling of 
energy products across the border which is due to the relative low price of petrol in 
Nigeria. This is evident from figure 3.3. The subsidisation of fuel price reduces the price 
of petrol compared to neighbouring countries, this result in dealers smuggling fuel at 
cheap prices from Nigeria to neighbouring countries such as Benin, Cameroun, Chad, 
Ghana, Mali, Niger, Togo, and others. They are sold at higher prices in those countries 
thereby creating scarcity in the domestic economy. Table 3.5 compares petrol price in 
US$ per litre in Nigeria with some selected countries. It is observed that Nigeria has the 
lowest price for petrol. Interestingly, as pointed out by Isihak and Akpan (2012), Nigeria 
unlike many other countries, despite subsidies, does not have tax element in their retail 
price. 
 
 
Figure 3.3: Fuel Price in Neighboring Countries and West Africa Region 
Source: CPPA and IISD Citizen‟s Guide to Energy Subsidies in Nigeria 
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Table 3.6: Petroleum Product Prices in Selected Countries in US$ per litre (2014 Figures)   
Country Retail fuel price Gasoline Diesel Tax as % of Gasoline Retail Price 
Cameroon
+ 
Ad-hoc 1.24 1.14 - 
Gabon
* 
Ad-hoc 1.02 0.90 43.2 
Ghana
+ 
Automatic 1.06 1.03 47.5 
Kenya
+ 
Liberalised 1.21 1.07 26.6 
Nigeria
* 
Ad-hoc 0.56 0.84 None 
India
+ 
Ad-hoc 1.10 0.91 55.1 
Philippines
+ 
Automatic 1.05 0.82 25.9 
Russia
* 
Liberalised 0.81 0.75 30.8 
Source: World Bank Online Database (2014) 
Note: 
+
net oil importer and 
*
net oil exporter 
 
 
3.4.4. Stylised fact 4: Fuel Price had continued to be on the increase despite Subsidy 
            There have been many attempts to reduce subsidies on petroleum products in Nigeria, 
and these attempts had at times, resulted in long public protests and policy reversal in the 
form of cancellation or reduction of the planned price increases. The trends in petroleum 
product pricing in Nigeria has a long history as indicated in Table 3.6. Adagunodo (2013) 
described different price increases by different regimes in Nigeria as an attempt towards 
the removal of fuel subsidy. In 1976, fuel price was raised from 8.45 kobo by General 
Yakubu Gowon to 9 kobo by the late General Muritala‟s Administration. It then became 
15.37 kobo on 1
st
 of October, 1978 and this change was made by General Olusegun 
Obasanjo. There was another hike on April 20, 1982, when the price became 20 kobo.On 
March 31, 1986, General Ibrahim Babangida increased pump price of fuel to 39.5 kobo 
and in April 1988, it was increased to 42 kobo per litre. On January 1, 1989, another 
increase was announced whereby private car were to pay 60 kobo per litre while 
commercial cars continued paying 42 kobo. 
            According to Adagunodo (2013), the failure of price discrimination policy led to the 
announcement of a uniform price of 60 kobo per litre on December 19
th
, 1989. In March 
1991, the retail price of fuel was further increased to ₦0.70 per litre. In November 1993, 
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the pump price became ₦3.25 per litre and in November 1994 it was raised again to 
₦11.00 per litre. In December 1998, it increased to ₦30 and reduced again to ₦25. The 
price was further reduced to ₦22 per litre on June 2000. On January 1st, 2002, it was 
again hiked to ₦26 per litre from ₦22, later it was increased to ₦40 per litre on June 23, 
2003. There was another increase in price on 29
th
 May, 2004 to ₦50. This was later 
increased to ₦65 in August of the same year and hiked to ₦75 per litre on 27th May, 
2007. However, following oppositions, it was reduced to ₦65 per litre in June 2007. This 
was sustained till January 1, 2012, when the President announced the price increasing to 
₦141 per litre. After protests in various parts of the country by organised labor and civil 
societies that led to a shutdown of the economy making the nation loose close to ₦300 
billion in the five days strike; government agreed to lower the price to N97 per litre. 
Furthermore, given the decline in crude oil price, government further reduced fuel price 
to ₦86 in April 2015, however, under a new administration and the need to attract 
investment to the energy sector, government eliminated subsidy on petrol and this 
brought the price of petrol to between ₦140 and ₦145. These are represented in Table 
3.6.   
 
The Petroleum Industry Bill (PIB) 
Another measure of reform in the energy sector in Nigeria is the Petroleum Industry Bill 
(PIB) 2012. This bill is the result of several attempts at reforming the energy sector for 
many years. It represents the harmonised version of the PIB (2008) and previous drafts. 
The main thrust of the act is to clearly separate the role of government in the oil industry 
and create a stronger vibrant National Oil company that will be internationally 
competitive. The objectives of the bill includes ensuring a business-friendly environment 
for operators; creation of adequate fiscal framework that brings about more investment in 
the oil sector; supporting the promotion of participation of Nigerians in the industry; 
creation of efficient and effective regulatory agencies; promotion of transparency and 
openness in the administration of petroleum resources in Nigeria; and ensure safety, 
health and protection of the environment in the course of oil operations (The PIB, 2012).  
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Table 3.7: Trend in Petrol Pump Prices in Nigeria 
Date Prices % Change 
January 1973 0.095 - 
September 1978 8.9 8447.2 
October 1978 15.5 73.9 
April 20 1985 0.20 31.0 
March 31, 1986 0.395 97.5 
April 10, 1998 0.42 9.0 
January 1, 1989 0.40* 43.0 
December 19,1989 0.60** 43.0 
March 6, 1991 0.70 16.6 
November 08, 1993 5.0 614 
November 22, 1993 3.25 -35.0 
October 2, 1994 15.0 361.5 
October 4, 1994 11.0 -26.67 
December 20, 1998 25.0 127.0 
January 6, 1999 20.0 -20.00 
June 1, 20000 30.0 50 
June  8, 1999 25.0 -16.67 
June  13, 2000 22.0 -12.0 
January 1,2002 26.0 18.2 
June 20, 2003 40.0 53.0 
July 9, 2003 34.0 -2.40 
October 1, 2003 38.59 and 42.00 23.53 
May 29, 2004  49.90 16.67 
September 2004 53.0 8.16 
September 2005 65.0 22.64 
May 27, 2007 70.0 7.6 
June 2007 65.0 -7.6 
January 1, 2012 141.0 116.9 
January 8, 2012 
April 2015 
May 2016 
97.0 
86.0 
145.0 
-31.2 
-11.34 
68.60 
Source: Author‟s Computation and Adapted from Adagunodo (2013).  
Note:
*
For commercial users and buyers
**
For all vehicles 
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3.6 Trend Analysis of Fuel Subsidy and Environmental Quality 
     Cantore et al. (2012) asserted that from a theoretical point of view, fuel subsidy removal 
is an appropriate policy tool and also will be better for the environment. However, the 
study pointed out that the reality is much more complex. Analyses on the impact of fuel 
subsidy often assess how the policy will affect economic conditions, socio-welfare of 
households and the environment. The belief is that with the introduction of fuel subsidy, 
fuel prices become subsidised, enhancing energy access for the people, stimulating 
growth in the economy but worsening environmental conditions through increased 
emission from the combustion of fossil fuel. High fluctuations in international oil price in 
recent years have made this subsidy payment in Nigeria unsustainable for government. 
As indicated in ADR (2012), fuel subsidies increased by 97 percent from US$4.31 billion 
in 2010 to US$9.3 billion in 2011. Isihak and Akpan (2012) used the price-gap approach 
in estimating subsidies on energy products (fuel, diesel and kerosene) in Nigeria and it 
was observed that subsidies to gasoline (fuel) had the highest amount which runs into 
billions of US dollars.  
 
     The IEA (2011) estimates also showed that fossil-fuel consumption subsidies globally had 
been on the increase in the past years and will likely continue in the coming decade. They 
estimated that these subsidies amounted to about US$557 billion in 2008 using the price-
gap approach. The report asserted that if these subsidies were phased out by 2020, it 
would bring about a 5.8 percent reduction in primary energy demand at the global level. 
In the same vein, there would be a 6.9 percent fall in energy-related CO2 emissions 
compared with a baseline in which subsidy rates remain unchanged. This shows that 
conscious efforts at globally phasing out fossil fuel subsidies and replacing them with 
more energy efficient technology will bring about economic and environmental gains. 
 
     Figure 3.4 shows a graphical representation of amount of fuel subsidy and carbon 
emissions from liquid fuel consumption in Nigeria from 1971 to 2011. From the graph, it 
is evident that subsidy payment reached a peak in 2011 with carbon emissions fluctuating 
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in the wake of the millennium. Theoretically, it is expected that subsidy payments 
increases the level of carbon emissions through lower fuel prices; however, the case of 
Nigeria had a mixed scenario. This may be attributed to corruption surrounding the 
payment of the subsidy and fluctuations in environmental policy. Also, it can be 
explained due to the peculiar characteristics of the Nigerian economy. In effect, the green 
growth strategy expects the total or partial removal of fuel subsidy to translate to 
reductions in emission levels from fuel consumption. Emission levels indicated in the 
graph can still be further stabilised to lower levels if Nigeria intends to drive its green 
growth strategy. Many African countries such as Nigeria do not contribute much to 
global emissions compared to the industrialised countries and emerging economies like 
China. However, they are the most vulnerable to climatic change impacts and this had 
made it imperative to engage a low carbon economy in the drive towards sustainable 
development. 
 
Figure 3.4: Trend Analysis of Fuel Subsidy and Liquid Fuel Emissions. 
       Source: Author‟s Computation using e-views  
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Figure 3.5: Transmission Mechanism/Conceptual Framework of Fuel Subsidy Impact 
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Figure 3.5 presents the transmission mechanism which also explains the conceptual 
framework through which fuel subsidy as a policy impacts the environment. This is 
in terms of its effects on CO2 emissions, greenhouse gases, thus creating 
environmental challenges such as climate change. The figure explains that fuel 
subsidy as a policy affects the economy in terms of its effects on macroeconomic 
variables, welfare indicators and the environment. In other words, the policy 
impacts the economy economically, socially and environmentally. Thus, when fuel 
subsidy is removed or reformed, macroeconomic variables such as government 
income, savings, GDP, trade and total investment improves. Also, the removal of 
the subsidy will improve the quality of the environment and further reduce 
environmental degradation. However, the effect on welfare of households tends to 
be negative and the removal will transmit price increases to petroleum products and 
other household goods. This is the channel of transmission as shown from figure 
3.5.   
 
3.7. Green Growth Strategy and Low Carbon Development 
               Green growth involves the making of growth processes resource efficient, cleaner 
and more resilient without necessarily reducing the level of economic growth 
(Hallegatte, Heal, Fay and Treguer, 2011). As a strategy for enhancing economic 
growth, it is a growth path that does not pollute the environment. An established 
fact in empirical literature is that the greatest sources of carbon emission are energy 
production, transportation and consumption (Adenikinju et al., 2012). A green 
growth strategy as opposed to a “brown growth” must adopt efficient production 
technology that de-emphasise environmentally harmful source of energy such as 
fossil fuel. According to Adenikinju et al. (2012), a green growth strategy can take 
any of the following forms; promotion of energy efficiency across sectors, creation 
of incentives for firms and households to invest in less energy intensive technology 
or encouragement of substitutability between energy and non-energy capital. In 
accessing the relationship between fuel subsidy and environmental damage, the 
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contending issue is often how subsidising fuel price contributes to increased carbon 
emissions. Also, energy and carbon tax are also used to drive energy efficiency 
towards a green economy.  
 
               Africa as a continent had been emphasising on the need to switch to Green growth 
path for sustainable development. Inclusive and green growth had become a 
reoccurring theme among African economies in the last three years. Africa‟s 
vulnerability to climate change impacts makes it essential to pursue a green growth 
strategy (ADR, 2012). Green growth and low carbon development involves 
increase in a country‟s economic growth with lower carbon emissions. 
Theoretically, the Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC) explains that economic and 
industrial activities of a country would initially be accompanied by high pollution 
but eventually reach a threshold or breaking point and begin to fall. However, many 
fuel rich countries have been doomed with what Friedrichs and Inderwildi (2013) 
termed “carbon curse”. The achievement of a low carbon development with high 
rates of economic growth is essential to actualise the Vision 20:2022 (Cervigni et 
al., 2013a; Cervigni et al., 2013b; Eleri, Onuvae and Ugwu, 2013) and the fight to 
tackle climate change impacts. This led the World Bank to present two reports titled 
Towards a Climate-Resilient Development in Nigeria and Low-Carbon 
Development Opportunities for Nigeria, to the Nigerian government in June 2013 
(Cervigni et al., 2013a; Cervigni et al., 2013c). 
 
              The document on low carbon development opportunities provided means of how 
low carbon technologies and management options can be incorporated into 
Nigeria‟s developmental plan. This is to enhance growth and at the same time 
stabilise carbon emissions. Among the options suggested in the report is the more 
efficient use of the country‟s endowment of oil and gas resources. The ADR (2012) 
stated that the low carbon development can take two forms. It can either be in terms 
of reducing GHG emissions per unit of energy use through deployment of 
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renewable energy technologies or by increasing output (GDP) per unity of energy 
input through improvements in efficiency (ADR, 2012). The report however 
pointed out that fossil fuel subsidies prevalent in many African countries undermine 
both options highlighted. It essentially does this by reducing the competitiveness of 
low carbon fuel options and the incentive to improve energy efficiency. 
 
               Also the need to cut down emission levels from fuel consumption through fuel 
subsidy is supported by the result of the study done by Friedrichs and Inderwildi 
(2013). The study highlighted fossil fuel subsidy as one of the causal mechanism 
for most fuel rich countries to be doomed with “carbon curse”. In other words, 
governments in these countries are often under considerable pressure to subsidise 
fuel price so as to ensure the equitable distribution of the wealth of the nations. 
They presented evidence of a causal connection between fossil fuel endowments, 
fuel subsidies and carbon intensity. None of the most aggressive “subsidisers” 
achieved an emission reduction (i.e. stayed in the green growth category). Table 3.8 
presents carbon emissions from petroleum consumption for Nigeria and some 
selected countries/regions, while the CO2 emission per capita and carbon intensity 
are presented in Table 3.9.            
Table 3.8: CO2 Emissions from Consumption of Petroleum (Million Metric Tons) 
S/N Country 2011 2010 2009 2008 
1 Egypt 101.1847 98.85559 96.03711 96.42497 
2 Libya 39.35421 42.43035 40.72797 39.28237 
3 Nigeria 34.55169 34.86826 34.50472 41.79489 
4 Ghana 9.00539 9.10806 7.48618 7.38905 
5 South Africa 85.85094 80.62836 77.56975 78.98331 
6 Kenya 12.39526 12.06951 11.3868 10.78335 
7 South Sudan 18.46477 18.57161 18.12932 12.10186 
8 Africa 481.0129 472.9034 457.2763 446.5188 
Source: US Energy Information Agency (2013).  
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Table 3.9: CO2 Per capita and *CO2/GDP (carbon Intensity) using exchange rates 
S/N Country 2011  2010  2009  2008  
  a b a b a b a b 
1 South Africa 7.27 1.23 7.41 1.28 7.39 1.30 7.85 1.34 
2 Libya 5.43 1.67 8.74 1.04 8.35 1.00 7.30 0.88 
3 Egypt 2.28 1.53 2.20 1.47 2.17 1.50 2.24 1.60 
4 Nigeria 0.33 0.32 0.33 0.33 0.27 0.29 0.33 0.37 
5 Ghana 0.43 0.64 0.42 0.70 0.38 0.66 0.32 0.56 
6 Kenya 0.28 0.47 0.28 0.49 0.27 0.48 0.23 0.41 
7 South Sudan 0.33 0.36 0.35 0.39 0.35 0.41 0.33 0.40 
8 Africa 0.93 0.76 0.95 0.77 0.93 0.77 0.96 0.80 
9 Asia 1.51 1.03 1.49 1.06 1.43 1.09 1.36 1.06 
10 *China 5.92 1.81 5.42 1.80 5.11 1.86 4.91 1.92 
11 Middle East 7.70 1.26 7.58 1.29 7.46 1.30 7.28 1.25 
12 OECD Europe 6.75 0.24 7.00 0.25 6.82 0.25 7.38 0.26 
13 OECD Americas 13.37 0.41 13.73 0.42 13.26 0.41 14.33 0.43 
Source: IEA Statistics (2013).  
Note: a- CO2 per capita b- Carbon intensity. *China includes People‟s Republic of China and Hong Kong. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
METHODOLOGY 
4.1 Preamble 
      In this chapter, the theoretical base, analytical framework and research method for the 
study are examined. In addition, the description of the model suitable to address the 
stated objectives is presented. The CGE model adopted for the study is a modified 
Dynamic Energy-Environment CGE (E2CGE) model for the Nigerian economy by 
Adenikinju et al. (2012). It is a modification of the Partnership for Economic Policy 
(PEP) model. The chapter ends with the data source for the study. 
 
4.2 Theoretical Framework 
     The theoretical framework points to theories and principles that may have been 
established and proven by authorities in a field which can be useful in explaining the 
nature of a specified relationship. It represents the foundation of any research study. It 
discusses the underlying theory that backs a study. This session describes the competitive 
general equilibrium theory which represents the underlying framework for any CGE 
analysis and modelling.  
 
      The Competitive General Equilibrium Theory 
      The competitive general equilibrium theory is usually credited to the French economist, 
Leon Walras. It is mainly neo-classical in nature and founded strongly on the Walrasian 
theory of market behaviour. It essentially concerns the interrelationships that exits among 
economic agents (households and firms) as mediated by interacting markets. The 
interdependence or interrelationships implies that decisions in one market have effect on 
all other markets. The interacting markets usually considered under the competitive 
general equilibrium theory are “competitive” in nature as they take prices as given. The 
market interacting and interdependence feature of the general equilibrium theory makes it 
suitable in explaining the economy-wide shocks that will occur at a given time when 
there is a policy shift such as fuel subsidy reform by the government.   
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      Generally, the theory seeks to explain the behaivour of demand, supply and prices within 
an economic system on the whole. The resulting effect of this interaction between 
demand and supply is what is referred to as overall “general equilibrium”. It differs from 
a partial equilibrium analysis which focuses on individual markets. The theory provides a 
“bottom-up” approach by using microeconomic foundations, that is, it adopts 
microeconomic principles in explaining optimisation behaviour of rational economic 
agent and attempting to derive equilibrium in the whole economic system.  
 
      The theory is based on the notion that economic agents will maximise some given 
objectives subject to their constraints, equilibrium is then given by a vector of market 
clearing prices where only relative prices will matter (referred to as the numeraire in 
modelling). This is what is classified as the foundation of the Walras law. The argument 
of Leon Walras is that the price system is responsible for the coordinating and 
equilibrating function (Hosoe, Gasawa and Hashimoto, 2010). The main assumptions of 
the theory include the following: 
 
     -Each economy consists of a finite number of economic agents (households and firms 
represents agents in a simple framework while further extensions incorporate government 
and the rest-of-the-world) 
      -Agents have a strictly continuous concave utility function. 
      -Agents would have to trade their production to consume other goods. 
 
      Based on the above assumptions, a simple case of a small economy can be considered to 
explain the competitive general equilibrium theory. It consists of two agents (one 
household and one firm), two factors of production (labour and capital) and two goods (X 
and Y). The households are represented by their portfolio of factors (land, labour, capital, 
etc.) and their preferences for final consumption while the firms are represented by the 
outputs they produce and their production technologies. The economic agents are linked 
by factor market where households rent their demand for factors of production to firms 
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generating income and commodity markets where firms sell final consumption goods to 
households, thus generating income for firms.  
     Mathematically, from the above specifications, one can derive the consumption and 
production optimisation equations for the economic agents. The equations are presented 
below: 
 
       Max Uh (Xh, Yh)   ……………………..……...….… (4.1) 
  Subject to: Px + Py = I   ……………………..….…...…... (4.2) 
   
where Uh: Utility of the representative household derived from consumption of X and Y 
           Px, Py: Price of good X and Y  
           I: Income of the representative household 
h: The representative household 
 
In the above case, equations 4.1 and 4.2 present the maximisation problem of the 
representative household where utilities from the consumption of goods X and Y are 
maximised subject to the budget constraints (e.g. income).  
 
Furthermore, the optimisation problem of the firm can be presented where firms 
maximise profits relative to production technology and inputs mix between factors of 
production (labour and capital). This is explained by equations 4.3, 4.4 and 4.5 below: 
Max X (Kx, Lx) + Y (Ky, Ly)              …………………... (4.3) 
 Subject to: Kx + Ky =  ̅,    …………………… (4.4) 
      Lx + Ly =  ̅      …………………… (4.5) 
 
where  K: capital 
            L: Labour 
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Here, the optimisation problem involves the maximisation of output subject to inputs 
(labour and capital) limitations. Thus, the firms make the decision on the quantities of 
goods X and Y to produce given the factor endowments available. In order to ensure 
market equilibrium for both factor and commodity markets of the two agents, the 
following market clearing conditions will be set or imposed. 
 
 DDx = SSx      …………………….. (4.6) 
 DDl, k = SSl, k    …………………….. (4.7) 
   
      
 
    …………………….. (4.8) 
 
where DD: demand 
           SS: supply 
           P:   Prices 
l: labour 
k: capital 
 f: firm 
 h: household 
 
While equations 4.6 and 4.7 are classified as the goods and factor markets, equation 8 
shows that for the market to clear, the price of good X as supplied by the firm should be 
equal to the price the household is willing to purchase the commodity. In other words, the 
demand price must equal the supply price.    
 
The above given specification on how consumers maximises utility subject to their 
income constraints, forms the basis of the consumer behaviour described in the CGE 
model (Hosoe et al., 2010). In the same vein, the firm behaivour describes how firms 
maximise profits subject to their production technology. Thus, all these yield a set of 
simultaneous equations in the CGE model. There is the demand function derived from the 
representative household utility maximisation problem; the production (supply) function 
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is derived from the profit maximisation problem of the firm; the factor endowment 
optimisation and market clearing conditions are also derived and specified.   
 
      According to Decaluwe et al. (2000), the initiation to CGE modeling requires recalling 
the major assumptions and properties of the model and so the theoretical framework for 
the study is drawn from their work. The main points emphasised by the theory are as 
presented in the model specification section. A standard CGE model has as its framework 
the points in the competitive general equilibrium theory. Relevant adjustments are only 
made to suit the peculiar features of each economy. Further extensions of the general 
equilibrium theory include the welfare and efficiency theorems.  
 
4.3 Analytical Framework 
      The general framework in any general equilibrium analysis especially in assessing degree 
of impact of the implementation of a policy begins with the understanding of the linkages 
that exists within the economy. This is especially through the circular flow of income. A 
CGE study must be able to establish the various links within the economy as its strength 
lies in its ability to explicitly show the character and magnitude of the impacts of energy 
and environmental policies, in the case of this present study. Figure 4.1 explains 
graphically the circular flow of income within the economy, including the environmental 
component. This section, thus, describes the nature of linkage within the economy using 
the circular flow of income of a small open economy such as Nigeria. It starts with the 
assumption that the country as a small open economy, engages in trade with other 
economies (external world) and so is unable to influence the international price of fuel. It 
has the households, firms, government and the rest of the world (ROW) as the main 
actors. The households own factors of production such as land, labour and capital and 
represents final consumers of finished goods.  
 
      The firms rent these factors of production from the households to produce goods and 
services consumed by the households, government and other firms. The government on 
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the other hand, collects taxes and distributes its revenue to households and firms in form 
of subsidies and other transfer payments subject to budgetary constraints. Government 
also spends revenue on purchase of public goods and amenities such as roads, bridges, 
and other necessary infrastructure for growth (government consumption). The final actor 
in the economy which is the rest of the world or the international actors, purchases and at 
the same time, sell goods and services in the domestic market. This explains the linkage 
within the economic system. The variable labeled G in the chart reflects the interaction of 
the economy with the environment. In other words, environmental pollution, such as the 
emission of carbon through the burning of fossil fuel, is as a result of the activities of 
households and firms leading to the release of environmental byproducts. See figure 4.1.  
 
 
               Figure 4.1: Circular Flow of Income (Economy-Environment) 
               Source: Wing (2011:46) 
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Figure 4.2 which represent a schematic representation of the model framework, explain 
further the process of how a policy shock transmits and affects other sectors of the 
economy in a standard PEP 1-1 CGE model. In the case of the present study, it shows the 
channel through which a shock to tariff on imported refined oil may be transmitted to 
influence changes in other sectors of the economy. Energy is used in the production of 
goods, transport and also at the household level. Thus, if government for example, 
reduces fuel subsidy by 50 percent, this policy change which represents a shock, will 
flow through the various sectors of the economy. The nature of the general equilibrium 
framework is such that any shock in a sector will affect every other sector especially for 
policies relating to energy issues given that energy is widely used for varying purposes. 
The Figure 4.2 also demonstrates how closely connected the different sectors are within 
the general equilibrium framework (Okodua and Alege, 2014).  
 
 
                   Figure 4.2: Schematic Representation of the Circular Flow in a PEP 1-1 Model 
                   Source: Okodua and Alege (2014:47) 
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The interrelationships from Figure 4.2 suggest that a positive shock on import tariff 
(TIM) is expected to reduce imports (IM), especially for import dependent sectors. 
Thus, these categories of commodities (e.g. refined oil) become more expensive. The 
implication is that domestic demand will shrink and consumption will fall. Given that 
imported refined oil is a production input, this increase in price as a result of the 
positive shock on import tariff, will increase cost of production. Similar effect will 
occur for producer price. Also, in the different sectors where the refined oil is used, 
intermediate consumption (DI, output (XS) and value added (VA) will fall, which will 
invariably influence demand for labour and capital (LD and KD). Depending on the 
government safety programmes put in place and its effectiveness, the policy shift 
might result in a fall in household income due to the fall in labour demand. Overall, a 
policy shock such as the removal of subsidy on refined oil will have varying impact on 
different sectors of the economy.   
4.4 The Method of Analysis 
       This section discusses the model adapted for achieving the stated objectives of the study. 
This consists of describing the recursive PEP CGE model for a single country called the 
PEP-1-t model, the description of the different simultaneous equations that make up the 
model, the modification made to suit the objectives of the study, their interrelationships 
and linkages and the SAM structure which is the data set for any CGE analysis. An 
important aspect is the modification made to the PEP recursive dynamic model in order 
to adapt the model to the present study. An examination of empirical literature had 
shown that many studies on energy subsidy analysis often focus on economic and 
welfare impact evaluation. Only a limited amount of studies carry out environmental 
assessment of the impact that energy subsidies have on an economy and these studies 
often adopt a primary or descriptive analysis which are usually regarded as not been too 
rigorous. This is especially for analysis of policies that generates economy-wide impacts 
such as the fuel subsidy policy, where a change in this policy transmits shocks in 
different sectors of the economy. This had made the use of CGE models very useful 
based on their general equilibrium framework.  
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       These categories of models are well grounded in standard microeconomic theory and use 
a wide variety of macroeconomic data, making them more desirable to other traditional 
econometric models. Thus, it finds applications in different areas such as general 
macroeconomic issues, fiscal policy, international trade, transport, poverty, labour, 
environment, energy, among others. In the case of Nigeria, using a dynamic recursive 
CGE model to investigate the impact of fuel subsidy (energy policy) on environmental 
quality (environmental policy) requires a model that has both energy and environment 
component. However, many of such environmental CGE models are designed for 
developed economies and thus, adapting such to a developing economy such as Nigeria 
becomes computationally and theoretically difficult.  
 
        In light of this, this study attempts to address this challenge by adapting a CGE model 
that follows the features of a developing economy (the PEP model) and introduces the 
environmental component following the manner in which Adenikinju et al. (2012) 
applied it to their work. This was performed by applying it to the fuel subsidy policy, 
thereby creating an avenue for further researches requiring this type of modelling. It 
specifically accounted for carbon co-efficients for all sectors considered in the model 
using data from the SAM table. The assumption is that these carbon coefficients depends 
on the energy intensity of the sectors and the energy intensity is given by the ratio of the 
energy expenditures of each sector to its value added. In addition, the study calculates 
the subsidy on fuel for the 2006 SAM year and incorporated this into the SAM table to 
account for the subsidy component. Thus, the general mode of implementing a CGE 
model is presented which the study follows.  
 
        Generally, the implementation of a CGE model usually involves a number of steps. 
Firstly, the structure of the CGE model is set up. This entails sourcing for the dataset for 
the economy which is the construction of the SAM for the economy. This study 
however, intends to adapt an existing dataset, thus, the process would be modified 
towards verifying the dataset. This results in the benchmark equilibrium dataset. The 
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second step involves selecting a functional form for the production and demand 
functions which could be of the type, Cobb-Douglas or Constant Elasticity of 
Substitution (CES). Lastly, the parameter values for the functional forms are derived. 
This procedure is termed calibration and is one of the most commonly used procedure 
for deriving parameter values in CGE modeling. The calibration process ensures the 
model reproduces the initial data as an equilibrium solution after being fed into the 
software, in the case of this study, the General Algebraic Modelling System (GAMS). 
This is done with the use of different GAMS codes. The form of the CGE model follows 
the structure of the SAM for the study where the former provides the mathematical 
formulations of what is contained in the latter. 
 
4.4.1 The Dynamic Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) Model  
         CGE models are essentially the mathematical representations of the transactions in the 
SAM dataset. The model for the study is a modified PEP dynamic recursive model 
which is for a single country over a period of time as against the static PEP model 
version. The model does not involve any intertemporal optimisation behavioural 
assumption, rather, each period is solved as a static equilibrium subject to the values 
inherited or observed from the preceding period. This makes it possible to separate the 
within-period and the between-period component. This section provides a description 
of the mathematical expression of the CGE model and their underlying assumptions as 
indicated in the PEP model document by Decaluwe et al., (2012).  
 
The CGE model used in this study is based on the modified Energy-Environment CGE 
(E2CGE) for the Nigerian economy by Adenikinju et al. (2012). This model consists of 
a number of non-linear simultaneous equations modified from the standard PEP CGE 
model by Decaluwe et al. (2012). The equations defined are according to the behaviour 
of different actors in the economy, just as production and consumption decisions are 
defined in economic theory by the maximisation of profits and utility respectively. 
According to Adenikinju et al, (2012), the model‟s unique feature allows for the 
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incorporation of carbon emissions in the equation blocks and the introduction of 
pollution emission estimation as indicated in Al-Amin et al. (2008). However, instead 
of the numerous tax components of the E2CGE model, this study, in achieving its 
stated objective, derived the carbon emission co-efficients for each sector and included 
it in the model for each production process and energy use. Also, the study calculated 
the amount for fuel subsidy in the year under review and incorporated it into the SAM. 
This subsidy on refined oil is accounted for in the SAM table as a negative value in the 
import tariff row.  
         In terms of structure, the model follows the standard neo-classical assumptions of 
market clearing condition in all markets, zero excess profits, and a balanced budget for 
each agent (Adenikinju et al., 2013). The model essentially contains eight (8) blocks of 
equations. They include production, income and savings, demand, international trade, 
prices, carbon emissions, equilibrium and the dynamic equation block. The equilibrium 
block usually contains the equilibrium conditions that are to be satisfied and they cover 
both for markets and macroeconomic balances. Thus, the system of equations described 
by the model will show the behavior of various economic agents, the constraints they 
are confronted with and the equilibrium conditions obtainable in the different markets. 
 
               4.4.1.1 Model Description 
         This section presents the various equations for the different blocks in the model. This 
follows the standard equations of the PEP dynamic recursive CGE model which was 
modified to suit the objective of the current study. The following represents the salient 
features of the E2CGE model showing the structure and linkages in the economy. A 
complete list of the model sets, variables, parameters and equations are presented in 
Appendix Two. 
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i. Production Block: The model begins with the assumption that firms operate 
in a perfectly competitive environment. Thus, firms will maximise profits 
subject to the firm‟s production technology. The firm also exhibits a price-
taking behaviour as it takes prices of goods, services and factors as given. 
Also, the production technology follows a nested structure such that it is 
composed of a multi-level cascading specification of the production process. 
At the top level, output is produced by each sector from the combination of 
value added and total intermediate consumption in fixed shares following a 
Leontief production function. This is represented by equation 4.9 and 4.10 
respectively. At the lower level (equation 4.11), each sector‟s value added 
consists of both composite labour and capital following a CES specification.  
 
They describe the production technology of the representative firm, various 
combinations of labour and capital employed by the firm which maximizes 
profit, and total intermediate consumption for production. In the extractive 
sectors of the economy namely petroleum (which includes crude oil, gas and 
other mining sectors) and refined oil, lower substitution of capital and labour 
is employed to ensure the upward trend in both investment and capital stock 
growth in the sector (Adenikinju et al. 2012). According to Nwafor et al. 
(2006), labour demand will grow at the expense of capital demand without 
this treatment. 
 
Equation 4.12 shows how firms combine labour and capital inputs to the point 
where the value of marginal product of each input equals its price thereby 
ensuring profit maximisation. This follows a Constant Elasticity of 
Substitution (CES) production function. The bottom level of the value added 
side reveals the combination of the various categories of capital (land and 
capital) following a CES function technology assumed to be imperfect 
substitutes (equations 4.13). Equation 4.14 is the equation for the demand of 
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each type of capital. From the second level, the total intermediate 
consumption is composed of different commodities and services (inputs) 
assumed to be perfectly complementary and combined using a Leontief 
production function. This is given by equation 4.15.  
 
In the case of producers‟ supply behaviour, they allocate output among 
products so as to maximise sales revenue, given product prices subject to 
equation 4.16 and equation 4.17 is the individual product supply functions. 
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ii. Income and Savings Block: The second block in the model is composed of 
equations relating to income and saving behaviour of the economic agents in 
the economy (households, firms and government) and the rest of the world 
(ROW). These equations describes the income, taxes, savings and disposable 
income of the different agents and also transfers received or made from one 
agent to another. The household agent which is modeled as a representative 
agent is assumed to have a Stone-Geary type of preference. They derive their 
income from labour income, capital income and transfers received from other 
agents (equation 4.18). Likewise, each household category receives a fixed 
share of their earnings from the labour they provide (equation 4.19). This is 
also the case for capital income as the total is distributed between all agents in 
fixed proportions (equation 4.20). Transfers on the other hand represent the 
sum of all transfers received by the different categories of households 
(equation 4.21). The disposable income of the type h household is given by 
the difference between the income of the household and direct taxes which is 
equation 4.22. Equation 4.23 shows the proportion of disposable income that 
is consumed after saving. The model assumes that households‟ saving is not a 
fixed proportion of total income but rather, it is modeled as a linear function 
of disposable income (equation 4.24). In this manner, the marginal propensity 
to save is assumed different from the average propensity.  
 
The model also has one representative firm that receives capital income 
(equation 4.25) which is a share of total returns to capital (equation 4.26). The 
firm‟s disposable income given by equation 4.27 is derived by deducting the 
firm‟s income taxes from its total income. Government is another agent that 
receives income from direct taxes from households and firms, indirect taxes 
on products and imports, and also taxes on production (equation 4.28). 
Additional income is received from capital income and transfers from the rest 
of the world (ROW). Equation 4.29 to 4.42 presents the equations of the 
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different revenue sources of the government. The model describes income 
taxes as a linear function of total income as done for household savings. Thus, 
whether for households or firm, when a non-zero intercept is employed; the 
marginal rate of taxation will be different from the average rate and this will 
be useful in simulating fiscal changes. Government savings shows the 
difference between government revenue and expenditure (equation 4.43). This 
equation also shows the current government budget deficit or surplus which 
could be positive or negative savings.  
 
The rest of the world which describes the domestic economy‟s interaction 
with the external world earns income from the payment of goods imported 
into the domestic economy and capital supplied (equation 4.44). The rest of 
the world also spends on the domestic economy which is in terms of paying 
for exports and transfers to domestic agents (e.g. remittances). Therefore, 
equation 4.45 presents the difference between the revenue of the rest of the 
world agent and its expenditure which is given as its savings. The value of the 
savings equals the current account balance (CAB) but opposite in sign 
(equation 4.46). Finally, transfers in the model consist of transfers by 
government to households (equation 4.47) and transfers from the ROW to 
domestic agents made up of households and government (equation 4.48). The 
transfers are initially set to their SAM values, growing in each period at the 
same rate    as the population index      which is indexed to the consumer 
price index.  
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iii. Demand Block: The third block explains the different equations relating to 
the demand for goods and services produced domestically or imported. It 
consists of demand for intermediate goods, household consumption demand, 
investment demand (by firms) and government consumption demand. The 
assumption that households have Stone-Geary utility function where the linear 
expenditure system is derived allows for a degree of flexibility with respect to 
substitution possibilities when there is a price change. The specification does 
not impose a zero cross-price elasticity or unit income elasticity as against the 
Cobb-Douglas utility function. Thus, the demand of each household type for 
each good is given by equation 4.49 and is determined by utility maximisation 
subject to budget constraint. The total of investment expenditure which is 
made up of both private and public investments is distributed in fixed shares 
among commodities. This is represented by equation 4.50 and 4.51. In 
equation 4.52, the final demand for each commodity i for investment purposes 
which is the sum of the quantity demanded for both private and public 
investment is presented. Equation 4.53 is government expenditure on goods 
and services. Finally, given that productive sectors employ inputs in the 
production of commodities, equation 4.54 shows the intermediate demand for 
each commodity given by the sum of industry demands.  
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iv. International Trade Block: This block describes the trade relations of the 
domestic economy with the rest of the world. It is essentially composed of 
supply of exports and demand for imports. The equations in this block 
represent the behaviour of domestic buyers and suppliers. The standard 
Armington assumption of imperfect substitutions between domestically 
produced goods and imported goods is assumed for relationship between the 
domestic economy and the rest of the world. The assumption is that world 
price of traded goods (imports and exports) is exogenous which is the small-
economy hypothesis. Equation 4.55 is the relative supply function which is 
derived from the first-order conditions of revenue maximisation subject to the 
Constant Elasticity of Transformation (CET) aggregator function. Equation 
4.56 summarises the producers‟ supply behaviour given by a nested CET 
function where the upper level shows output been allocated to individual 
products. At the lower level, supply of each product is distributed between the 
domestic markets and exports. Equation 4.57 represents the world demand for 
exports. Equation 4.58 asserts that domestically demanded commodities are a 
composite combination of both imported goods and domestically produced 
goods where they are imperfect substitutes. This imperfect substitutability is 
given by a CET aggregator function. The same manner producers seek to 
maximise revenue, so also buyers seek to minimise expenses subject to the 
CES aggregation function. The relative demand for imports or total 
commodity imported can then be derived to yield equation 4.59.   
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v. Price Block: This block defines various price categories as available in the 
model. It contains prices associated with production, foreign trade and price 
indices. In all, there are prices for production (price of goods and services, 
labour and capital), international trade (prices of imported and exported 
products) and the different price indices. Equation 4.60 represents the unit 
cost of an industry‟s output which is a weighted sum of the prices of value 
added and total intermediate consumption. This is because in aggregation, the 
price of an aggregate is the weighted sum of the prices of its component. This 
same principle is applied to other price aggregates (equations 4.61 and 4.62). 
The basic price of industry j‟s output obtained from the unit cost by adding 
taxes on production (other than taxes on labour and capital) is given by 
equation 4.63. Also, the price of composite capital of an industry given by a 
weighted sum of the rental rates of the different types of capital used by that 
industry is presented by equation 4.64. The corresponding equation for wages 
is not considered as there is only one representative labour in the model.  
The price charged by producers is a weighted sum of the price obtained from 
both the domestic and international markets since they are able to sell their 
products in both markets. The weight, thus, allocated to individual market is 
proportional to the amount sold in that market (equation 4.65). They, 
however, differ with respect to relative price changes, which is dependent on 
the elasticity of transformation. Equation 4.66 shows the basic price of 
product i by industry j which is derived from the weighted sum of its basic 
price on the domestic and export market. Given that commodities bought from 
the domestic market are composites or aggregates, therefore, the price paid for 
domestically produced commodities is given by the sum of the price received 
by the producer and indirect taxes (equation 4.67). In the same vein, the price 
paid for imported commodity will be the world price which is converted to 
local currency, plus taxes, import duties and domestic indirect taxes (equation 
4.68). Equation 4.69 shows the price of the composite which is weighted sum 
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of the price paid for domestically produced and imported. This is for goods 
facing import competition. Finally the model defines two price indexes 
namely the GDP deflator (equation 4.70) and the consumer price index 
(equation 4.71). The former is a Fisher index while the latter is a Laspeyres 
index.    
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where;  
                                
          
                          
                                               
                                                  
                                                         
                     
 
vi. Equilibrium Block: This block verifies the demand and supply equilibrium 
of both the goods market and the factor market. Equation 4.72 states the 
equilibrium condition between demand and supply of each commodity on the 
domestic market and international market. The equilibrium between the total 
demand and supply for each factor of production is ensured with equations 
4.73 and 4.74. Also, total investment expenditure must be equaled to total 
savings by the different agents (equation 4.75) while the different forms of 
investment expenditure equals total investment (equation 4.76). Equation 4.77 
show that sum of total goods produced locally that were demanded in the 
domestic market equal the sum of supplies of all commodities produced by 
domestic producers. Also, supply to the export market of each good should be 
the same with its demand (equation 4.78). The GDP is computed not as an 
equilibrium condition, but rather made up of payments to factors, including 
taxes on production, products and imports. The GDP equation (equation 4.79) 
consists of the sum total of income paid to labour and capital including taxes 
on products and income and other taxes on production.  
       ∑                                   (4.72) 
 ∑                        (4.73) 
 ∑                       (4.74) 
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where; 
                     
                               
                            
 
vii. Dynamic Equations Block: This block links one period to another in the 
model by showing the between-period relationships. It explains the variables 
that grow over time for example, population. It is represented in the model by 
population index      growing each period at a rate    such that        for 
the first period and                     for other periods. Other 
constants assumed to grow at the same rate with    and      include the 
household savings function intercept, households‟ and firms‟ income tax 
function intercepts, household transfers to government function intercept, 
transfers from government and the rest of the world. The variables whose 
values are assumed to update with time (each growing period) are labour 
supply, current account balance, minimum consumption of commodities in the 
LES demand equations, government current expenditures, public investment 
and changes in inventories.  
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Capital accumulation in the model is given by equation 4.80 and it shows that 
the stock of type k capital in industry j in period     equals the stock of the 
preceding period minus depreciation plus volume of new capital investment in 
the preceding period. Equation 4.81 describes the amount of public investment 
expenditures which is determined by the price of public investment. This 
depends on how much savings are taken up by public investment. The amount 
left for private (business sector) investment given the price of private 
investment is presented in equation 4.82. The prices of new private and public 
capital represent equations 4.83 and 4.84 respectively. The volume of new 
type k capital allocated to industry bus (business sector) is proportional to the 
existing stock of capital (equation 4.85). On the other hand, this proportion 
varies according to the ratio of the rental rate to the user cost of that capital 
which may be interpreted as the Tobin‟s q. (equation 4.86). The user cost of 
capital is defined as depending on the price of new capital, rate of depreciation 
and the interest rate.  
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     where; 
                                                              
                                                                         
   
                                
   
                                 
   
                                 
   
                                
                                                 
                   
                                                       
                                                       
                                                      
                                                              
                                                          
      
                                                                  
 
viii. Carbon Emissions Block: An additional block is included in the model to 
achieve the objective of the study. This provides allowance for simulations on 
CO2 emissions within the framework of the model. It also establishes links of 
CO2 with the production process. These links are established through the 
energy use of these sectors, that is, the energy intensity of each sector and the 
carbon co-efficients. This measure of emissions represent fixed co-efficient of 
energy intensity per sector. Equation 4.87 describes the total carbon emission 
in the economy from the energy intensive sectors of the model while equation 
4.88 is the difference between the total emissions and maximum emission 
permitted in the economy. The emissions in the model are treated as 
proportional to the energy inputs used. 
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                                                    ∑          
(4.87)    
            
̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅                    (4.88) 
where; 
pet: Petroleum sector 
roil: Refined oil sector 
rtrans: Road transport sector 
       : Total carbon emission; 
     
̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  : Carbon emission limit; 
   : Total energy type use by sector;   
   : Carbon emission coefficient per unit of energy type use by sector; 
 
                  4.4.1.2 Closure Rules 
In a CGE model analysis, equilibrium results, direction of causality and 
magnitude of change in terms of policy shift depends on the manner in which 
the model is closed. Empirical literature suggests that closure rule for 
macroeconomic variables determine how macro-equilibrium is attained after a 
shock. Mathematically, this process ensures that a “closed” model that derives 
a square system results to having as many independent equations that explains 
the endogenous variables. In other words, there are a sufficient number of 
equations which should equal the number of endogenous variables. According 
to Decaluwe et al. (2013), with respect to decision on choosing macro-closure, 
consideration should be given to specific nature of the problem and the origin 
of the shock of interest.   
  
Broadly, CGE models follow different closure rules which could either be 
based on the Walrasian system where markets are assumed to clear (neo-
classical savings-driven characteristics) or the structuralist model that 
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emphasises structural rigidities in markets and institutions. Others include the 
Johansen and Neo-keynesian closure. Also, the rules on model closure are 
classified into the microeconomic and the macroeconomic model closure. The 
micro closure rule focuses on how the capital and labour markets balance; that 
is, deciding if capital will be mobile or immobile and if the model assumes 
full employment where labour supply is fixed and wage rate is allowed to 
adjust.  
 
A CGE model often contain three macro balances which includes government 
balance, savings and investment, and finally, rest of the world/external 
balance (current account balance). Generally, common macro closures in 
standard CGE models are the savings driven by investment or investment 
driven by savings (Ezaki, 2006). In other words, choice is made between a 
savings driven and an investment driven closure. In the former, value of 
savings is determined possibly by a fixed proportion of disposable household 
income. The balance identity determines the value of investment. On the other 
hand, in the investment driven macro closure, the value of total investment is 
determined within the model with the balance identity determining savings. 
The default closure of PEP-1-t model adopts the nominal exchange rate as the 
numeraire. Also, variables such as government expenditures, volume of 
public sector investment and the current account balance are assumed fixed in 
each period. Other variables considered exogenous in the model includes 
labour supply (assumed to be mobile across sectors), capital stock, minimum 
consumption, volume of inventory changes, and the world prices of imports 
and exports. In addition, the model states the equilibrium conditions for the 
factor and goods markets.    
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However, the study adopts a neo-classical savings driven macro closure with 
the full employment assumption. The savings driven closure ensures that 
savings rate of domestic institutions remain fixed while investment passively 
adjusts to ensure that savings rate equals investment spending in equilibrium. 
In the micro closure, labour supply is held fixed and mobile across sectors so 
that wage is able to adjust to clear the market. Also, capital is held fixed and 
immobile. The nominal exchange rate is the chosen numeraire with the current 
account balance held fixed while foreign savings are made to adjust 
endogenously to ensure external balance. Empirical evidence from literature 
argue that if the current account is not fixed and allowed to be free, indicators 
of economic welfare based on household consumption becomes invalid. This 
is in view of the fact that borrowing of funds increases consumption in the 
present period, especially as no provision is made in the model to pay back the 
debt incurred. In the same vein, government expenditure is held fixed in real 
terms as well as all tax rates. Thus, the balance on government budget adjusts 
to ensure that public expenditure equals public revenue. The savings driven 
closure seems appropriate for the Nigerian economy given that many 
household consumers of imported refined oil are low-income earners and will 
most likely not increase savings to fund future investment.      
 
               4.4.1.3 Description of Simulation Scenarios 
The study considers three alternative scenarios to achieve the earlier stated 
objectives of analysing the implications of changes in imported refined oil subsidies 
on carbon emissions in Nigeria.  
i. Scenario One: This simulation experiment considers a partial removal of 
subsidy on imported refined oil when there is a 50 percent increase in import 
tariff on refined oil over the simulation period.  
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ii. Scenario Two: This simulation experiment considers a gradual elimination 
of subsidy on imported refined oil over a period of five years and compares 
the results generated.  
iii. Scenario Three: This simulation experiment considers a complete removal 
of subsidy on imported refined oil. This involves a 100 percent shock to 
import tariff on refined oil. 
 
 
4.5 Technique of Estimation/ Model Implementation 
       The process of implementing a standard CGE model involves a number of steps. Firstly, 
the structure of the model is set up which ensures that the dataset for the study is verified 
against the benchmark equilibrium dataset. This is followed by the calibration process of 
determining the appropriate parameters for the production and demand functions while 
also deriving the values for the “free” parameters of the model. This calibration process 
follows the process of choosing the values of a subset of parameters in a way that when 
combined with the modified SAM and the chosen behavioural parameters, the model 
reproduces the initial data of the reference year. Following a replication check (the 
baseline or business-as-usual scenario) that ensures the specified model and calibration 
exercise were properly done, the data contained in the SAM together with the associated 
equations of the model are used to solve the model. Once this is completed, the 
simulation scenarios are then introduced to shock the model and compare simulation 
results with the baseline or business-as-usual (BAU) scenario. The General Algebraic 
Modeling System (GAMS) software which is a high level computer modeling 
programme designed to solve large and complex non-linear system of equations such as 
the CGE model and the SAM dataset employed to achieve the objectives of the study are 
discussed in the following sub-section.  
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             4.5.1 The Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) of the Nigerian Economy 
The Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) is essentially a square matrix comprising of rows 
and columns that show different economic activities and transactions that takes place in 
an economy. It represents a comprehensive economy-wide data framework that shows 
the economy of a nation (Lofgren et al, 2002). It can also be defined conceptually as an 
accounting system that gives a comprehensive account of all incomes and expenditures 
by source and destination (Falokun and Adenikinju, 2009). As a matrix, each cell 
represents the flow of economic activities in monetary terms from a column account to a 
row account, giving a snapshot of an economy for a given year (Nwafor, Diao and 
Alpuerto, 2010). These multiple accounts comprise activities, commodities and 
economic agents.  
              The design is such that, it brings together aggregated data in a coherent and organized 
form that can be useful for policy makers in policy making and planning. According to 
Falokun and Adenikinju (2009), it is the basic building structure for CGE models that 
serves as the benchmark solution for them. The SAM also represents the database of the 
CGE model and is designed to capture the microeconomic and macroeconomic structure 
of the economy (Nwafor et al, 2010).  In terms of basic philosophy, different variations 
are often adopted in the construction of the SAM depending on the country or region. 
However, the most important factor is that there must be accounting consistency at every 
stage of data generation by modelers. In other words, the data that the modelers supply 
into their models must be consistent with the national income and the input-output 
accounting that their equations contain (Falokun and Adenikinju, 2009). 
             The double-entry accounting principle in a SAM requires that for each account, total 
revenue (row total) must equal total expenditure (column total). The SAM according to 
Lofgren et al (2002) and Falokun and Adenikinju (2009) is made up of a number of 
accounts namely, activity account, commodity account, factor account, current account 
of the domestic institutions, the capital account and the rest of the world account; the 
subdivision of each account however depends on the objective of the study and data 
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availability. The SAM is useful when trying to identify structure and linkage effects in 
an economy, analyzing growth and multiplier effects, monitoring of movements of key 
variables, the tracking of their effects on macroeconomic aggregates and answering “if” 
situation or policy scenarios especially using a CGE framework (Falokun and 
Adenikinju, 2009).  
The main features/structure of a SAM as described by Nwafor et al. (2010) is as follows: 
       a) Activities and Commodities 
              This section of the SAM describes the sector responsible for production (such as 
domestic firms) in the economy and goods and services produced by these production 
sectors. The former is called activities or sectors while the latter are collectively called 
commodities, distinction is often made between the two. These production units divided 
into different sectors combine different factors of production (land, labour, capital) with 
raw materials used as intermediate inputs to produce different goods and services. In 
return, for the supply of the factors of production, activities pay economic agents. For 
instance, households receive wages and rents, government receive profits while the rest 
of the world collects payments for foreign capital. In a SAM, the “commodities” 
component also covers total domestic production plus imported supply of goods and 
services available in an economy at market prices. Also included in this account is tax 
imposed on commodities (consumption tax, import duties, levies). Other divisions in this 
category within the SAM include intermediate demand and intermediate inputs for 
production having their ways of balancing them. They trace the income and expenditure 
flows of activities and commodities. A SAM consists of different activities and 
commodities with activities divided majorly into agriculture, manufacturing and 
services. This can however be disaggregated into other components depending on data 
availability and the type of sub-sectors aggregated will depend on the nature of the study 
using it. For example, an agricultural-based study will have large numbers of 
agricultural sub-sectors like livestock, poultry, maize, beans, rice, and so on; while a 
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manufacturing-based analysis will have the manufacturing sector opened up and other 
sectors aggregated depending on the objective. 
 
              b) Domestic Institutions/Economic Agents 
              The SAM also records information on various institutional accounts such as households, 
firms and government (Nwafor et al., 2010). The households get their income from 
payments for use of labor and capital in the form of wages and rent during production 
process. They also accept profit incomes from firms, social security and transfer 
payments such as pensions from the government and the rest of the world (usually in 
form of remittances and gifts). The rest of the world constitutes the external sector that 
trades with the domestic economy and also make/receive payments. The households 
spend their income on the purchase of commodities, pay taxes to the government and 
save the remaining portion or dis-save if expenditure exceeds income. Firms as 
institutions are treated as intermediate agents who transfer their profits to households 
and governments (taxes).   
 
             c) Savings, Investment and the Foreign Account 
             According to Nwafor et al. (2010), the savings and investment account covers the 
sources of savings used in financing domestic investments and these savings are divided 
into domestic (savings from households and government) and foreign (this shows the 
position of a country‟s current account balance). The foreign account referred to as “the 
rest of the world” in the SAM summarizes the economic relations between the country 
and other economies of the world. Foreign trade is captured in the synergy between the 
commodities account and the foreign account by trailing the import payments and export 
earnings. A country can also have interplays between the foreign account and factors 
account if some capital account employed in domestic production is owned by foreign 
companies (an example is oil production in Nigeria). The foreign inflows is made up of 
net remittances from abroad to households and foreign aid/grants received by 
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governments from abroad together with export earnings. Foreign outflows comprise 
import payment and payments to foreign capital.  
             The most current SAM for the Nigerian economy is the 2006 SAM representing the 
economic activities in the economy for the year 2006. It is the most recent year for 
which sufficient data is available (Nwafor et al, 2010). It was built for the Dynamic 
CGE (DCGE) model that examined the agricultural growth and investment options for 
reducing poverty in Nigeria (Nwafor et al., 2010). This SAM contains 61 
sectors/activities, 62 commodities, 12 household groups, 3 factors of production (land, 
labor and capital) and 4 tax accounts (Nwafor et al., 2010). Each of the sectors were 
disaggregated to various components; under agriculture, there are 27 crops in cropping 
sub-sector, 4 livestock and 2 in other agriculture; under manufacturing, there are 13 
divisions; under mining, 2 divisions (crude petroleum and natural gas and other mining) 
while services contains 13 sub-sectors. Agriculture has larger sectors because the study 
was agricultural-based so the SAM can be re-aggregated based on the nature and 
purpose of a study.  
For the purpose of this study which focuses more on the energy sector, the sectors will 
be re-aggregated to eight (8) sectors and the details, including each sector‟s contribution 
to GDP, are presented in Table 4.1 while the complete re-aggregated is contained in 
Appendix One. Data used in building the SAM were sourced from publications of 
Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN), National Bureau of Statistics (NBS), Federal Ministry 
of Agriculture and Water Resources (FMAWR) including data from the earlier 1995 
SAM by UNDP showing Nigeria‟s economy in 1989. Nwafor et al. (2010) noted that the 
income and expenditures are unlikely to be balanced as a standard SAM make use of 
information from various sources, however, various methods can be adopted in making 
the data consistent and balance. It is important to point out some likely limitations 
associated with the 2006 SAM which emphasises the fact the SAM was built based on 
the input-output table of 1998. Thus, some of the features of the SAM show 
characteristics structure of the Nigerian economy as at that period. However, despite this 
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limitation, the SAM is still useful in analysing the objective of the study especially as it 
is currently the most recent SAM vetted by government institutions such as the National 
Bureau of Statistics. Notable recent literature on CGE analysis for Nigeria had also used 
this SAM. Further development of a more recent SAM that considers the new structure 
of the Nigerian economy is on-going and yet to be completed as at the time of this study.  
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Table 4.1: Description of the Re-aggregated SAM for the Study 
Code 
Name 
Sector 
Description 
Sub-sectors GDP (Current 
₦ million) 
Share in % 
AGR Agriculture Rice, Wheat, Maize, Sorghum, Millet, Cassava, Yams, 
Cocoyam, Irish Potato, Sweet Potato, Banana And 
Plantain, Beans, Groundnuts, Soya beans, Beniseed, 
Vegetables, Fruits, Cocoa, Coffee, Cotton, Oil Palm, 
Sugar and Sugar Cane, Unprocessed Tobacco, Nuts, 
Cashew, Rubber, Other Crops not Specified, Cattle, 
Live Goats and Sheep, Live Poultry and Other 
Livestock, fish, fish meat and forestry 
5,913,648 29.70 
MFC Manufacturing beef, goat, sheep meat, poultry meat, eggs, milk, other 
meat, beverages, processed food products, textiles, 
wood, wood products, furniture, transportation and 
other equipment, other manufacturing 
1,315,588 6.61 
PET Crude 
Petroleum 
Crude petroleum, natural gas and other mining.  6.860.390 34.46 
ROIL Refined oil Refined oil. 58,157 0.29 
RTRANS Road transport Road transport 446,506 2.24 
UTIL Utility Electricity and water. 624,578 3.14 
SER Services Building and Construction, Other transportation, 
wholesale and retail trade, hotel and restaurants, 
telecommunications, post, broadcasting, finance and 
other business services, real estate, education, health, 
other private services.  
3,773,775 18.96 
ADM Non-tradable Public Administration 915,889 4.60 
Total   Total GDP at Factor Cost 19,908,531 100.00 
Source: 2006 Nigerian SAM  
Note: The original SAM can be downloaded from the following link: 
https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataset.xhtml?persistentId=hdl:1902.1/15648 
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      4.5.2 Solution Technique 
              CGE models are often solved or formulated through the use of software systems. 
The major software systems often used are GAMS and GEMPACK, depending on 
the type of CGE model adopted. Other methods for solving a CGE model include 
Excel and MATLAB. The PEP model uses GAMS in solving the model and thus 
will represent the solution technique adopted for this study. The software enables 
users to implement some form of hybrid algorithms that combines different solvers. 
It was originally developed by a group of economists from the World Bank and was 
essentially to facilitate the resolution of large and complex non-linear models on 
personal computers (Robichaud, 2010). It permits the solving of simultaneous non-
linear equations with or without optimization of some objective function (Decaluwe 
et al, 2010). The major strength of GAMS lies in its simplicity, portability, 
transferability and ease of technicalities. It is essentially user friendly once the 
codes are well-understood. 
 
              According to Robichaud (2010), a typical CGE model programmed in GAMS can 
be decomposed into three modules. These modules correspond to data entry, model 
specification and solving procedure. Also, elements in the model must be clearly 
defined, declared and assigned (that is, sets, parameters, variables and the 
equations). The first stage (data entry) involves calibration of data and begins with 
sets and parameter declaration and definition, data assignment and intermediate 
displays. The benchmark data for a CGE model is usually drawn from the SAM 
adopted for the study. The second stage (model) entails specifying the model, 
variables and equations. The third stage (resolution) centers on creating solving 
statements and display of results. 
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4.5.3 Simulation Procedure 
This section discusses the various steps involved in the simulation procedure that 
produced the results of the study. Figure 4.3 presents the different steps involved in 
the implementation of a standard CGE model as described by the WTO and 
UNCTAD report (2012). Implementing a CGE model begins with obtaining the 
national data for the concerned economy, region, and world (depending on the 
nature of analysis). Thus, a country-specific study will use a national SAM data, 
while a regional study or global study will use a regional SAM or global SAM 
respectively. The next step will be to aggregate the data in the SAM to suit the 
objective of the study, where the various sectors are expanded or collapsed.  
The completion of the above described process will lead to verifying the dataset 
with the benchmark equilibrium in the CGE GAMS code. In the gams code, the set 
of the model including the various variables (real, nominal, price) are presented. 
Following this is the calibration process where the functional form and elasticity 
parameters of the model vis-a-viz the SAM data for the economy, are specified. A 
replication check is then performed to ascertain the validity of the specified 
parameters.  This is closely followed by a pre-simulation procedure that ensures the 
dataset and components of the model replicate the benchmark equilibrium. The 
value of the infeasibility input point is usually useful to ascertain this successful 
replication as the values must be as close to zero as possible. Thus, the stage 
ensures that there are no specification or calibration errors and thus, shocks can be 
introduced to the model. 
 
After the initialisation process and policy change, the results of the counterfactual 
can then be compared to the benchmark. This is usually interpreted in percentage 
changes. Other policy shock scenarios can be evaluated and necessary sensitivity 
analyses are carried out. This is the basic simulation procedure for a standard CGE 
model.  
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Figure 4.3: Steps in Implementing the CGE model 
Source: Adapted from WTO and UNCTAD (2012)  
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4.5.4. Diagnostic Tests and Sensitivity Analysis 
Increasing concern in the literature, especially on the influence of elasticity 
parameters (demand, supply, price and income) adopted in CGE models, has made 
it essential to perform robustness checks and the sensitivity of the results obtained. 
This is especially important as many researchers often “borrow” these elasticity 
parameter estimates from previous empirical literature. In other words, the rigour 
involved in CGE model often does not permit the modeller, to directly estimate 
these parameters. Thus, they depend on econometric studies that focused on 
determining the values of these elasticities that corresponds with the structure of the 
economy under study.  The values of the parameters determine the magnitude of the 
result obtained in a CGE analysis. This is why emphasises are often placed on 
choice of parameters. Therefore, performing some diagnostic checks and sensitivity 
analysis will help determine the robustness and overall goodness of the model 
specification.  
 
Further to this, the diagnostic tests helps to ascertain if the model had been able to 
replicate the benchmark equilibrium as reflected in the SAM data used for the 
analysis. This is because if the benchmark equilibrium values are not able to 
replicate the data for the economy as contained in the SAM, then, the results of the 
model will not be able to adequately explain the changes observed. Invariably, the 
results cannot be relied upon. One of the commonly used tests of diagnosis is the 
examination of the values of the infeasibility input point after the running of the 
model. This value is expected to be as close to zero as possible. The solution of the 
model must be able to reproduce the initial value of the equilibrium. Also, the 
verification of the non-violation of the Walras law is another diagnostic test often 
used in CGE analysis. This law ensures that the last market is in equilibrium. This is 
referred to as the Leon Walras law. This process involves examining the “level” 
values of the leon variable to ascertain if it is zero or infinitesimally small (very 
close to zero) in the baseline and simulation scenarios.    
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The sensitivity analyses on the other hand are conducted to essentially ascertain the 
robustness of the stimulation results when different parameter estimates are 
introduced. Thus, different elasticity parameters can be used in the model and the 
results under them are compared to check if there are any significant variations in 
magnitude or otherwise. This is usually performed systematically and then the 
results are compared. If there are no large deviations or significant variations, then 
it can be said that the parameter estimates and elasticity values adopted adequately 
reflect the dynamics of the economy. The result will also show if the model is 
relatively stable or not, in addition to showing how sensitive the model is to large 
changes.  
 
4.6 Data Sources and Measurements 
     The 2006 Nigerian SAM which shows the monetary flows in 2006 is the dataset for the 
study. It gives detailed information on the flow of goods and services between different 
sectors, final demand, production inputs and trade for the year 2006. However, the re-
aggregation described in Table 4.1 is to adequately capture the feedback effects between 
the fuel subsidy removal as a policy and the rest of the economy, especially the effect on 
carbon emission. The re-aggregated SAM contains 8 sectors (6 non-energy and 2 energy 
sectors); 9 commodities (here, agriculture is divided into food and agriculture to fulfill 
the Walras Law); 3 factors of production (land, labor and capital); two household groups 
(rural and urban); 3 tax accounts (firm and government; savings and investment; and rest 
of the world). This SAM specially accounts for fuel subsidy through the refined oil sector 
since it is imported refined oil that is subsidised by government. The estimated subsidy 
on petroleum product for Nigeria from the data of the Federal Ministry of Finance for 
year 2006 was given as ₦261 billion. However, the computed amount of the subsidy 
using the Energy Information Administration (EIA) and Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) 
data reflected ₦179 billion. This calculation was based on the price of crude oil and retail 
price for domestic production as opposed to the imported refined oil. It can be attributed 
to the implicit subsidy of the domestic refineries as the price crude oil is sold to the local 
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refineries is lower than the price sold to the export market. The difference of ₦82 billion 
is accounted for by this implicit subsidy. The study adopts the ₦179 billion as this 
reflects the actual value for the imported refined oil, given that this is the sector of 
interest. The benchmark statistics of this SAM as it relates to the various components are 
explained in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS  
 
5.1 Preamble 
      This chapter presents the results of the analysis and simulation in line with the objectives 
set for the study. It begins with the discussion of the benchmark statistics of the model, 
that is, the state of the economy at status quo before simulation scenarios were 
introduced. The objective of the simulation scenarios as explained in the previous chapter 
centers on investigating the impacts that removing subsidy provided on petrol have on 
carbon emission levels in Nigeria. Thus, the results obtained from the simulation 
experiments are discussed, focusing on how removing fuel subsidy transmits shock to the 
economy and influence the measure of environmental quality (CO2). 
 
5.2 Benchmark Statistics 
This section presents the overview of the structure of the Nigerian economy especially as 
it relates to production structure of the different sectors, factor shares, value added, trade 
pattern (import and export), optimising behaviour of agents (households, firms, 
government, rest of the world) as indicated in the SAM for the study. These statistics 
presents the state of the economy before any shock or simulation is introduced. Table 5.1 
shows the contribution of each of the re-aggregated sectors to GDP and their respective 
shares. The information from Table 5.1 as contained in the 2006 Nigerian SAM show that 
the crude oil (oil and gas and mining activities) has the largest share of GDP in 2006 with 
₦6,887,581,000 at 34.60 percent, closely followed by the agricultural sector (29.70 
percent). In other words, the energy sector (Petroleum and Refined oil) jointly contributes 
about 34.89 percent while the non-energy sector contributes the remaining 65.11 percent 
for the year 2006. This explains the strategic importance of the energy sector in 
contributing to GDP, foreign exchange as well as government revenue.   
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                   Table 5.1: Re-aggregated SAM and their share of GDP 
Code Name Sector Description GDP(₦‟m) Share of GDP (%) 
AGR Agriculture 5,913,648 29.70 
MFC Manufacturing 1,315,588 6.61 
PET Crude Petroleum 6,887,581 34.60 
ROIL Refined oil 58,157 0.29 
RTRANS Road transport 446,506 2.24 
UTIL Utility 624,578 3.14 
SER Services  18.82 
ADM Non-tradable 915,889 4.60 
TOT Total GDP at 
Factor Cost 
19,908,533 100 
Source: Re-calculated by author from the 2006 Nigerian SAM  
 
In terms of trade, data shows that the bulk of imports originates from the manufacturing 
sector (makes up 52 percent) closely followed by the service sector (21 percent). On the 
export side, the mining sector holds the largest share with over 90 percent which 
reflects the economy‟s dependence on crude oil export. This is presented in Table 5.2. 
As a result of the huge revenue from oil export (evidenced from high export share of 
the mining sector), Nigeria had trade surplus in the year 2006. This surplus is estimated 
at ₦2.87 trillion. Also, it was observed that the net foreign transfer which amounted to 
₦0.57 trillion, combined with the trade surplus contributed to the economy 
experiencing a current account surplus of ₦3.44 trillion. Summarily, the above 
described relationship in the economy as depicted by the SAM helps to understand the 
economic linkages and multiplier effects in the CGE model analysis. 
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Table 5.2: Nigeria Import and Export Share (%), 2001-2005 
Sectors Import shares Export shares 
Agriculture 9.23 0.44 
Manufacturing 52.32 1.12 
Mining 2.01 93.9 
Refined Oil 15.24  - 
Services 21.2 4.54 
Total 100 100 
 Source: Computed by Author from the 2006 Nigerian SAM Results 
 
The SAM also contains information on the different tax revenue collected by 
government from the other economic agents, composed of both direct and indirect 
taxes. Also, taxes are imposed on activities and commodities (Nwafor et al, 2010). The 
sum of tax revenue for that year in the SAM amounted to ₦2.8 trillion. These taxes 
ranges from production taxes imposed on the production sectors (excise duties, sales 
taxes, import tariffs, port levies, and other surcharges), households‟ personal income 
taxes, and company taxes (levied on oil companies).   
 
5.3 Simulation Strategies 
This section presents the description of the simulation strategies targeted towards 
providing results of the response of the economy, especially the magnitude of carbon 
emissions when subsidy of petrol is partially, gradually and completely removed in a 
dynamic setting. As a first step, a baseline scenario is simulated. The aim of this 
simulation is to produce a “business-as-usual” (BAU) picture of the economy, without 
the introduction of any policy impact. Once the benchmark statistics as described earlier 
are replicated, three variant of policy shocks are introduced before running the model. 
This is then compared with the outcome of the benchmark scenario and the deviations are 
reported as percentage changes. The simulation considered in the study is based on three 
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scenarios; a partial (50 percent) removal of petrol subsidy, a gradual removal over a 
period of five years and a full or complete removal.  
 
5.4 Results from Simulation Analysis 
           The results of the simulation performed to achieve the objective of the study when shocks 
are introduced to the model are presented. After replicating the baseline scenario of the 
economy, the policy shocks are expected to bring about macroeconomic and sectoral 
changes across the economy, including variations in carbon emission level which are 
reported in percentage changes. In other words, a CGE framework helps to determine the 
direction and magnitude of change in other sectors of the economy due to policy shift 
(such as reduction of fuel subsidy) in one sector (refined oil). Table 5.3 shows the 
simulation results of the changes in different indicators of macroeconomic performance. 
The aggregate effect is analysed under macroeconomic impacts while how the policy 
shock influences other sectors is presented under sectoral effects. The discussion follows 
both analysis of macroeconomic effects and sectoral effects 
 
5.4.1 Macroeconomic Impacts 
A policy shock due to a partial, gradual or complete elimination of import tariff on 
refined oil (fuel subsidy) is expected to bring about some changes in key macroeconomic 
aggregates in the economy. Such aggregates include Gross Domestic Product (GDP), 
government income, government savings, total investment, import price and trade. From 
Table 5.3, it is evident that all the macroeconomic variables produced a positive value in 
all simulation scenarios except for simulation 1 (partial removal) where the values were 
negative. Though the direction of change differed, however, the difference in magnitude 
was marginal. A partial removal of subsidy (SIM1) represented by a 50 percent increase 
in import tariff on refined oil resulted in a fall in GDP over time with 0.24 percent 
reduction in the first period and a 1.23 percent fall in the fifth period with an average fall 
of 0.69 percent over the five-year period.  
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Table 5.3: Simulation Results of Macroeconomic Effects (Full Employment) 
Year    GDP   YG   SG   IT   
 SIM1 SIM2 SIM3 SIM1 SIM2 SIM3 SIM1 SIM2 SIM3 SIM1 SIM2 SIM3 
1 -0.24 0.25 0.39 -1.89 2.05 3.33 -6.20 6.75 10.96 -10.18 10.63 17.14 
2 -0.42 0.48 0.69 -2.23 2.75 3.85 -7.32 8.96 12.61 -12.75 15.55 22.30 
3 -0.65 0.78 1.06 -2.61 3.43 4.35 -8.56 11.24 14.23 -15.61 20.37 26.36 
4 -0.92 1.15 1.49 -3.03 4.18 4.89 -9.93 13.69 16.00 -18.78 25.56 30.59 
5 -1.23 1.59 1.98 -3.51 4.99 5.48 -11.47 16.38 17.95 -22.33 31.22 35.14 
Ave. -0.69 0.85 1.12 -2.65 3.48 4.38 -8.69 11.40 14.35 -15.93 20.67 26.31 
  Source: Author‟s Computation based on simulation results from GAMS 
   GDP: Gross Domestic Product, YG: Government Income, SG: Government Savings, IT: Total Investment 
 
 
This can be expected as one of the negative effects of subsidy is the fact that the policy 
results to diversion of fund from priority sectors which can reduce productivity over time. 
Thus, given that under this scenario, the subsidy still persist even though at a lower level, 
the influence is still evident as government continues to earmark a portion of the budget 
to fuel subsidy payment. In terms of government income and savings, a similar scenario 
is observed as income reduced by 1.89 percent in the first year and 3.51 percent in the 
fifth year with an overall average of 2.65 percent over the five-year period. Government 
savings likewise fell by 6.20 percent in the first period and by 11.47 percent in the fifth 
year, with 8.69 percent on the average. In the same vein, total investment declined by 
10.18 percent in the first period, 22.33 percent in the fifth period and an average decline 
of 15.93 percent. The decline in investment could be attributed to the decline experienced 
in government income and savings which sidelined fund available to investment purposes 
overall.  
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In simulation 2 (gradual elimination of import tariff) and simulation 3 (complete removal 
of import tariff), the scenario is different as all the macroeconomic variables showed 
positive changes. In simulation 2, the value of GDP increased by 0.25 percent in the first 
year and 1.59 percent in the fifth year with an overall year average of 0.85 percent; for 
government income (YG) and government savings (SG), percentage increase recorded 
2.05 and 6.75 respectively in the first year. This increased continued until it climatised at 
4.99 and 16.38 percent respectively in the fifth year with an overall average of 3.48 and 
11.40 percent. Also, the simulation procedure showed an increase in total investment (IT) 
as against the experience in simulation 1 since the variable reflected an increase of 10.63 
percent in the first period and 31.22 percent in the fifth period with an overall average of 
20.67 percent.  
 
Similarly, the macroeconomic aggregates increased in the simulation 3 given that GDP, 
YG, SG and IT increased by 0.39, 3.33, 10.96 and 17.14 percent respectively in the first 
period. These increases can be attributed to the fact that with the complete removal of the 
fuel subsidy, funds are freed up immediately for investment purposes while in the partial 
removal, the funds through savings slowly accumulates for investment over the period. 
For all the macroeconomic variables, the rise peaked in the fifth year with percentage 
change of 1.98 percent for GDP, 5.38 percent for YG, 17.95 percent for SG and 35.14 
percent for total investment. On the average, the variables recorded 1.12, 4.38, 14.35 and 
26.31 positive percentage variation. It is important to note that the complete elimination 
scenario (SIM3) recorded the largest increase as the magnitude of government savings 
and total investment increased significantly compared to simulation 1 and simulation 2. 
 
Another interesting picture is painted in Table 5.4 with a mixed result from wages and 
imports of refined oil variables. Across the different simulation scenarios, import of 
refined oil fell as expected. This can be due to a fiscal policy change that attempted to 
achieve an upward effect on import tariff, given that it was targeted at the refined oil 
sector. However, despite the fact that the direction of change is the same across all 
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simulation scenarios (SIM1, SIM2 and SIM3), it was observed that the magnitude 
slightly differ. In simulation 1, import of refined oil declined by 5.67 percent while 
simulation 2 and simulation 3 showed a decline of 3.66 percent and 5.67 percent 
respectively in the first period. The magnitude of change in the simulation 1 and 
simulation 3 over the five year period appears to be almost the same and grew over the 
years in the same manner unlike the case of the simulation 2. In other words, a partial 
elimination and complete elimination achieves the same effect in terms of reduction in 
import of refined oil. A slightly similar occurrence was observed with the variable wage 
as negative values were presented in all the simulation scenarios. While there was a fall 
in wages in the first and second year for simulation 2 and simulation 3, an increase in 
wages was experienced for simulation 1 given that the latter produces a partial removal of 
fuel subsidy.  
 
 
Table 5.4: Results for other Macroeconomic Variables 
Year Import*    Wage   
 SIM1 SIM2 SIM3 SIM1 SIM2 SIM3 
1 -5.67 -3.66 -5.67 0.53 -0.73 -1.25 
2 -13.39 -8.17 -13.39 0.18 -0.24 -0.11 
3 -15.06 -10.75 -15.06 -0.17 0.11 0.42 
4 -15.70 -12.68 -15.70 -0.54 0.44 0.87 
5 -15.93 -14.31 -15.94 -0.94 0.80 1.29 
Ave. -13.15 -9.91 -13.15 -0.19 0.076 0.24 
        Source: Author‟s Computation based on simulation results from GAMS 
   Note:*Import is of Refined Oil 
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5.4.2 Sectoral Impacts 
The simulation procedure under the different scenarios in addition to the 
macroeconomic effects also produced sectoral effects. One of the strongest 
advantages of the CGE model is that it enables the analysis of the impact of a policy 
change in one sector on other sectors of the economy. Thus, when government 
introduces a policy shock in one sector, in this case, an increase in import tariff on 
refined oil sector, the impact of this policy shift can be assessed on the other sectors 
of the economy. This section presents the percentage change in the sectoral 
aggregates of total output, imports and exports after the introduction of a policy 
shock.  
 
Sectoral Output 
As shown in Table 5.5, output for virtually all the sectors was negative except for 
the non-tradable (public administration) and road transport that were positive under 
a partial removal scenario.  Though road transport declined over the five-year 
period with an overall year average of 2.05 percent; utility only declined in the 
fourth and fifth year with an average of 0.11 percent. The output of the refined oil 
sector equally declined even as the magnitude was greater for the later years.  
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Table 5.5: Sectoral Output-SIM1 
Year agr mfc pet roil util rtrans ser adm 
1 -0.05 -0.47 -0.01 -1.19 0.41 2.18 -0.33 1.09 
2 -0.16 -0.78 -0.49 -5.61 0.28 2.14 -0.51 1.24 
3 -0.29 -1.17 -1.08 -9.25 0.12 2.07 -0.74 1.39 
4 -0.48 -1.64 -1.79 -12.18 -0.04 1.99 -1.00 1.57 
5 -0.69 -2.19 -2.62 -14.54 -0.22 1.89 -1.30 1.75 
Ave. -0.33 -1.25 -1.19 -8.55 0.11 2.05 0.78 1.41 
 Source: Author‟s Computation based on simulation results from GAMS 
 Note: agr-agriculture, mfc-manufacturing, pet-crude oil and natural gas, roil-refined oil, util-utility,  
rtrans-road transportation, ser-services, adm-public administration 
 
 
Table 5.6: Sectoral Output-SIM2 
Year agr mfc pet roil util rtrans ser adm 
1 0.07 0.52 0.02 1.06 -0.49 -2.46 0.34 -1.20 
2 0.16 0.89 0.48 12.55 -0.29 -2.63 0.59 -1.53 
3 0.35 1.41 1.16 19.46 -0.14 -2.84 0.89 -1.84 
4 0.61 2.07 2.02 24.92 0.03 -3.02 1.25 -2.16 
5 0.95 2.85 3.05 29.88 0.23 -3.17 1.67 -2.49 
Ave. 0.43 1.55 1.35 17.57 -0.13 2.82 0.95 -1.84 
 Source: Author‟s Computation based on simulation results from GAMS 
Table 5.7: Sectoral Output-SIM3 
Year agr mfc pet roil util rtrans ser adm 
1 0.13 0.86 0.01 1.66 -0.80 -4.02 0.54 -1.96 
2 0.22 1.28 0.75 24.48 -0.28 -3.52 0.86 -2.13 
3 0.49 1.91 1.71 30.78 -6.67 -3.31 1.20 -2.29 
4 0.85 2.66 2.80 34.10 0.26 -3.13 1.59 -2.46 
5 1.26 3.51 4.00 36.29 0.52 -2.93 2.02 -2.64 
Ave. 0.59 2.04 1.85 25.46 -1.39 -3.38 1.24 2.29 
Source: Author‟s Computation based on simulation results from GAMS 
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In simulating a gradual and complete removal, the opposite was the case as the 
agricultural, manufacturing, petroleum, refined oil and services had a positive 
change with an overall magnitude average of 0.43 percent, 1.55 percent, 1.35 
percent, 17.57 percent and 0.95 percent. These are presented in Tables 5.5, 5.6 and 
5.7. On the other hand, output in road transport and public administration fell all 
through the years while utility only declined for the initial three years. The above 
description and table of results shows generally the response of the other sectors of 
the economy when a policy shock such as simulation 1, simulation 2 and simulation 
3 are introduced to the refined oil sector. 
Evidently, the results suggest that on the average, despite the increase in the price of 
refined oil due to either a gradual or one shot removal; output eventually increased. 
This particularly stood out for the petroleum, refined oil and service sectors. At the 
initial period, output was low but at latter years, there is an increase in their total 
output. This sectoral analysis provides important policy pointers to the energy-
intensive and non-energy intensive sectors. This is in terms of the design of policies 
for these identified sectors. An examination of the agricultural and manufacturing 
sector show that output declined with a partial removal, however, it experienced 
positive changes in the gradual and complete removal (even though magnitude of 
change was not as large as other sectors).   
 
Intermediate Consumption 
Overall, the intermediate consumption for all sectors declined under simulation 1 
with the exception of road transportation and public administration. This is very 
similar to the results obtained earlier under total output. It is observed that a partial 
removal of subsidy reduced intermediate consumption of refined oil and petroleum 
sectors though with varying magnitude. Also, for utility, the intermediate 
consumption was only positive for the earlier years before declining. However, with 
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a gradual and complete removal, the consumption pattern showed an increase 
across the sectors that recorded negative change under SIM1; though marginal for a 
few sectors. These results are presented in Tables 5.8 and 5.9.  
 
                    Table 5.8: Total Intermediate Consumption by Industry j 
Year   agr    mfc      pet     roil      util   
   S1 S2 S3   S1 S2 S3   S1 S2 S3   S1 S2 S3  S1 S2 S3 
1 -0.05 0.07 0.13 -0.47 0.53 0.86 -0.01 0.002 0.004 -1.19 1.06 1.66  0.41 -0.49 -0.80 
2 -0.16 0.16 0.22 -0.78 0.89 1.28 -0.49 0.48 0.75 -5.61 12.55 24.48  0.28 -0.29 -0.28 
3 -0.29 0.35 0.49 -1.17 1.41 1.91 -1.08 1.16 1.71 -9.25 19.46 30.78  0.12 -0.14 -6.67 
4 -0.48 0.61 0.84 -1.64 2.07 2.66 -1.79 2.02 2.80 -12.18 24.92 34.10 -0.04  0.03  0.26 
5 -0.69 0.95 1.26 -2.19 2.85 3.51 -2.62 3.05 4.00 -14.54 29.88 36.29 -0.22  0.23  0.52 
Source: Author‟s Computation based on simulation results from GAMS 
Note: S1-Simulation 1, S2-Simulation 2 and S3-Simulation 3 
 
   Table 5.9: Total Intermediate Consumption by Industry j (contd.) 
Year rtrans         ser      adm   
 S1 S2 S3 S1 S2 S3 S1 S2 S3 
1 2.18 -2.46 -4.02 -0.33 0.34 0.54 1.09 -1.20 -1.96 
2 2.14 -2.63 -3.52 -0.52 0.59 0.86 1.24 -1.53 -2.13 
3 2.08 -2.84 -3.31 -0.74 0.89 1.20 1.39 -1.84 -2.29 
4 1.99 -3.02 -3.13 -1.00 1.25 1.59 1.57 -2.16 -2.46 
5 1.89 -3.17 -2.93 -1.30 1.67 2.02 1.75 -2.49 -2.64 
Source: Author‟s Computation based on simulation results from GAMS 
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Imports 
Table 5.4 discussed earlier highlighted the import characteristics of the refined oil sector 
and thus, the impact of the policy change on the imports of other sectors are presented 
herein. Based on the Armington assumption which implies that the elasticity of demand 
between imported commodities and locally produced goods is 2, a 50 percent increase in 
import tariff on imported refined oil will reduce demand for imported goods in 
agricultural, manufacturing, petroleum, road transport and services over the five year 
period. Only import for food commodities increased in the first two years, though it 
began declining in the following years (Tables 5.10 and 5.11). However, with a gradual 
and complete removal, imports for all the sectors increased except for the food sectors 
which only increased in the latter years.          
 
Table 5.10: Sectoral Imports 
   agr    mfc    pet 
Year SIM1 SIM2 SIM3 SIM1 SIM2 SIM3 SIM1 SIM2 SIM3 
   1 0.19 -0.41 -0.74 -0.57 0.45 0.66 -0.97 0.87 1.36 
   2 -0.32 0.36 0.78 -1.27 1.57 2.52 -4.17 9.69 19.12 
   3 -0.87 0.95 1.53 -2.01 2.54 3.61 -6.72 14.85 23.68 
   4 -1.44 1.52 2.18 -2.81 3.55 4.65 -8.68 18.77 25.75 
   5 -2.06 2.13 2.81 -3.68 4.66 5.72 -10.15 22.19 26.84 
Source: Author‟s Computation based on simulation results from GAMS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
146 
 
Table 5.11: Sectoral Imports (contd.) 
   rtrans    ser    food 
Year SIM1 SIM2 SIM3 SIM1 SIM2 SIM3 SIM1 SIM2 SIM3 
1 -1.72 1.99 3.30 -0.96 0.93 1.47 0.89 -1.22 -2.09 
2 -1.89 2.42 3.37 -1.58 1.96 3.01 0.41 -0.51 -0.36 
3 -2.08 2.91 3.63 -2.24 2.88 3.95 -0.07 -0.09 0.27 
4 -2.27 3.45 3.93 -2.94 3.85 4.87 -0.55 0.25 0.74 
5 -2.49 4.02 4.26 -3.71 4.90 5.82 -1.03 0.58 1.14 
Source: Author‟s Computation based on simulation results from GAMS 
 
Exports 
This section presents the results of the percentage change in exported commodities for 
the economy when there is a partial, gradual and full removal of subsidy in the economy. 
From Table 5.12, it is evident that exports declined the highest when there is a partial 
removal of subsidy, especially for agricultural (including food), manufacturing and 
petroleum, though the magnitude fluctuated. However, there was an increase in exported 
commodities of the services and road transportation sectors over the entire period. In 
these two sectors, a gradual and complete removal reduced the volume of exports where 
the greatest reduction was recorded for the road transportation sector. On the contrary, 
exports for the other commodities were positive even though the magnitude declined over 
five years on the average. The various simulations are with the assumption that the 
current account is held fixed within the model as described in the closure rules.   
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Table 5.12: Sectoral Exports 
   Agr    mfc    pet 
Year SIM1 SIM2 SIM3 SIM1 SIM2 SIM3 SIM1 SIM2 SIM3 
1 -0.95 1.33 2.29 -0.19 0.31 0.55  0.006 -0.005 -0.008 
2 -0.65 0.75 0.69 -0.16 0.13 0.05 -0.46  0.39  0.59 
3 -0.43 0.68 0.58 -0.18 0.18 0.16 -1.03  1.03  1.51 
4 -0.29 1.83 0.79 -0.25 0.34 0.41 -1.72  1.86  2.58 
5 -0.21 1.14 1.18 -0.39 0.59 0.74 -2.54  2.86  3.77 
Source: Author‟s Computation based on simulation results from GAMS 
                               Table 5.13: Sectoral Exports (contd.) 
                          rtrans    ser     
Year SIM1 SIM2 SIM3 SIM1 SIM2 SIM3 
1  2.89 -3.23 -5.26  0.17 -0.14 -0.21 
2  2.92 -3.56 -4.79  0.30 -0.42 -0.68 
3  2.94 -3.95 -4.69  0.43 -0.58 -0.81 
4  2.93 -4.33 -4.62  0.54 -0.71 -0.88 
5  2.92 -4.69 -4.55  0.64 -0.82 -0.92 
   Source: Author‟s Computation based on simulation results from GAMS 
 
5.4.3 Household Impact 
The change in policy as a result of attempt to reform fuel subsidy is expected to 
impact the different household categories in the model. The model differentiated 
between two categories of households namely rural and urban households. The 
results of the various channels through which the different households are impacted 
are presented in Tables 5.14-5.17 and the discussion follows therein.  
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Income 
Household income was found to have increased due to a partial removal of subsidy 
(SIM1) only in the first two years after which it began to fall. However, with a 
gradual and a one shot removal, income only declined in the first two years and 
experienced an increase in the following years. On the average, values of income 
across all household categories were positive under simulation 2 and simulation 3 
while negative under simulation 1. The largest increase in income was recorded for 
urban households under simulation 3.   
Table 5.14: Household Income 
Year SIM1  SIM2  SIM2  
 HR HU HR HU HR HU 
1  0.44  0.30 -0.62 -0.43 -1.06 -0.75 
2  0.93  0.01 -0.13 -0.02  0.02 0.13 
3 -0.27 -0.32  0.24  0.31  0.57 0.61 
4 -0.66 -0.66  0.62  0.66  1.07 1.65 
5 -1.08 -1.04  1.03  1.04  1.56 1.49 
Ave. -0.13 -0.34  0.23  0.31  0.43 0.63 
Source: Author‟s Computation based on simulation results from GAMS 
 
In the case of labour and capital income, a similar scenario is observed as across all 
households, labour income only increased for the first and second period in 
simulation 1 while it fell for the remaining periods, with a negative overall average 
of 0.19 percent. In simulation 2 and simulation 3, labour income was found to 
increase for most of the years under review and only fell in the first two years with 
an overall average of 0.08 percent and 0.24 percent respectively. This may be 
attributed to the absorption of labour in the refined oil sector as is equally evident 
from the changes observed in wages. It is important to note that labour income for 
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both rural and urban households were the same under the different simulation 
scenarios (Table 5.15). This is due to the assumption that each category of 
households obtains a fixed share of the total labour income.  
Furthermore, capital income only accrues to rural households as they are the only 
household category that own land which is a component of capital. As shown in the 
SAM re-aggregated for the study, urban households do not get income from capital. 
Table 5.16 shows that the highest capital income accrues to the rural household 
when fuel subsidy is completely eliminated in one shot. This is evident with an 
average increase of 0.67 percent. On the other hand, it declined for the same 
category of household when subsidy was partially removed by 0.44 percent. On the 
average, the highest transfer income went to urban households with an increase of 
0.95 percent when subsidy is completely removed while it only fell for rural 
households in the first year and increased thereafter. On the other hand, a consistent 
decline was observed for rural and urban households in the case of a partial 
removal.   
Table 5.15: Labour Income of Households 
          SIM1   SIM2   SIM3 
Year   hr. hu.   hr. hu. hr. hu. 
1  0.53  0.53 -0.73 -0.73 -1.25 -1.25 
2  0.18  0.18 -0.24 -0.24 -0.11 -0.11 
3 -0.17 -0.17  0.11  0.11  0.42  0.42 
4 -0.54 -0.54  0.44  0.44  0.87  0.87 
5 -0.94 -0.94  0.80  0.80  1.29  1.29 
Source: Author‟s Computation based on simulation results from GAMS 
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Table 5.16: Capital Income of Households 
          SIM1   SIM2   SIM3 
Year   hr. hu. hr. hu. hr. hu. 
1  0.47 - -0.65 - -1.11 - 
2  0.06 - -0.11 -  0.05 - 
3 -0.39 -  0.36 -  0.77 - 
4 -0.89 -  0.88 -  1.46 - 
5 -1.44 -  1.48 -  2.18 - 
Source: Author‟s Computation based on simulation results from GAMS 
Note: Urban households do not on land which is a component of capital 
 
Table 5.17: Transfer Income of Households 
          SIM1   SIM2   SIM3 
Year   hr. hu. hr. hu. hr. hu. 
1  -0.03 -0.09 -0.03  0.08 -0.07 0.12 
2  -0.19 -0.31  0.25  0.35  0.45 0.54 
3  -0.36 -0.57  0.44  0.66  0.66 0.93 
4  -0.53 -0.87  0.61  1.02  0.81 1.36 
5  -0.70 -1.22  0.78  1.44  0.95 1.82 
Source: Author‟s Computation based on simulation results from GAMS 
 
                    Consumption 
Across all households, consumption of agricultural and manufacturing products 
only increased in the first two years and declined in the following years with an 
average of 0.09 percent (rural) and 0.26 percent (urban) for agriculture and 0.17 
percent (rural) and 0.10 percent (urban) for manufacturing under simulation 1. This 
is evident from Table 5.18. In the consumption of refined oil, there was an increase 
for all households even though the magnitude of the decrease declined over the 
five-year period. Also, a partial removal of subsidy resulted in an increase in the 
consumption of road transportation and services, though it fell in the fifth year. This 
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may be attributed to the vital role that refined oil plays in supporting households 
domestic and business‟ energy needs.  It is commonly used to power generators and 
vehicles used for transportation services, thus the increase in the two commodities, 
except when it fell for the rural households for road transport in the fifth year and 
for both households for services. However, consumption of food commodities fell 
across all the households with the partial removal of subsidy.  
 
Table 5.18: Consumption of Commodities by Households-SIM1 
Year  agr   mfc    roil   util  rtrans    ser    food  
 hr hu hr hu hr hu hr hu hr hu hr hu hr hu 
1 0.14 0.11 0.63 0.53 13.49 13.10 0.49 0.44 0.35 0.33 0.48 0.43 0.09 0.05 
2 0.04 0.04 0.28 0.26 12.25 11.95 0.35 0.34 0.27 0.26 0.36 0.35 -0.04 -0.05 
3 -0.07 -0.05 -0.12 -0.05 11.14 10.92 0.18 0.21 0.17 0.18 0.22 0.25 -0.22 -0.18 
4 -0.20 -1.15 -0.57 -0.42 10.13 10.00 -0.03 0.03 0.07 0.09 0.06 0.13 -0.42 -0.34 
5 -0.35 -0.27 -1.07 -0.84 9.21 9.16 -0.27 -0.17 -0.04 0.01 -0.12 -0.01 -0.67 -0.54 
Source: Author‟s Computation based on simulation results from GAMS 
 
The results for simulation 2 and simulation 3 shows a different scenario from that of 
simulation 1 as consumption of refined oil declined significantly with an average 
magnitude of 12.02 percent (rural) and 11.78 percent (urban) with a gradual 
removal and 13.77 percent (rural) and 13.52 percent (urban) when there is a 
complete removal. These are presented in Tables 5.19 and 20. This differs from the 
intermediate demand of the sectors for refined oil which increased under simulation 
2 and simulation 3. Therefore, with a gradual and complete removal of subsidy, 
consumption for road transport and service commodities declined but increased 
when the subsidy was partially removed. The above described scenario may be 
connected to the fall in import and local price of refined oil in simulation 1. As the 
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price fell, consumption increased while under simulation 2 and simulation 3 when 
the prices rose and household consumption of refined oil declined.  
Overall, a policy change in fuel subsidy brings about a positive response in quantity 
demanded of composite commodity even though the magnitude was found to 
decline under simulation 1. On the other hand, the response was negative under 
simulation 2 and simulation 3.  
 
Table 5.19: Consumption of Commodities by Households-SIM2 
Year  agr   mfc    roil    util  rtrans    ser  food  
 hr hu hr hu hr hu hr hu hr hu hr hu hr hu 
1 -0.17 -0.12 -0.79 -0.66 -11.90 -11.54 -0.59 -0.52 -0.42 -0.38 -0.58 -0.50 -0.12 -0.05 
2 -0.07 -0.06 -0.39 -0.38 -11.48 -11.20 -0.50 -0.49 -0.33 -0.33 -0.47 -0.46 0.03 0.03 
3 0.06 0.03 -0.04 -0.08 -11.78 -11.55 -0.38 -0.40 -0.27 -0.28 -0.36 -0.39 0.23 0.18 
4 0.21 0.15 -0.45 0.28 -12.25 -12.05 -0.20 -0.27 -0.20 -0.23 -0.23 -0.31 0.49 0.39 
5 0.39 0.30 0.99 0.72 -12.71 -12.56 0.02 -0.09 -0.12 -0.17 -0.07 -0.19 0.83 0.67 
Source: Author‟s Computation based on simulation results from GAMS 
 
Table 5.20: Consumption of Commodities by Households-SIM3 
Year agr  mfc  roil  util  rtrans  ser  food  
 hr hu hr hu hr hu hr hu hr hu hr hu hr hu 
1 -0.28 -0.20 -1.34 -1.10 -18.08 -17.53 -0.98 -0.86 -0.69 -0.64 -0.96 -0.83 -0.21 -0.09 
2 -0.05 -0.07 -0.38 -0.42 -14.26 -13.94 -0.66 -0.66 -0.41 -0.41 -0.58 -0.59 0.08 0.05 
3 0.15 0.09 0.28 0.11 -12.98 -12.77 -0.36 -0.42 -0.25 -0.28 -0.33 -0.41 0.39 0.29 
4 0.37 0.26 0.95 0.65 -12.13 -12.00 -0.03 -0.15 -0.11 -0.16 -0.08 -0.22 0.76 0.59 
5 0.61 0.47 1.66 1.24 -11.41 -11.38 0.33  0.15  0.03 -0.04  0.19 -0.01 1.18 0.94 
Source: Author‟s Computation based on simulation results from GAMS 
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5.4.4 Carbon Emission 
In the simulation of the consequences of subsidy removal on carbon emissions in 
Nigeria, the carbon co-efficients for each of the sectors were derived. This is to 
achieve the environmental objective of the study. In other words, the model 
specially accounts for carbon co-efficients to ensure the derivation of both total 
carbon emissions in the economy and sectoral carbon emissions. This is one of the 
key features of the E2 model. The study calculates the energy intensity of each 
sector and the assumption is that the amount of carbon emissions emitted by the 
sectors is dependent on their energy intensity. Thus, how clean or dirty the different 
sector‟s production technology is will depend on the amount of energy been used as 
inputs. This energy intensity is derived by calculating the ratio of energy 
expenditures of each sector relative to their respective value added. Therefore, the 
estimated carbon emission co-efficients consistent with the emissions (obtained 
from energy intensity) of each sector is presented in Table 5.21.  The estimation is 
based on the value added and energy expenditure values of each of the sectors from 
the re-aggregated 2006 SAM for Nigeria. This is presented in percentage values.  
 
Table 5.21: Estimated Sectoral Carbon Co-efficients  
S/N Sector Carbon Co-efficient (%) 
1 Agriculture 0.04 
2 Manufacturing 2.62 
3 Petroleum 1.10 
4 Refined Oil 21.11 
5 Utility 9.10 
6 Road Transport 30.90 
7 Services 6.02 
8 Public Administration 22.78 
Source: Calculated by Author from the 2006 Nigerian SAM 
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In the dynamic simulation of an increase in import tariff on refined oil, overall total 
carbon emission declined for simulation 1 while it was found to surprisingly 
increase under simulation 2 and simulation 3. These results are presented in Table 
5.22. Despite the fact that most of the macroeconomic variables analysed under 
simulation 1 showed a decline (though the magnitude was marginal), the scenario 
showed the greatest fall in total carbon emissions for the economy. This implies that 
with a partial (50 percent) elimination of import tariff on refined oil, overall carbon 
emission in the economy fell while it increased with a gradual and complete 
elimination. This is despite the fact that the simulation 2 and 3 recorded the highest 
increase in macroeconomic variables. This further confirms the assertion of 
empirical literature that driving a sustainable low-carbon growth path comes with 
inherent trade-offs between ensuring environmental sustainability and economic 
prosperity.  
 
Table 5.22: Total Carbon Emissions for the Economy 
Year SIM1 SIM2 SIM3 
2 -0.65 1.02 1.89 
3 -1.38 1.98 3.08 
4 -2.19 3.04 4.24 
5 -3.09 4.24 5.46 
         Source: Author‟s Computation based on simulation results from GAMS 
 
In addition, the result further provided evidence that the removal of subsidy on 
petrol is not sufficient in cutting down emission. The justification for this could be 
due to the fact that in Nigeria, there is no alternative to using petrol to run cars and 
generating sets. Therefore, with increase in petrol price, consumers will initially 
reduce their consumption but with time, they will have to increase it so as to satisfy 
their various energy needs. This eventually resulted to the increase in emission 
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observed in the latter years, even though on the average the increase marginal. The 
conclusion is that for the removal of fuel subsidy to be effective in reducing carbon 
emissions, there must be adequate development and supply of appropriate 
alternatives to fossil fuel based petrol.   
 
The above discussed trend was equally observed in the sectoral carbon emission 
with the highest emission level from the refined oil sector in the three simulation 
scenarios, though the magnitude was much lesser in simulation 1.    
Sectoral Carbon Emission Results under various Simulation Scenarios 
As observed from Table 5.23, carbon emissions by all the sectors fell with a partial 
removal of import tariff on refined oil for the Nigerian economy. On the average, the 
sector with the lowest emission level was the road transport sector with 0.88 percent 
followed by utility and agriculture sectors with 1.35 percent and 1.47 percent 
respectively. This tends to show an interesting image considering the fact that the road 
transport sector had a high carbon co-efficient when compared to other sectors such as 
manufacturing and services. This result further reiterates the results from the output of the 
sectors as explained previously (See Tables 5.5-5.7). In the case of the road transport and 
manufacturing sector, even though emissions only fell in the simulation 1 scenario, there 
outputs increased when subsidy was completely phased out in one shot (SIM 3 scenario).     
   
Table 5.23: Sectoral Carbon Emission-SIM1 
Period agr mfc pet roil util rtrans ser 
2 -0.46 -0.52 -0.49 -4.79 -0.40 -0.19 -0.48 
3 -1.04 -1.17 -1.09 -8.70 -0.94 -0.55 -1.10 
4 -1.76 -1.97 -1.79 -11.83 -1.61 -1.06 -1.87 
5 -2.61 -2.92 -2.63 -14.33 -2.43 -1.73 -2.80 
Ave. -1.47 -1.65 -1.50 -9.91 -1.35 -0.88 -1.56 
Source: Author‟s Computation based on simulation results from GAMS 
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On the contrary, however, emissions from all sectors were found to increase with a 
gradual and complete removal even though the magnitude increased only marginally. 
These results are presented in Tables 5.24 and 5.25. Overall, it is evident from results 
analysed that emission increased on the average in sectors where output increased and 
likewise carbon emissions declined in the sectors where output fell at the aggregate level 
under the various scenarios simulated in the study.   
 
Table 5.24: Sectoral Carbon Emission-SIM2 
Period agr mfc pet roil util rtrans ser 
2 0.43 0.49 0.48 11.88 0.35 0.09 0.45 
3 1.09 1.27 1.17 18.97 0.95 0.41 1.17 
4 1.96 2.27 2.03 24.54 1.75 0.90 2.11 
5 3.01 3.50 3.06 29.56 2.73 1.56 3.29 
Ave. 1.62 1.88 1.69 21.24 1.45 0.74 1.76 
 Source: Author‟s Computation based on simulation results from GAMS 
 
Table 5.25: Sectoral Carbon Emission-SIM3 
Period agr mfc pet roil util rtrans ser 
2 0.65 0.77 0.75 23.89 0.51 0.08 0.69 
3 1.61 1.88 1.72 30.56 1.41 0.57 1.73 
4 2.73 3.18 2.81 34.07 2.47 1.26 2.97 
5 3.99 4.67 4.02 36.37 3.66 2.12 4.39 
Ave. 2.25 2.63 2.33 31.22 2.01 1.01 2.45 
 Source: Author‟s Computation based on simulation results from GAMS 
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5.5 Unemployment Assumption in the Labour Market 
The study under the closure rule, made an assumption of unemployment where it is 
assumed that a certain level of unemployment exists in the economy. This was done by 
adjusting the labour equilibrium of equation 65 of the model equations by setting labour 
supply to equal labour demand plus unemployment. This becomes ∑                . 
 
Under the full employment assumption which are the results earlier presented above, 
equation 65 equated labour supply to labour demand without unemployment. This section 
thus presents the macroeconomic and sectoral results from the model after equation 65 
was adjusted to assume that a level of unemployment exists in the economy. To maintain 
equilibrium in the labour market under this specification, wage is held fixed in the model.  
 
Figures 5.2-5.4 presents the graphical representation of the comparison between results of 
macroeconomic aggregates under the full employment assumption and the 
unemployment assumption. It reflects the extent to which unemployment may influence 
macroeconomic results. It is evident from the figures that the effect of the shock, 
especially in terms of direction is the same with the full employment assumption. 
However, the two scenarios differ in magnitude, though slightly, except for total 
investment. This deviation in total investment could be attributed to the change observed 
in government savings as compared to the case of full employment where it was slightly 
higher. Overall, from the three figures, the impact of subsidy removal on macroeconomic 
variables under the three scenarios was less in the unemployment assumption compared 
to the full employment assumption.    
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Figure 5.1: Macroeconomic Effects under Unemployment (SIM1)  
Source: Author‟s Computation using excel 
Note: SIM1+U indicates simulation one under the unemployment assumption 
 
 
 
Figure 5.2: Macroeconomic Effects under Unemployment (SIM2)  
Source: Author‟s Computation using excel 
Note: SIM2+U indicates simulation two under the unemployment assumption 
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Figure 5.3: Macroeconomic Effects under Unemployment (SIM3)  
Source: Author‟s Computation using excel 
Note: SIM3+U indicates simulation three under the unemployment assumption 
5.6 Diagnostic Tests and Sensitivity Analysis 
A number of diagnostic checks and sensitivity analysis were performed to ascertain the 
overall goodness of the model specification and confirm the robustness and reliability of 
the simulation results using different elasticity parameter values. The former is referred to 
as diagnostic checks while the latter is the sensitivity analysis component. The diagnostic 
test carried out involves the verification of the baseline simulation which confirms that 
the solution to the model in the absence of policy shocks, replicates the initial benchmark 
equilibrium statistics. One way this was done was to examine the magnitude of the 
infeasibility at the input point from the output (.lst) file. The results shows that the input 
point for all simulation exercises were infinitesimally small. This is presented in Table 
5.26. It suggests that the highest deviation of the simulation value from the benchmark 
initial equilibrium value is minimal and negligible, as close to zero as possible. In other 
words, it does not lead to the explosion or bloating of the simulation results. Also, it is 
expected that the various simulation scenarios are solved without any iteration. This was 
performed within the modeling framework, showing absence of any iteration beyond 
“After-scaling”. 
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Table 5.26: Diagnostic 1- Baseline Simulation Check 
Inter Phase Ninf. Infes. RGmax NSB StepInter MX OK 
0 0  1.7838834324E+07 (Input Point)     
    Pre-triangular equations:  461   
    Post-triangular equations:  140   
1 0  1.4260580680E-06 (After pre-processing)     
2 0  7.1501849851E-13 (After scaling)     
 Source: Author‟s Computation based on simulation results from GAMS 
 
The second diagnostic test that was performed relates to checking the Leon variable to 
confirm that the last market is in equilibrium which verifies that the Walras law is not 
violated. This is done by examining the “level” value of the variable both in the baseline 
scenario and under the various simulation procedures. The expectation is that the values 
are as close to zero as possible, that is infinitesimally small and this is confirmed from the 
Table 5.27. It shows that under the simulations and baseline column, the values are 
approximately zero.   
Table 5.27: Diagnostic 2- Leon Walras Check (VAR LEON) 
--------VAR LEON Excess Supply on the last Market 
       
 LOWER LEVEL LEVEL   UPPER 
  Baseline SIM1 SIM2 SIM3  
1 -INF -4.66E-10 -4.729E-7 -2.785E-8 3.6357E-7 +INF 
2 -INF -4.66E-10 1.3278E-6 4.622E-10 -1.683E-6 +INF 
3 -INF -6.99E-10 -1.191E-6 -1.343E-8 -4.113E-6 +INF 
4 -INF -4.65E-10 5.1532E-8 1.1584E-8 -7.655E-6 +INF 
5 -INF -6.99E-10 3.4562E-8 1.2219E-8 -1.343E-5 +INF 
 Source: Author‟s Computation based on simulation results from GAMS 
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The sensitivity analysis which is the other component of the robustness check for the 
model employed for the study, involves running the model with varying Constant 
Elasticity of Substitution values and confirming that they are not significantly different 
from the earlier results obtained. This is performed systematically and results are 
consequently compared. A common procedure for carrying out this exercise is to double 
the parameter values, run the model; then reduce the values and then compare the 
different results to confirm if there is any significant deviation from the previous results 
obtained. The purpose of this procedure is to investigate how sensitive the results 
obtained from the model are, to large changes. The result of the sensitivity analysis 
conducted with simulation one (a partial removal) is presented in Figure 5.4. The results 
generally reflect minimal deviation from previous simulation after the Constant Elasticity 
of Substitution values were changed. This is particularly evident with the macroeconomic 
and emission aggregates. From the figure presented, all the variables did not show any 
significant deviation. The savings and investment variables that appeared to change as 
only changed slightly as the magnitude of deviation was very minimal and insignificant. 
It is important to point out that the CES value investigated concerns the values arbitrarily 
obtained from the literature and does not include those calibrated within the model. This 
includes labour and capital demand, imports and value added.  
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Figure 5.4: Sensitivity Analysis of Macroeconomic and Carbon emission Variables (average) 
Source: Author‟s Computation using excel 
 
 
5.7 Policy Implications   
           The results presented and discussed have some policy implications. They include: 
1. It was found that carbon emissions declined only in the first simulation where import 
tariff on refined oil were decreased by 50 percent and it was also the only simulation 
that recorded decline in key macroeconomic aggregates and welfare of households. 
This suggests that the drive to minimise emission levels through fuel subsidy removal 
comes with an additional cost of loss in economic value. This explains the trade-off 
between a fossil fuel driven growth (brown growth) and environmental sustainability 
(green growth). It reflect issues usually raised on driving sustainable development in 
developing economies as pointed out in UNEP and IEA (2001). Even though 
household‟s income fell, the fall was marginal. Given the fact that domestic demand 
fell with domestic supply, a local content strategy might be able to generate a more 
rewarding outcome. This local content strategy entails developing the local refineries 
to increase the percentage of domestic production of petroleum. Thus, rather than 
allocating fund towards subsidising petrol, these financial resources can be redirected 
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towards further development of the petroleum sector. The savings from the subsidy 
when targeted on the development of the capacity of the refineries can increase 
domestic supply which will minimise dependence on import of refined oil. This is 
especially as a significant proportion of the fuel consumed locally is imported and 
only a small percentage is produced by the local refineries.   
 
2. Also, given that government savings, income and total investment increased the 
greatest when fuel subsidy was gradually eliminated and when it was completely 
eliminated with increased emission; alternative mix of energy can be a viable policy 
option. Government can develop support programmes that enhance technology in 
production to minimise fossil emission from fuel consumption. Such can be the “fuel 
blending” technology used in the Southern African region (Mukonza, 2015) which 
can be enhanced and adapted to the Nigerian context. This “fuel blending” 
technology involves developing an energy type that minimises the composition of 
fossil fuel. A variant of this can be developed for Nigeria. In Zimbabwe for example, 
there are fuel blending of ethanol15 which implies that the fuel is made up of 85 
percent petrol and 15 percent ethanol (a more environmentally friendly energy) and 
by this, carbon emission from the consumption of the fuel is minimal as the fossil fuel 
content is reduced. Even though the study of Mukonza (2015) noted that there are 
implementation challenges for the case of Zimbabwe; however, with appropriate 
policy design, these challenges can be navigated with time. The “green petrol” idea as 
documented in Ibikunle (2006) could have been a viable substitute to gasoline as it 
will reduce the volume of emissions from the petrol.       
 
 
 
5.8 Concluding Remarks 
This chapter has presented and discussed the results obtained from the simulation 
exercise of a partial, gradual and complete removal of import tariff on imported refined 
oil in Nigeria. This process has helped to shed light on the economic, social and 
environmental implications of the policy shift on different sectors of the economy. It 
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presents how the various sectors response to attempt to remove the fuel subsidy policy 
under varying simulation procedures. Generally, the results obtained produced a mixed 
picture which further reinforced the trade-off often associated with achieving a 
sustainable development especially for developing countries such as Nigeria. This 
implies that any attempt to cut down emission levels such as the removal of subsidy 
results to lower productivity, output and a decline in household welfare while enhancing 
economic prosperity will come at a cost of increased emission. The results also showed 
that removing subsidies on petrol may not be sufficient to ensure lower carbon emissions, 
especially given that there is no cleaner alternative to fossil fuel based petrol to power 
vehicles. Thus, even if removal of fuel subsidy reduces emission initially through price 
increases, it may rise in future years since there is no better alternative to switch to. 
Though the results are slight deviation from other empirical studies but its arguments are 
similar to that of Allaire and Brown (2012) and Ballali (2012). The latter argued that 
degree of changes in response will depend on the cross price elasticities of the products. 
Finally, the results of the various diagnostic and sensitivity analysis performed were 
presented which indicated the robustness of the model specification of the study and 
reliability of the results therein obtained.   
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CHAPTER SIX 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
 
6.1 Summary 
           Recent years had witnessed renewed interest at ensuring environmental sustainability in 
driving higher levels of economic growth globally. One of the measures often advocated 
is adopting green growth strategies as against a brown growth. Nigeria as part of Africa‟s 
strategy on voluntary emission reduction had been making efforts at combating 
environmental challenges through different initiatives, especially given its commitment 
under the UNFCCC accord. This commitment which is a voluntary “non-bidding” one to 
reduce atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases, represents a global effort 
towards mitigating the impacts of climate change. This is despite the fact that the country 
contributes minimally to climate change but is most vulnerable to its impact. For 
example, the Clean Energy Initiatives by the Ministry of Environment is to ensure all 
sectors of the economy switch to cleaner sources of energy. The study, thus, investigates 
how effective the removal of subsidy on fuel can be a viable tool in achieving 
environmental quality. This was done by analysing the environmental consequences of 
fuel subsidy removal using an economy-wide modelling approach such as the dynamic 
CGE. It is based on the premise that cheap energy pricing policy such the fuel subsidy 
policy enhances inefficient consumption of energy among economic agents as supported 
by empirical literature. It used a modified energy-environment recursive dynamic CGE 
over a five-year period.  
 
           In the core analysis of this study, it was revealed from simulation experiments, that 
removing subsidy through increases in import tariff as a means of cutting down emission 
levels provides mixed results. In the three simulation scenarios, simulation 1 which 
involves a 50 percent increase in imports tariff on refined oil recorded the highest decline 
in carbon emissions for the economy and in sectoral analysis, even though it also 
recorded a decline in key macroeconomic variables. In the other two simulations 
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simulation 2 (gradual elimination) and simulation 3 (complete elimination), carbon 
emissions were found to increase even though sectoral output and other indicators of 
macroeconomic aggregates also increased. This is despite the fact that the increase in 
carbon emissions in the two simulations was marginal. It invariably points to the fact that 
removing subsidies on petroleum is not sufficient enough in reducing carbon emissions, it 
needs to be complemented with relevant policies that will result to environmental 
sustainability. Examples of such policies include adoption of green growth practices, 
further development and commercialisation of renewable energy options, technological 
advancement that will result to use of machineries that use less of fossil fuel, among 
others. In other words, the result showed that even though initially when subsidies are 
introduced and fuel price increases, individuals reduce their consumption of fuel, they 
however with time increase their energy consumption given that there are currently no 
alternatives to petroleum use in Nigeria. Thus, consumers will have no choice than to 
consume to satisfy their energy needs for their cars and to power their generators. This is 
evident from the observed trend in the result analysis where even though emissions 
declined in earlier years, they began to increase in the latter years.      
 
            Furthermore, this result support empirical evidence that policies to cut down emission 
levels often comes at a cost especially in driving the achievement of the green growth 
agenda. This result is supported by the works of Abraham (2013). It is especially the case 
for many developing countries due to weak institutional framework, insufficient 
financing and low technological development. This implies that attempts to reduce 
emissions generate low economic progress while increasing economic prospects drives 
up carbon emission levels. This is also as a result of the central role of the key energy 
input of fuel in production. The high carbon coefficients of some of the sectors, 
calculated from their energy expenditures as a ratio of their value added suggested that 
this category of fuel use is very significant and high in the production process, thus, given 
that it is a fossil fuel, its increased consumption will result to increased emission of 
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carbon which contributes to climate change impact. The issues analysed in this study are 
relevant to economic and environmental management in Nigeria.  
 
6.2 Recommendations  
           The major findings obtained from the simulation analysis of the study makes it necessary 
to point out a number of policy recommendations. They are presented below: 
 
1. In the first place, the complete or one shot removal of subsidy on refined fuel was 
found to be the most favourable for the Nigerian economy. This is given that this 
scenario produced the most favourable outlook for the performance of 
macroeconomic aggregates, and thus, measure of economic prosperity.  
 
2. Secondly, complimentary policies can be useful in tackling the observed trade-off 
relationship between economic prosperity and environmental sustainability. It was 
evident from the results that at earlier years, carbon emissions declined as 
consumption of fossil fuel fell. However, carbon emission levels increased at later 
years due to the fact that there was no alternative to petrol and since people must meet 
their energy demands, they simply re-adjust their budget spending to accommodate 
the increase in price. These complimentary policies will enhance and support 
innovation that will bring about the emergence of better energy efficiency model. 
 
3. Thirdly, a switch from a fossil-based production process to cleaner alternatives is also 
recommended. Through the appropriate application and adoption of relevant 
technology, clean alternatives to fossil-fuel can be developed through the local 
content framework. This will ensure the creation of alternative energy mix that will 
be more sustainable that fossil fuel. For example, a variation of the Southern Africa 
“fuel blending” can be implemented for Nigeria. When adequate finance is provided, 
entrepreneurial start-up companies can develop and commercialise a different 
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component of ethanol blend. This will be composed of a certain percentage of fuel 
and ethanol where the latter is more environmentally friendly.   
 
4. Finally, it is recommended that subsidies within the energy sector should be focused 
on supporting the commercialization of cleaner alternatives to energy rather than 
subsidise fossil-fuel based energy. In other words, subsidies to be encouraged by 
policy-makers should be environmentally friendly subsidies as against 
environmentally harmful subsidies.     
 
 
6.3 Contributions to Knowledge 
            This study made some contributions to knowledge and are presented as follow: 
1. This study developed a novel energy-environment CGE model that specifically 
accounted for the impact of petroleum subsidy on carbon emissions (measure of 
environmental quality). It modified the E2 energy-environment model by Adenikinju 
et al. (2012) which focused on the economy wide impact of the introduction of 
energy tax on carbon emissions, to incorporate subsidy on petrol. The model by the 
present study was able to model the environmental consequences of removing fuel 
subsidy for Nigeria and assess the extent to which the policy can be useful in driving 
a low-carbon growth strategy.   
 
2. The study also contributes to the field of energy and environmental economics by 
establishing a policy framework that showed that removing subsidies on petroleum 
was not sufficient in ensuring the reduction of carbon emissions, but must rather be 
supported with complementary policies. This was evident from the fact that a gradual 
and one shot removal did not lead to a fall in emissions. It goes to show that if 
necessary policies such as encouragement of green growth practices and 
technological advancements of renewable energy are not introduced, increase in 
energy prices due to subsidy removal will only temporarily reduce emissions. This is 
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because once consumers are unable to access alternatives to fossil fuel, they will in 
time increase consumption to satisfy their energy demands. In doing this, they will 
adjust their energy expenditures upwards. 
 
3. It further contributed to knowledge by providing empirical facts on the inter 
relationship between fuel subsidy removal and environmental quality in Nigeria. It 
specifically showed an innovative way to economic investigation of environmental 
sustainability in Nigeria. This was done by addressing issues relevant to economic 
and environmental management in Nigeria through the help of the Computable 
General Equilibrium model.   
  
6.4 Suggestions for Further Studies 
           The study has a number of opportunities for other studies to further advance the frontier of 
knowledge in the field of energy and environmental policy as well as dynamic CGE 
modelling. In the first place, it will be useful for further studies in the area of the study of 
the interaction of the energy sector through energy policy, with the environment to adopt 
an updated SAM that includes energy and carbon emission data. It would be appropriate 
to divert necessary resources, effort and time towards simulation with more recent 
database such as the 2010 SAM been currently developed that can also incorporate the 
financial sector and reflect the role of financing for the achievement of the green growth 
agenda. This will help to ensure output of more result in the analysis of the impact of 
energy policy shift on key variables in the economy. 
 
In the same vein, further studies can incorporate micro-simulation in modeling fuel 
subsidy policy impact especially at the household level as primary data for micro analysis 
can be useful for analytical purposes. For example, primary data could be used to gather 
information on energy consumption from generators and the level of emission at that 
level, be incorporated into the energy-economy-environment CGE model. This, together 
with further aggregation of the different sectors and commodities will be most useful in 
explaining industry-household linkages and the transmission mechanism as embedded. 
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Finally, the various elasticity parameters often used in the energy-economy-environment 
for the Nigerian economy model can be econometrically determined through further 
studies and research as against the arbitrary selection obtained. Parameters relating to 
elasticity of capital demand, labour demand, value added, among others, can be 
determined by conducting econometric analysis of them and thus obtaining more robust 
and reliable estimates.  
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APPENDICES 
Appendix One: The Re-aggregated Nigerian SAM (In Millions of Naira) 
Re-aggregated 2006 Nigerian SAM (Left Panel) 
  L K K AG AG AG AG AG AG AG AG 
  LAB CAP Land HR HU Firm Gvt. TD TM TI ROW 
L LAB            
K CAP            
K Land            
AG HR 3317904  2190043   119371     661776 
AG HU 5781750     2513105 171781    697465 
AG Firm  4865843          
AG Gvt.  2760884      23587
71 
6584 51599 206333 
AG TD     125405 233366      
AG TM            
AG TI            
AG ROW  992105          
J agr            
J mfc            
J pet            
J roil            
J util            
J rtrans            
J ser            
J adm            
I food    3619134 2380589       
I agr    445327 399238       
I mfc    1477186 1851278       
I pet            
I roil    39478 78832       
I util    162228 265229        
I rtrans    74670 124775       
I ser    412143 1457901  607729     
I adm       310896     
X food           5380 
X agr           28857 
X mfc           87889 
X pet           7359051 
X rtrans           152278 
X ser           203213 
OTH INV    58928 2480851  1700047    -3263718 
OTH VSTK            
OTH TOT 9099655 8618833 2190043 6289097 9164102 4865843 5588517 23587
71 
6584 51599 6138528 
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Re-aggregated 2006 Nigerian SAM (in Millions of Naira Right Panel) 
  J J J J J  J J J I I I 
  agr mfc pet roil util rtrans ser adm food agr mfc 
L LAB 3511888 720967 20867 689 357092 272684 3300582 914883    
K CAP 211717 594620 6866714 57467 267485 173821 446000 1005    
K Land 2190043           
AG HR            
AG HU            
AG Firm            
AG Gvt. 7545 11526 12418 3283 18760 9009 82544     
AG TD            
AG TM         1818
30 
2066
3 
3364
6 
AG TI         4980 4661
9 
 
AG ROW         2214
65 
2536
29 
2692
373 
J agr         5359
290 
1100
374 
 
J mfc           2481
012 
J pet            
J roil            
J util            
J rtrans            
J ser            
J adm            
I food 92086 54632     15193     
I agr 14800 653718    825 9536     
I mfc 190730 181150 288987 35435 25244 133162 389882 284275    
I pet  46640 2113 13910 30488 3993 22432     
I roil 2281 34497 76085 12275 56850 137984 225460 208602    
I util 9073 1826 1275 12593 2927 1342 158000 180252    
I rtrans 10093 32259 165327 7402 3822 3640 190665 432418    
I ser 253643 237060 53079 6988 32077 24504 538501 108752
2 
3940
68 
1181
69 
1602
83 
I adm            
X food            
X agr            
X mfc            
X pet            
X rtrans            
X ser            
OTH INV            
OTH VSTK            
OTH TOT 6493903 256890
1 
7486869 27523
6 
794749 760969 53788 310896 6161
635 
1539
456 
5367
315 
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Re-aggregated 2006 Nigerian SAM (in Millions of Naira Right Panel contd.) 
  I I I I I I X X X X X X OTH OTH OTH 
  pet roil util rtrans ser adm food agr mfc pet rtran ser INV VSTK TOT 
L LAB               9099655 
K CAP               8618833 
K Land               2190043 
AG HR               6289097 
AG HU               9164102 
AG Firm               4865843 
AG Gvt.               5588517 
AG TD               2358771 
AG TM 9059 -179359             65840 
AG TI               51599 
AG ROW 103349 784233  43638
4 
6549
86 
         6138528 
J agr       538 288
57 
      6493903 
J mfc         878
89 
     2568901 
J pet 127817         735
905 
    7486869 
J roil  275236             275236 
J util   7947
49 
           794749 
J rtrans    60869       1522
78 
   760969 
J ser     5175
587 
      203
213 
  53788 
J adm      310
896 
        310896 
I food               6161635 
I agr             1600
9 
 1539456 
I mfc             5099 1.00 5367315 
I pet               244769 
I roil             7849  880199 
I util               794749 
I rtrans               1045075 
I ser 4542 89   6771        4422  6507728 
I adm               310896 
X food               538 
X agr               28857 
X mfc               87889 
X pet               735905 
X rtrans               152278 
X ser               203213 
OTH INV               976108 
OTH VSTK              1.00 1.00 
OTH TOT 244769 880199 7947
49 
10450
75 
6507
728 
310
896 
538 288
57 
878
89 
735
905 
1522
78 
203
213 
9761
08 
1.00  
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Appendix Two: Description of the Model 
SETS 
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MODEL EQUATIONS 
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Income and Savings Block 
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Demand Block 
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Producer Supplies and International Trade Block 
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Price Block 
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Price indexes 
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Dynamic Equations Block 
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This carbon emission component is adapted from Adenikinju et al (2012). 
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Description of Variables and Parameters (Legend) 
Volume Variables 
       Value added of industry j 
       Total intermediate consumption of industry j 
        Total aggregate output of industry j 
         Demand for type l labor by industry j 
        Industry j demand for composite labor 
        Demand for type k capital by industry j 
       Industry j demand for composite capital 
        Intermediate demand for commodity i by business j 
      Total income of type h households 
        capital income of type h households 
       Labor income of type h households 
        Transfer income of type h households 
       Disposable income of type h households 
      Total income of type f businesses 
        Capital income of type f businesses 
         Transfer income of type f businesses 
        Disposable income of type f businesses 
     Total government income 
      Government capital income 
       Government transfer income 
       Total government revenue from business income taxes 
       Total government revenue from household income taxes 
        Government revenue from indirect taxes on product i 
        Total government receipts of indirect taxes on commodities 
        Government revenue from import duties on product m 
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       Total government revenue from imports duties 
        Government revenue from taxes on industry j production (excluding taxes directly 
related to the use of capital and labor) 
         Total government revenue from taxes on products and imports 
       Total government revenue from production taxes (excluding taxes directly related to the 
use of capital and labour. 
            Transfers from agent agj to agent ag 
        Consumption of commodity i by type h households 
      
     Minimum consumption of commodity i by type h households 
       Public consumption of commodity i (volume) 
        Total intermediate demand for commodity i 
       Purchaser price of composite commodity i (including all taxes and margins) 
         Industry j demand for good i 
         Industry j production of commodity i 
         Supply of commodity i by sector j to the domestic market 
       World demand for exports of product x 
   
     Total private investment expenditure 
   
     Total public investment expenditure 
      
     Final demand of commodity i for private investment purposes 
      
     Final demand of commodity i for public investment purposes 
      Supply of type k capital 
      Supply of type l labor 
     Total Investment Expenditure 
      Gross Domestic Product 
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Price Variables 
    Exchange rate: price of foreign currency in terms of local currency 
        Basic price of industry j‟s production of commodity i 
       Purchaser price of composite commodity i (including all taxes and margins) 
        Intermediate consumption price index of industry j 
       Price of local product i sold on the domestic market (including all taxes and margins) 
       Price received for exported commodity x (excluding export taxes) 
         Consumer price index 
         GDP deflator 
         Investment price index 
       Price of local product i (excluding all taxes on products) 
       Price of imported product m (including all taxes and tariffs) 
        Industry j unit cost, including taxes directly related to the use of capital and labor, but 
excluding other taxes on production 
        Price of industry j value added (including taxes on production directly related to the use 
of capital and labor) 
        World price of imported product m (expressed in foreign currency) 
       World price of exported product x (expressed in foreign currency) 
        Rental rate of type k capital in industry j 
      Wage rate of type l labor 
 
Nominal (Value) Variables  
      Current account balance 
    Current government expenditure on goods and services 
    
    GDP at basic prices 
    
    GDP at market price 
       Gross fixed capital formation 
       Savings of type f business 
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       Savings of type h households 
     Government savings 
       Rest-of-the-world savings 
       Rest-of-the-world income 
 
Parameters 
:jio Coefficient (Leontief-intermediate consumption) 
:j Coefficient (Leontief-value added) 
:, jiaij Input-output coefficient 
:KDjB Scale parameter (CES-composite capital) 
:LDjB Scale parameter (CES-composite labour) 
:MmB Scale parameter (CES-composite commodity) 
:VAjB Scale parameter (CES-value added) 
:,
X
xjB Scale parameter (CET-exports and local sales) 
:XTjB Scale parameter (CET-total output) 
:,
KD
jk Share parameter (CES-composite capital) 
:,
LD
jl Share parameter (CES-composite labor) 
:Mm Share parameter (CES-composite commodity) 
:VAj Share parameter (CES-value added) 
:,
X
xj Share parameter (CET-exports and local sales) 
:,
XT
ij Share parameter (CET-total output) 
:, jk Depreciation rate of capital k used in industry j 
: Price elasticity of indexed transfers and parameters 
:GVTi Share of commodity i in total current public expenditures on goods and services 
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:INVPRIi Share of commodity i in total private investment expenditure 
:INVPUBi Share of commodity i in total public investment expenditure 
:LESi Marginal share of commodity i in type h household consumption budget 
:,
RK
kag Share of type k capital income received by agent ag 
:,
TR
agjag Share parameter (transfer functions) 
:,
WL
lh Share of type l labor income received by type h households 
:t Population growth rate 
:, jk Scale parameter (allocation of investment to industries) 
:tpop Population index 
:KDj Elasticity parameter (CES-composite capital); 
KD
j1  
:LDj Elasticity parameter (CES-composite labor); 
LD
j1  
:Mm Elasticity parameter (CES-composite commodity); 
M
m1  
:VAj Elasticity parameter (CES-value added); 
VA
j1  
:,
X
xj Elasticity parameter (CET-exports and local sales); 
X
xj ,1   
:XTj Elasticity parameter (CET-total output); 
XT
j1  
:,
INV
jk Elasticity (allocation of investment to industries) 
:KDj Elasticity of substitution (CES-composite capital); 
KD
j0  
:LDj Elasticity of substitution (CES-composite labor); 
LD
j0  
:Mm Elasticity of substitution (CES-composite commodity); 
M
m0  
:VAj Elasticity of transformation (CES-value added); 
VA
j0  
:,
X
xj Elasticity of transformation (CET-exports and local sales); 
X
xj ,0   
:XDx Price-elasticity of the world demand for exports of product x 
:XTj Elasticity of transformation (CET-total output); 
XT
j0  
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:0 ,thsh Intercept (type h household savings) 
:1hsh Slope (type h household savings) 
:,ijitmrg Rate of margin i applied to commodity ij 
       
   Rate of margin i applied to exported commodity x 
        Intercept (income taxes of type f business) 
:1 fttdf Marginal income tax rate of type f businesses 
        Intercept (income taxes of type h households) 
:1httdh Marginal income tax rate of type h households 
         Tax rate of commodity i 
         Rate of taxes and duties on imports of commodity m 
         Tax rate on the production of industry j 
 
Carbon Emission Variables 
       : Total carbon emission; 
     
̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  : Carbon emission limit; 
   : Total energy type use by sector;   
   : Carbon emission coefficient per unit of energy type use by sector; 
 
